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Abstract 
 
Sri Lanka is a relatively small sized island economy possessing significant resource and 
location advantages and demonstrating impressive human capital indicators, which only 
few countries are fortunate to have. At the same time, the country is recovering from 
nearly three decades of civil war, which ended in 2009. However, Sri Lanka has 
performed poorly in terms of attracting FDI.  
 
Research in FDI in the context of Sri Lanka is limited. Only a handful of studies 
(Wijeweera & Mounter, 2008; Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004; Athukorala, 2003; 
Athukorala, 1995) have looked at FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. To fill the research 
gap, this thesis attempts to formulate systematic and in-depth studies of FDI in Sri Lanka, 
investigating the determinants, impact and policy issues. First, efforts are made to provide 
an analytical piece that set out the environmental context of Sri Lanka before providing 
details focusing on FDI. This is followed by three empirical chapters on the determinants 
and impact of FDI in Sri Lanka. With regard to determinants of FDI, special attention is 
given to civil war, human capital and stock market price level. For the impact, the focus is 
on the impact of FDI on productivity. 
 
Civil war is a major source of political instability and is likely to discourage FDI. Based 
on the nearly three decades of civil war in Sri Lanka during the period of 1983-2009, the 
first empirical study demonstrates that presence of war can have a negative effect on 
incoming FDI. Though this is unsurprising, this study demonstrates different levels of 
impact of war on FDI in manufacturing and services. The negative effects are much 
higher in manufacturing than in services. Investigating the impact of war by market-
orientation of manufacturing FDI, this study further finds that there is a higher negative 
impact on FDI in export intensive manufacturing than in market-seeking manufacturing. 
 
Human capital is often considered to be a determining factor for FDI. Recent studies also 
emphasise the importance of stock market in attracting FDI. Given Sri Lanka‘s 
impressive human capital indicators and recent development of stock market, the second 
research study explores these two determinants by conducting a panel study based on 
annual FDI inflows to a sample of countries in Asia. It shows that the relationship 
between human capital and FDI flows was significantly negative for Sri Lanka while, in 
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general, human capital has been a positive determinant of FDI flows to the rest of the 
countries in the sample. Further analysis shows that Sri Lanka is constrained to capitalise 
on its human capital due to linguistic limitations of human capital and qualitative 
weaknesses in the education system. Although the importance of human capital in 
attracting FDI is widely recognised in the theoretical consideration, empirical evidence is 
inconclusive, particularly for developing countries. In this context, findings of this study 
highlight the importance of recognising country specific limitations in human capital in 
understanding the relationship between human capital and FDI. This study also revealed a 
significant negative relationship between host country stock market valuations and 
FDI in the context of Sri Lanka and other countries with under-developed stock 
markets. These results indicate that cheap assets hypothesis (and expensive assets 
hypothesis) is likely to be applicable in the context of countries with under-developed 
stock markets, and therefore, in the context of Sri Lanka.   
Based on the firm level data for Sri Lanka, the third empirical study revealed that foreign 
firms are quite distinctive from local firms. Compared to domestic firms, foreign firms are 
larger, more productive and more profitable. Foreign firms also tend to hire high 
proportion of skilled workers, pay higher wages and undertake more in-house training 
programmes. They are more active in R&D and more innovative.  They are more export 
oriented but rely more on inputs of foreign origin. A cross sectional econometric study 
estimating direct and indirect effects of FDI on firm level labour productivity indicated a 
positive own firm effects of FDI and negative spillover effects of foreign firms on local 
firms and other foreign firms in the same sector.  
In summary, Sri Lanka‗s economy is characterised by a lower level of industrialisation 
and is narrowly concentrated in a few sectors with little participation in technical 
intensive sectors. Foreign firms, through their distinctive characteristics identified in this 
thesis, are likely to bring in much needed expertise and skills that could help to overcome 
these structural deficiencies. However, Sri Lanka‘s mediocre performance in attracting 
FDI, poor performance in attracting FDI into technology intensive sectors, and absence of 
positive spillovers from foreign firms to local firms may all have resulted in poor 
performance of local firms in terms of upgrading their firm specific capabilities. The goal 
of the national FDI policies are twofold. First a country should attract the right type of 
FDI. Second, the country should devise appropriate policies to extract benefits from it. It 
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appears that Sri Lanka has performed poorly in both of these aspects, and this has in turn, 
deprived the country the much needed skills and technologies, and decelerated the 
development of the country. End of the civil war has given renewed hopes for Sri Lanka. 
Sri Lanka‘s impressive human capital indicators appear as a key strength. However, due 
to issues with quality of education and linguistic limitations of human capital, the extent 
to which Sri Lanka can exploit its impressive human capital indicators to lure FDI is 
rather limited. Weak institutional environment, poorly managed exchange rate policy and 
poor infrastructure appear to be major issues in terms of boosting future FDI inflows to 
Sri Lanka. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
When Sri Lanka gained political independence from Britain in 1948, the country had the 
third highest per capita income in Asia, after Japan and Malaysia (Rajapatirana, 1988). 
Post-independent Sri Lanka was widely considered as a country with excellent prospects 
for economic development and was regarded as one of Asia‘s most promising new 
nations (Snodgrass, 1998; Kelegama, 2000). Until 1965, Sri Lanka's economic 
performance was still well above that of today's dynamic economies of East Asia, 
including South Korea, China and Thailand (UNCTAD, 2004). However, since then the 
country has lagged behind. It has encountered severe economic and political 
complications and ended up with a reputation for weak economic growth indicators but 
strong human development indicators (Snodgrass, 1998). One of the noticeable political 
events is the nearly three-decades of civil war which ended in 2009. This has brought new 
hope to the country‘s development.  
Sri Lanka has great potential to become an international business hub. It possesses rich 
natural resources and offers an abundant supply of highly trainable workers (Pradhan, 
2001). As it will be shown in details in chapters 3 and 4, Sri Lanka‘s adult literacy rate of 
92 per cent is the highest in South Asia, higher than Malaysia‘s and comparable to that in 
Vietnam
1 
(UNCTAD, 2004). Sri Lanka‘s geographical location in the Indian Ocean, 
intersecting with the major shipping routes connecting South Asia, Far East and the 
Pacific with Europe and the Americas, provides the country a strategic advantage in terms 
of facilitating international logistics. Furthermore, the rapid growth of neighbouring 
countries including India and China could create ample opportunities for Sri Lanka. It is 
worthy of note that International Finance Corporation has categorised Sri Lanka as a 
frontier market - a country that is less developed but has immense untapped potential for 
growth (Religare Enterprise Limited, 2011).  
Despite these conditions, Sri Lanka has not performed well in attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI). It is generally recognised that FDI provides host developing countries 
with much needed technologies and management skills in additional to financial capital, 
therefore is an important source of economic growth and development (Moran, 2005; 
                                                 
1
 Both Malaysia and Vietnam are popular destinations of foreign investors. 
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United Nations, 1992). For example, FDI has played a key role in the growth of most of 
the East Asian economies (Hsiao & Hsiao, 2006; Zhang, 2001; Akyuz & Chang, 1998; 
The World Bank, 1993). Not being able to attract FDI could deprive a country the much 
needed skills and technologies, and decelerated the development of the country. As will 
be shown in chapter 4, Sri Lanka‘s FDI inflow record has been patchy and biased. Even 
though in some years FDI in Sri Lanka has increased sharply (see Figure 1-1), these 
increases were the results of one-off privatisations (UNCTAD, 2004). Moreover, most of 
the FDI in Sri Lanka is narrowly concentrated in few sectors; for example, the 
communications industry has absorbed over 50 per cent of services FDI, and textiles and 
garments related sector has absorbed about one third of manufacturing FDI.   
Figure 1-1: FDI inflows to Sri Lanka (from 1990 to 2011) 
 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2012) 
The main purpose of this thesis is to provide systematic and rigorous research in to FDI in 
Sri Lanka, more specifically, to identify the determinants and impact of FDI. This is an 
interesting and valuable exercise as to date, there are only a handful of studies, i.e. 
Wijeweera and Mounter (2008), Athukorala and Jayasuriya (2004) and Athukorala (2003) 
and Athukorala (1995) that have looked at FDI in Sri Lanka. More research in this area is 
needed to aid a better understanding of the important issues of FDI in Sri Lanka and 
inform policy making. The inadequate policy framework may be one reason for Sri Lanka 
failing to attract much FDI.   
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1.2 Motivation for the Study 
 
Sri Lanka possesses significant resource and location advantages and impressive human 
capital indicators, which only few countries are fortunate to have. Despite having these, 
Sri Lanka has performed poorly in terms of attracting FDI. This puzzle motivated me to 
study FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. What are the determinants of FDI in Sri Lanka? 
What is the impact of FDI in Sri Lanka? 
Since independence, Sri Lanka has suffered from a long drawn out internecine conflict 
between the two main ethnic communities in Sri Lanka, Tamils and the Singhalese. It has 
long speculated that this is the main variable responsible for the country‘s weak 
performance as FDI recipient. However, to date there is little systematic econometric 
work being conducted on the link between war and FDI. Sri Lanka as a case study 
provides an excellent opportunity to analyse the implications of war on FDI inflows 
because Sri Lanka has undergone varying degrees of conflict intensity over time, 
consisting of periods with war, without war, and with ceasefire arrangements. War is 
likely to not only be a major impediment to FDI inflows, but also the conflagration could 
have resulted in the divestment of their investment by a number of firms. For instance, as 
per the list of current FDI projects in 2011 (Board of Investment Sri Lanka, 2011), it was 
noted that out of the top 20 FDIs in 2002 (UNCTAD, 2004), seven have subsequently 
been divested during the period from 2002 to 2010. This rate of divestments is very 
alarming. It is said that war devastated countries bounce back to high levels of growth and 
development rapidly, often referred in the literature as the Phoenix effect (Murdoch & 
Sandler, 2002). This is supposed to have occurred in Germany soon after the Second 
World War and in Vietnam in recent years. Is this likely to happen in Sri Lanka that has 
recently emerged from a long drawn out internal conflict? If so, what role can FDI play in 
the process? Answering these questions could not only help Sri Lanka in proper policy 
making but also benefit the broad literature on the effects of war on FDI. 
Another important FDI determinant is human capital. This is widely recognised in the 
literature, however existing empirical evidence is inconclusive, particularly for 
developing countries. Many studies have found little or no effect of human capital on FDI 
flows (Hanson, 1996; Root & Ahmed, 1979; Schneider & Frey, 1985; Kinoshita & 
Campos, 2004; Nunnenkamp & Spatz, 2002; Cheng & Kwan, 2000; Jinyoung & Jungsoo, 
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2012). Given this context, Sri Lanka with impressive human capital indicators but poor 
performance in attracting FDI provides a valuable context to analyse the country specific 
limitations that can affect the relationship between human capital and FDI. Sri Lanka is 
widely known for its high rating in human capital index in terms of literacy rate and 
schooling rates (The World Bank, 2011). Available evidence shows that the Sri Lanka‘s 
Gini coefficient of education is low while its population enjoys relatively long years of 
education (Thomas et al., 2000). However, Sri Lankan economic performance, and 
performance in FDI inflows in particular, are far behind that of East Asian countries, 
which have similar educational achievements (Ganegodage & Rambaldi, 2011; 
UNCTAD, 2004). This raises questions about the quality of education in Sri Lanka. It can 
be the case that whilst the country enjoys widespread literacy it does not possess a pocket 
of skilled labour or a rich endowment of human capital. This fact could also have 
implications for the utilisation of FDI in the development process. Is it likely that a low 
GINI on education, though most admirable from a social and politico economic point of 
view, might not be attractive to MNCs. They may seek highly educated skilled labour as 
Sri Lanka is a largely service based economy. Whilst FDI may promote growth, it may 
not promote development because low GINI on education without a segment of highly 
skilled labour would not necessarily assist in promoting technology and know-how and 
activities associated with technology. Therefore, it will be informative to understand how 
this widespread literacy and secondary education levels affect the attractiveness of the 
country to MNCs and the impact of FDI. 
After the end of three decades of civil conflict in 2009, CSE went through a tremendous 
growth. While the market was going through a growth of over 200% in the share price 
index and almost fivefold increase in the market PER, net foreign inflows to the stock 
market was negative and FDI inflows were unusually low. A possible explanation for 
these strange observations in net foreign inflows (portfolio and FDI) is that the foreign 
investors could be reluctant to invest and/or could be selling their stocks because the 
stocks are overpriced. Although the theoretical considerations suspect an inverse 
relationship between asset prices and FDI inflows, available empirical evidence does not 
support this supposition. However, previous empirical evidence is based on US based FDI 
data, which can limit the generalisability of these findings to other countries, in particular, 
to developing countries. Given this context, Sri Lanka‘s recent experience in stock market 
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and FDI inflows provides a window of opportunity to analyse the relationship between 
asset prices and FDI inflows. 
A relatively small sized island economy such as Sri Lanka, however, is compelled to be 
an export economy. The role of FDI in export economies has always been controversial; 
the issue is whether FDI would relegate these small economies to the role of peripheries 
supplying raw materials and plantation crops to the home countries with little 
interlinkages with the domestic economy. This view, however, may be out-dated as most 
small-island economies are diversifying to the extent possible and seeking FDI to aid such 
diversification. Singapore, Hong Kong and to a lesser extent Mauritius provide examples 
of small economies that have successfully utilized FDI in the development process. 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand what benefits FDI can bring in to Sri Lanka. 
Extant literature on the impact of FDI remains inconclusive, particularly for the case of 
FDI spillovers and it is widely believed that different methodologies and different country 
contexts contribute to these inconsistencies in empirical findings. Due to these reasons, it 
would be informative to investigate the impact of FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. 
It is widely recognised that FDI determinants relevant for developing countries are 
considerably different from that relevant to developed countries. Also, factors that 
encourage and discourage FDI can vary with different country settings, and therefore, 
country specific studies are warranted for each country to identify its own FDI 
determinants. Furthermore, Sri Lanka differs considerably from the norm by having high 
development indicators, particularly in human development, while having low growth 
indicators. This fact, along with other distinguishing features discussed in this chapter, 
has given Sri Lanka a character of its own, which would further merit a separate study.  
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1.3 Chapter Framework 
This thesis comprises eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the reader to the theme 
and context of the research study and gives an overview of the main research topic. 
Chapter starts with an initial introduction to the research topic, then details what 
motivated the writer to embark on this research study and concludes with providing a 
concise chapter framework for the thesis.  
Chapter two presents the literature review relevant to this study. It starts with a review of 
theories and hypotheses in FDI and proceeds with literature review on determinants of 
FDI. Chapter then continues with a literature review on impact of FDI, while focusing on 
the impact of FDI on firm level productivity.  
Chapter three provides a context analysis of the economy and the internal environment of 
Sri Lanka while giving  special attention to recognise salient features of Sri Lanka and its 
internal environment that are relevant for FDI. 
Chapter four provide a context analysis of FDI and related aspects of FDI in the context 
of Sri Lanka. Chapter starts with an overview of current status of FDI and then explore 
the dimensions of FDI in terms of distribution by sector and origin. Thereafter, 
opportunities that Sri Lanka can offer to potential foreign investors are investigated. 
Chapter ends with a preliminary overview of factors that can influence FDI flows to Sri 
Lanka.  
Chapter five presents two econometric studies conducted to determine the effect of the 
civil war on FDI inflows to Sri Lanka, by employing time series and panel data 
econometric analysis. These econometric studies investigate the degrees of impact of war 
on FDI, as a whole, FDI in manufacturing and FDI in services, and manufacturing FDI by 
market-orientation. 
Chapter six presents an empirical study conducted to examine the determinants of FDI. 
Study employs a panel study based on annual FDI inflows to a selected group of 
countries, one of which is Sri Lanka. This chapter focus on the role of human capital and 
stock market price level in the host country as determinants of FDI inflows.   
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Chapter seven presents an empirical study conducted to examine the impact of FDI on 
firm level productivity in the context of Sri Lanka. This study examines the direct effects 
(own firm effects of foreign owned firms) and spillover effects (effects of foreign owned 
firms on other firms) of FDI on firm level labour productivity. 
Final chapter provides a conclusion for this thesis by summarising key empirical findings 
and highlighting key contributions of this research study.  This chapter also emphasise 
policy implications of the research findings and discuss the limitations of this study and 
finally suggest potential research topics that could extend this study further. 
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is one of the main forms of international equity flows, in 
addition to foreign portfolio investment (FPI). FDI can be defined as cross border 
investment made by a company with the intention of exerting a considerable degree of 
influence on the operations of the enterprise outside of the home country (Benito, 1997). 
One important feature of FDI therefore is to exercise management control; while on the 
contrary, investors of FPI gain equity but without management control (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008). FDI involves a transfer of package of resources including knowledge, 
information, know-how and other intangible assets. On the other hand, FPI involves only 
a transfer of finance capital. FDI therefore is considered more efficient and less volatile 
relative to FPI (Mata & Portugal, 1999; Goldstein & Razin, 2006). For classification 
purposes, foreign investments made by a firm with a stake of 10% or more in a foreign 
firm are often considered as FDI (World Trade Organisation, 1996; The World Bank, 
2011). 
 
FDI is one of the three common alternatives for exploiting long term profit opportunities 
in a foreign market. The other two are exporting and licensing. Exporting involves 
producing goods at home and then shipping them to foreign markets. Licensing involves 
granting a firm (the licensee) the right to produce and sell the firm‘s products in return for 
a royalty fee (Hill, 2011). Compared to exporting and licensing entry modes, FDI is 
considered more expensive
2
 and risky
3
 (Hill, 2011).  
 
Various FDI theories have been developed to differentiate FDI and FPI and answer the 
question why firms favour FDI over the alternative entry mode of exporting and 
licensing. Books by Caves (2007), Dunning and Lundan (2008) and Forsgren (2008) have 
all provided comprehensive synthesis and evaluation of the existing theories on FDI and 
its agent, multinational enterprises (MNEs). Literature on FDI in general and FDI in 
developing countries in particular poses several issues of relevance to the analysis of FDI 
in an economy such as Sri Lanka. It is not the intention of this thesis to cover all grounds. 
                                                 
2
 Firm undertaking FDI must bear the costs of establishing or acquiring foreign ventures. 
3
 Firms undertaking FDI face additional risk because of problems associated with conducting business in 
foreign territories. 
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The objective here is to focus on the review of theoretical and empirical studies related to 
the empirical research in chapters 4-7. Section 2.2 presents a synopsis of mainstream 
theories and hypotheses on FDI that are relevant to this thesis. To organise ideas, I first 
provide the typology of FDI. This account helps place the ensuing discussion in context. 
FDI is not a homogenous phenomenon. Different types of FDI are attracted by different 
locational advantages of the host country (Mottaleb & Kalirajan, 2010; Athukorala, 
2009), as a result, have different impact on the host country (Deborah, 2013). In chapter 
4, I will investigate Sri Lanka‘s potential in attracting different types of FDI and in 
chapter 5, I will examine the effects of civil war on different types of FDI. It is therefore 
important to show in this literature review chapter the categorisation of FDI. This will be 
followed by a description of a few main theoretical strands: Differential Rate of Return 
Hypothesis, Portfolio Hypothesis, Output and Market Size Hypotheses, International 
Division of Labour Theory, Eclectic Paradigm and Investment Development Path Theory. 
These theories provide enlightening ideas for the study of the determinants and impact of 
FDI in Sri Lanka. The first four theories largely focus on one or a few individual factors 
of the host country, therefore, are complementary to each other. The Eclectic Paradigm, 
then, offers an envelope of these theories. It is the most commonly adopted analytical 
framework in the analysis of FDI issues. Before making concluding remarks, I will also 
discuss the Investment Development Path theory which helps with the understanding of 
the dynamic relationship between FDI and economic development of a country, a key 
issue for understanding the developmental implications of FDI in Sri Lanka. After 
establishing the context of typology and general theories, the following two sections focus 
on the review of empirical studies. Section 2.3 provides a literature review on various 
determinants of FDI and section 2.4 provides a literature review on various impact of 
FDI.  
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2.2. Theories and Hypotheses on FDI  
2.2.1 Typology of FDI  
Behrman typology of FDI identifies four objectives of FDI: Resource- Seeking, Market-
Seeking, Efficiency-Seeking, and Strategic Asset-Seeking (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
This typology is very useful for understanding the kinds of investments that MNCs 
undertake. 
The resource seekers invest abroad to acquire particular resources at a lower real cost than 
they are in their home country. These resources could either be physical resources; human 
resources; or tacit resources such as technological capabilities, management or marketing 
expertise, and organisational skills (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
Market seekers invest abroad to exploit or promote new markets or to sustain or protect 
existing markets. Main drivers that encourage firms to engage in market-seeking 
investments are market share and market growth of the target market (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008). Generally, market seekers invest in a particular location in the intention of 
supplying goods or services to the host country or to adjacent countries/regions. Apart 
from market share and market growth of the target market, Dunning & Lundan (2008) 
identified four additional motivations for market seeking activities. First, if the main 
suppliers or customers of a firm set up foreign facilities, then the firm might have to 
follow them overseas. Second, firms might have to establish their operations close to 
markets in order to adapt their products and services to local tastes or needs, to cultural 
attitudes and to indigenous resources and capabilities. Third motivation for locating 
operations close to markets is to minimise production and transaction costs; if products 
are relatively costly to transport and can be produced economically in small quantities 
then such products are more likely to be produced close to the market than products that 
are otherwise. Firms tend to undertake market-seeking investments in order to bypass 
transaction costs resulting from import restrictions such as, tariffs and import controls 
imposed by host governments. Finally, MNCs might undertake market-seeking 
investment to have a physical presence in the leading markets served by its competitors. 
This type of strategic market seeking investment might be undertaken for both defensive 
and aggressive reasons (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
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The motivation of efficiency seekers is to rationalize the structure of established resource-
based or market seeking FDI in order to achieve efficiencies through economies of scale 
and scope and economies of risk diversification (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Efficiency 
seekers also attempt to gain access to more efficient labour or technology in order to 
improve their efficiency (Blonigen, 2005). 
Strategic asset seekers undertake FDI to acquire or link into valuable assets, such as, 
physical assets, human competencies, and technological and organisational capabilities, in 
order to sustain or advance their international competitiveness (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). 
2.2.2 Differential Rate of Return Hypothesis 
The differential rate of return hypothesis is one of the earliest attempts to explain 
international capital flows, which is based on neoclassical theories of economics 
(Agarwal, 1980). This hypothesis attempts to explain international flows of capital in 
terms of the relative scarcity of capital in different countries and differences in rates of 
return among these countries. It assumes that investors will try to maximise their profits 
by investing where returns are highest, and therefore, capital would flow from countries 
that have low rates of return to countries that have high rates of return, equalising these 
rates of return. According to this hypothesis, FDI will occur as a result of MNCs trying to 
maximise their returns by exploiting differentials in marginal productivities of capital 
(MPK) in home and host countries; MNCs would arbitrage capital by using capital 
obtained from its home country to invest in other host countries.  
Differential rate of return hypothesis can be illustrated using the MacDougall diagram 
(Figure 2.1). Capital stocks of first and second country are represented by O1K1 and O2K1 
respectively. Prevailing interest rates, without any capital flows between the two 
countries, are r1 for the first country and r2 for the second country. When capital flows are 
allowed between the two countries, capital will move from the first country to the second 
country (because r2 is higher than r1). Therefore, line k would shift to the left until each 
country‘s respective marginal productivities of capital become equal; two rates of return 
(r1 and r2) will equate (to r*). This leads to improved efficiency, higher output (increase in 
total output represented by the area ABC), and therefore, greater global economic 
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welfare. MacDougall diagram is criticised for its underlying assumptions
4
 but it is very 
helpful in illustrating differential rate of return hypothesis and benefits of international 
capital flows.  
The main weakness of this hypothesis is that it fails to accommodate risk factors as it 
assumes risk neutrality between domestic and foreign investments. It also neglects the 
barriers to capital movements (Hymer, 1960). This hypothesis on its own is not sufficient 
to explain why MNCs choose FDI over portfolio investment. Moreover, this hypothesis 
fails to explain FDI cross-flows between industrialised economies and FDI flows from 
developing countries to industrialised countries. 
Figure 2.1: Differential Rate of Return Diagram (MacDougall Diagram) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Visser (2004) 
2.2.3 Portfolio Hypothesis 
Portfolio hypothesis assumes that FDI is guided not only by expected rates of return, but 
also by risk, and MNCs seek to reduce risk via diversification of their investments across 
different countries (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Although this hypothesis is useful in 
explaining foreign portfolio investments, this theory on its own is not sufficient to explain 
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why MNCs prefer FDI over portfolio investment. Hymer (1960) argues that capital 
movements are not only induced by differences in return rates but also due to differences 
in risk preferences of the investors. He also elaborates the roles of barriers to movement 
of capital and imperfections in the capital markets on portfolio diversification, which 
would affect capital flows among countries. These barriers and imperfections can arise 
due to reasons such as government controls on capital flows, future exchange rate 
uncertainties, information asymmetries and imperfect information, and taxation and 
controls on profit repatriation.  
2.2.4 Output and Market Size Hypotheses 
Output hypothesis assumes that the volume of FDI of a firm in a host country depends on 
that firm‘s sales (output) in that host country. Market size hypothesis assumes that the 
volume of FDI in a host country depends on the market size of the host country. Both 
hypotheses are similar except that the first hypothesis relates to micro level aspects of 
output and the second hypothesis relates to the macro level aspects of output (Agarwal, 
1980).  
2.2.5 International Division of Labour 
International division of labour plays a major role in the choice of location of FDI and 
understanding its role in FDI is useful to understand MNCs locational choice of FDI. 
International division of labour refers to the spatial division of various productive 
activities around the globe according to the comparative advantage of labour. 
Multinationals can capitalise on these comparative advantages by locating their activities 
in different locations. Developments in transportation and communications technology 
have enhanced MNCs ability of locating their activities in different locations (Frobel, 
Heinrichs, & Kreye, 1980). International division of labour have enabled different 
countries to specialise in different activities - both sectoral specialisation and functional 
(different stages of production) specialisation - according to their respective endowments.  
International division of labour is practically evident in international activities of MNCs. 
MNCs need highly skilled and educated workers for research and development activities, 
and therefore, MNCS locate such activities in countries that have a very high quality 
human capital, for example, most of the research and development activities in the 
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electronic industries are located in countries such as Japan and USA. Capital-intensive 
processes require semi-skilled labour, and therefore, such activities are located in 
countries that has relatively skilled and moderately cost labour, for example, 
manufacturing of standard electronic components in the electronic industry is located in 
countries such as Taiwan, Malaysia, and South Korea. Labour intensive processes are 
located in countries that have low skilled and low cost labour, and therefore MNCs prefer 
countries such as China and Mexico for such activities (Hill, 2011). 
2.2.6 Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm 
The OLI framework, which is also referred as eclectic theory was developed by John 
Dunning as an approach to explain FDI. According to this framework, firms engage in 
international operations to realize three types of advantages: ownership advantages, 
location advantages, and internalisation advantages (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
Ownership advantages 
Ownership advantages include tangible and intangible sources of advantage which arises 
from firm-specific capabilities, competencies, or resources that give a foreign firm a 
competitive edge over domestic rivals. These advantages are largely derived from a 
possession of or having access to unique assets such as patents, trademarks, brands, and 
management skills (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Brakman et al., 2007).  
 
Early attempts to explain FDI using neoclassical theories were later criticised by several 
authors and they introduced the concept of ownership advantage to explain FDI. Among 
them, Hymer and Kindleberger were the forerunners of identifying limitations of 
neoclassical theories in explaining FDI. They used market imperfections and 
monopolistic advantages of firms to understand FDI flows. Hymer recognised that when a 
firm moves into a foreign territory, it faces several disadvantages in competing with 
indigenous firms in the host country. For example, foreign firms may have limited 
knowledge of local business practices, limited access to information, and will have to deal 
with physical and psychic distance. Therefore, foreign firms must possess ownership 
advantages - such as innovatory, cost, financial or marketing advantages - which should 
be sufficient to outweigh these disadvantages. Without such advantages, overseas firms 
will not be able to successfully compete with domestic counterparts because of the 
inconveniences that foreign firms face when doing business abroad such as 
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communication and transport problems, cultural and language barriers, limited knowledge 
about the domestic market and local business acumen and other barriers including host 
country government interventions (Hymer, 1960). FDI occur when it is difficult for firms 
to sell or lease these ownership advantages due to market failures (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). Kindleberger (1969) also had a similar view and suggested that firms need firm 
specific advantages that are powerful enough to overcome the disadvantages of locating 
business overseas. Related arguments were put forwarded by Caves (1971). He observed 
that horizontal FDI takes place in oligopoly industries where product differentiation 
normally prevail, and indicate the importance of product differentiation as a monopolistic 
advantage for undertaking horizontal FDI. 
   
Location advantages 
Location advantages originate from specific host country characteristics which provide an 
incentive for MNCs to locate operations in a foreign country. These location advantages, 
such as proximity to large markets, availability of skilled labour and natural resources, 
low factor prices, quality infrastructure, and trade and non-trade barriers favouring FDI, 
make foreign production profitable than exporting from home (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; 
Brakman et al., 2007).  
 
Internalisation advantages 
Transaction cost theory highlights that, due to market imperfections, firms incur 
transaction costs when undertaking arm‘s length transactions. When firms make 
economic exchanges they face issues such as bounded rationality/information asymmetry, 
asset specificity and opportunism, and therefore, incur transaction costs such as search 
and negotiation costs, contracting costs and policing costs (Williamson, 1979; 
Williamson, 1981; Govindan, 1997). In order to minimise these transaction costs, firms 
may opt to internalise these transaction rather than carrying out market base transactions.  
 
Along similar lines, firms can face significant transaction costs when undertaking 
operations across borders. For example, foreign firms may face larger degree of bounded 
rationality due to unfamiliarity with local cultural/business contexts. FDI can be 
associated with higher degree of assets specificity due to MNCs‘ unique 
assets/capabilities. Foreign firms can also be exposed to high risk of opportunism due to 
difficulty in monitoring distant operations. Moreover, MNCs could face serious costs and 
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risks when contracting and transferring its ownership advantages in foreign territories. 
Therefore, when MNCs engage in international business in order to exploit their firm 
specific advantages and location advantages, the extent of transactions costs determines 
whether MNCs externalise (by contracting or licensing) or internalise (by FDI) its 
international operations (Teece, 1986). 
 
Internalisation advantages make it more profitable for a firm to internalise its capital, 
technology, and management skills to produce goods/services rather than externalizing 
their use by engaging in portfolio investment, licensing, and management contracts 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008). These advantages arise due to market imperfections; market 
imperfections make the cost of carrying out arm‘s length transactions excessive and 
therefore firms are better off carrying out activities within the firm. Internalisation 
advantages explain why firms prefer FDI over importing, exporting, and licensing or 
franchising (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
2.2.7 Investment Development Path 
The concept of Investment development path (IDP) was first put forwarded by Dunning 
(1981, 1986). Thereafter, this concept has been refined and extended further in several 
instances (Dunning & Narula, 1996). This model attempts to explain the progression of a 
country‘s direct investment position as the country advances through different stages of 
economic development.  IDP theory advocates for a strong association between a 
country‘s direct investment position and its level of development.  As per the IDP theory, 
a country‘s direct investment position is systematically related to its level and structure of 
economic development (United Nations, 2006). 
According to Dunning, a country‘s direct investment position is determined by three sets 
of factors; (1) extent of ownership specific advantages of the indigenous firms relative to 
firms in other countries, (2) indigenous firms‘ tendency to internalise (rather than 
externalise) these ownership specific advantages across borders, and (3) country‘s relative 
location advantages against other countries (Dunning, 1981).  
The IDP theory recognises five stages of development and each stage is classified 
according to the country‘s propensity to import/export direct investment capital (Dunning 
& Narula, 1996). During the first stage of the development (least developed), a country is 
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unlikely to attract much inward FDI (IFDI) because of poor location specific advantages, 
mainly due to issues such as smaller domestic markets, poor infrastructure, weaker 
institutions, and lack of human capital (Dunning, 1981). In this stage, outward FDI 
(OFDI) will be very low due to lack of ownership specific advantages among indigenous 
firms. In stage two, FDI inflows will start to increase due to growth in income levels and 
improvements in location specific advantages.  Later on when the domestic firms start to 
gain their own ownership advantages, OFDI will start to increase, but will remain low. 
Stage three is characterised by gradual decrease in the growth rate of IFDI and an increase 
in the growth rate of OFDI, therefore, resulting in an increasing net outward FDI (NFDI) 
position. As the domestic firms compete with foreign firms and gain their own ownership 
advantages, ownership advantages of foreign firms will become less significant. Also, as 
domestic wages surge, the country will start losing some of the initial location 
advantages, particularly relevant to attracting labour intensive operations. These will in 
turn result in an increase in NFDI position. Although the country will lose comparative 
advantage in labour intensive operations, the country will gain different set of location 
advantages, for example, enlarged domestic market and improved domestic innovatory 
capacity, and these changes are likely to shift the motive of IFDI towards efficiency 
seeking production. A country reaches stage four when OFDI stocks surpass (or equal) 
the IFDI stock, while the growth rates of OFDI remains higher than growth rates of IFDI. 
Most of the domestic firms are now capable of competing with foreign firms in both local 
and international markets (United Nations, 2006). In the fifth stage, OFDI and IFDI flows 
get equally significant, and NFDI position tend to fluctuate around zero. 
IDP theory has recently been used in conjunction with Trade Development Path (TDP) to 
explain how the structure of trade, industry and FDI of a country evolves with the 
development of the country (Dunning, Kim, & Lin, 2001; Dunning, 2003). Countries in 
stage 1 have low resources and capability base with underdeveloped domestic markets 
and engage in trade in low and medium created asset-intensive sectors. Their exports are 
mainly in resource and/or labour intensive sectors and imports are mainly in medium 
technology intensive and consumer goods sectors. In this stage, countries will only be 
able to attract low to modest FDI, mainly in labour or resource intensive sectors with very 
limited OFDI. Intra-industry FDI will be negligible. 
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When they progress into stage two, with improving resource and capability base and 
rising domestic markets, their exports, although still mainly in resource and/or labour 
intensive sectors, will expand to medium technology sectors and services. Imports will 
remain as stage one but with some participation in more advanced technology sectors. In 
this stage, countries will witness increasing IFDI flows mainly into medium technology 
and consumer goods sectors and into some services and OFDI flows kicking off, mainly 
taking place in labour or resource intensive sectors. Intra-industry FDI will remain 
insignificant.  
When the countries move into stage three with further growth in domestic markets and 
increasing significance of human capital and indigenous innovatory base, their resource 
intensive exports will diminish in significance and exports will largely consist of medium 
technology goods and services. Imports in this stage will mainly consist of higher income 
consumer goods and technology intensive intermediate products. IFDI flows will largely 
take place in more skill intensive goods and services and OFDI flows will increasingly 
take place in medium technology and some asset-seeking investments and technology 
intensive sectors.  Intra-industry trade will now start to become significant while 
increasing intra-industry FDI flows.   
In the fourth stage, when countries approach mature industrialisation with relatively rich 
and sophisticated markets, exports will largely consist of higher income and medium to 
high technology goods and services. Composition of imports will now become mixed 
with increasing import in more sophisticated consumer goods. IFDI flows will be 
increasingly drawn to more technological intensive goods sectors and information 
intensive service sectors. OFDI flows will grow at a faster rate, sometimes exceeding 
IFDI flows. OFDI flows become increasingly concentrated in medium and high 
technology goods and services while asset-seeking OFDI continuing to grow. Both intra-
industry trade and intra-industry FDI flows will become increasingly significant in this 
stage.  
2.2.8 Concluding Remarks 
Theories of FDI attempt to answer a range of questions such as what kind of firms 
undertake FDI, why such firms undertake FDI, what kind of investments do they 
undertake, and how do they enter (entry mode), when do they undertake FDI (timing) and 
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where do they invest.  Theories that attempt to answer the last two questions are of 
particular relevance to the context of this study. First, it is important to understand 
different types of FDI; different types of FDI are attracted by different locational 
advantages of the host country, as a result, have different impact on the host country. 
Behrman typology of FDI is very useful in this respect. These theories provide 
enlightening ideas to understand the determinants of FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. To 
this end, differential rate of return theory and portfolio hypothesis are useful for 
understanding financial determinants and output & market hypothesis, concept of 
international division of labour and Investment development path theory are useful for 
understanding economic determinants of FDI. Dunning‘s Eclectic paradigm is a relatively 
comprehensive model. Eclectic model answers several important questions related to FDI 
concerning ‗who‘, ‗why‘, ‗where‘ and ‗how‘. Dunning‘s OLI paradigm provides a 
comprehensive model to analyse FDI determinants by looking from the host country‘s 
perspective as well as the foreign investor‘s perspective. Although this thesis primarily 
looks at the FDI determinants from the host country‘s perspective, it is difficult to 
disentangle MNCs motives/actions from the location determinants because a location‘s 
attractiveness for a certain type of FDI will be, ultimately, determined by MNCs actions. 
IDP theory advocates for a strong association between a country‘s direct investment 
position and its level of development. Therefore, this theory is not only useful in 
explaining the FDI flows but also useful for understanding the potential impact that 
inward FDI could bring in to a host country.      
It is important to understand that most of the conventional FDI theories were developed in 
an era that is very different from the current context of international business. The 
majority of the theories were developed in a time where bulk of the FDI was flowing 
among the developed countries and developing countries started receiving considerable 
amounts of FDI. Contrastingly, current context is characterised by increasing FDI flows 
to developing countries as well as increasing FDI flows from developing countries. Also, 
in the past, most of the MNCs were either from U.S.A or from a small number of 
countries and in the current context there is a wider participation of countries both as 
recipients and suppliers of FDI. Furthermore, in the past, most of the FDI was fresh FDI, 
but in the current context, a significant proportion of FDI is substitute/replacement to 
existing investments (FDI relocations and FDI diversions) rather than supplement to 
existing ones. Therefore, the dynamics of FDI in the present context can be different from 
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that of the past. With this changing context, some of the conventional FDI theories may 
have limitations in explaining present FDI flows. Furthermore, there is rising concerns 
that conventional FDI theories are not capable of capturing all dynamics of the behaviour 
of multinational firms. Another salient shortcoming of these theories is that they have 
failed to incorporate the implications of risks and risk preferences of MNCs.  Hymer 
(1960) emphasised the importance of risks and risk preferences but subsequent 
theories/models have not given adequate attention to the importance of risk and risk 
preferences.  
These theories are useful in providing a foundation for analysing FDI when used in the 
right context while understanding their limitations. Each FDI theory and hypothesis 
concentrates on a particular set of variables, and therefore, each theory/hypothesis has its 
own limitations. For example, Although Hymer‘s theory is useful in explaining why firms 
go abroad it fails to explain why a firm prefer one country over another. Therefore, it is 
sensible to use the concepts of these theories and hypotheses holistically rather than 
considering each theory in isolation. Thus, this study will take a holistic approach. Having 
looked at theoretical literature that is relevant to this study, next two sections will looked 
at the literature on FDI determinants and impact of FDI in an empirical point of view. 
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2.3. Determinants of FDI  
2.3.1. Introduction 
The literature on FDI suggests that the reasons for FDI are numerous. Many theories have 
been put forwarded to explain the actions of multinationals and their locational 
preferences. These theories have been tested by large number of empirical studies using 
different country settings. These studies have progressed in two different streams. Some 
researchers have concentrated on the micro-level factors by looking deeply into MNCs to 
identify the reasons behind their actions. Others have concentrated on macro-level factors 
to identify which factors attract MNCs to specific countries or regions. Factors such as 
size and growth of host market, quality of human capital and wages, political stability, 
institutional environment, degree of trade openness, quality of infrastructure, and 
exchange rate valuations have repeatedly appear as determinants of FDI in previous 
studies (Wheeler & Moody, 1992; Root & Ahmed, 1979; Quazi & Mahmud, 2004; 
Chakrabarti, 2001). Proceeding section provides a review of these FDI determinants.  
2.3.2 Size and Growth of Host Country’s Economy 
Market size and market growth are major sources of location advantage, particularly for 
market seeking FDI that target local or regional markets. Market seekers invest in a 
particular location in the intention of supplying goods or services to the host country or to 
adjacent countries/regions. Such FDI, which is also referred as horizontal FDI, replicates 
production in the host country in order to serve the host country market, and therefore, 
market size and market growth of the host country play a crucial role (Kinoshita & 
Campos, 2004; Brada, Kutan, & Yigit, 2006). Host market can be a magnet to FDI for 
several reasons. Foreign firms that want to cater to the local market by directly supplying 
goods and services may want to locate operation close to the market in order to minimize 
production and transaction costs; to bypass trade barriers; and to adapt their products and 
services to local tastes or needs, cultural attitudes and indigenous resources and 
capabilities (Dunning & Lundan 2008). Also, firms may have to follow its suppliers and 
customers who set up facilities in the host country (Dunning & Lundan 2008). Market 
size can also have a positive effect on export oriented FDI, to the extent that export 
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performance can benefit from economies of scale of a large host market
5
 (Kravis & 
Lipsey, 1982). 
Many empirical studies have found that market size (GDP, GNP) have a positive effect on 
inward FDI (Nonnemberg & Mendonça, 2004; Root & Ahmed, 1979; Schneider & Frey, 
1985; Wheeler & Mody, 1992; Billington, 1999; Nigh, 1985; Suliman & Mollick, 2009). 
As per Chakrabarti (2001)‘s synopsis, almost all studies have found a consistent positive 
effect of market size on FDI inflows. 
The prospect of growth has a positive impact on FDI inflows and countries with high and 
sustained growth rates receive more FDI flows than volatile or low growth economies 
(Hoang, 2006). Past rate of economic growth is considered as a predictor of future market 
size (The World Bank, 1998). Also, it has been found that the recent growth rates of a 
host country are much more significant for FDI inflows than the growth rates for past 
periods (The World Bank, 1998). Economic growth can be a powerful stimulant for FDI 
inflows, and at the same time, an increase in foreign investment could also stimulate 
economic growth (Nonnemberg & Mendonça, 2004; Agrawal, 2000). Therefore, the 
direction of causality, whether FDI causes growth in GDP or growth in GDP creates more 
FDI, is a much debated issue, and may depend on various factors such as factor 
endowment, geographical location, level of infrastructure, quality of human capital, 
market size and trade regime of the country (Faeth, 2005). 
Majority of empirical studies have found that market growth rate (GDP growth, GNP 
growth) have a positive effect on inward FDI (Schneider & Frey, 1985; Billington, 1999; 
Suliman & Mollick, 2009; Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef, 1999) while handful of 
studies have found the growth rate to be insignificant as a FDI determinant (Nigh, 1985). 
Empirical studies have produced mix results on the direction of causality, equally 
supporting both premises, and therefore, supports the existence of the endogeneity 
problem. 
Using time series data from 1959 to 2002 and employing an econometric framework of 
co-integration and error correction mechanism, Athukorala (2003) examined the two-way 
                                                 
5
 Large host country market can contribute to economies of scale which can be conductive to export 
production. Kravis & Lipsey (1982) show that U.S. majority owned affiliates tend to export from countries 
with large internal markets. 
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relationship between FDI and GDP in the context of Sri Lanka. His econometric results 
indicate that GDP growth rate and FDI is positively related. He shows that GDP growth 
rate influence FDI directly but the direct influence of FDI inflows on GDP growth is 
weak. Using Engle-Granger method to see the direction of causality, he shows that the 
direction of causation is from GDP growth to FDI but not from FDI to GDP growth. 
2.3.3. Trade Openness  
Countries can increase their trade openness through liberalising their trade policies 
through reducing tariff and other barriers to trade. Trade openness, the degree to which a 
host country is open to trade, can have implications on FDI inflows, mainly in two 
opposing directions. High trade barriers can create significant transaction costs to firms 
exporting to host country. Therefore, on one hand, with low degree of trade openness, 
more horizontal FDI (import substituting) can be expected due to MNCs trying to avoid 
trade barriers. On the other hand, high degree of trade barriers can increase transaction 
costs to multinationals engaged in vertical FDI (Busse & Hefeker, 2007). Therefore, 
lower trade barriers can augment more vertical FDI or export oriented FDI, especially if 
such FDI is associated with high proportion of imports of intermediate and capital goods 
(Walsh & Yu, 2010). In the former case, FDI is generated as a substitute for trade, and 
therefore, would imply a negative correlation between trade and FDI. In the latter case, 
FDI is complementary with trade, and therefore, would imply a positive correlation 
between trade and FDI. Trade restrictions are likely to be linked with other forms of 
policy imperfections such as exchange rate controls and restrictions on foreign 
investments, particularly in developing countries. These policy restrictions can also 
discourage FDI inflows (Busse & Hefeker, 2007).   
Import substituting FDI will be limited by the size of the host-country 
(Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 1996), and therefore, for countries with smaller 
internal markets, potential of generating FDI would be larger with pursuing Export 
Promotion (EP) induced FDI than pursuing Import Substituting (IS) induced FDI.  
Many studies on FDI determinants use trade openness as an explanatory variable, usually 
represented by the trade intensity, i.e. total trade as a proportion of GDP. Majority of 
these empirical studies have found a positive relationship between trade openness and 
FDI, see, for example (Erdal & Tatoglu, 2002; Suliman & Mollick, 2009; Noorbakhsh, 
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Paloni, & Youssef, 1999; Abbott, Cushman, & De Vita, 2012; Asiedu, 2002), while a 
handful of studies have found a negative (Wheeler & Mody, 1992) or insignificant 
(Nunnenkamp & Spatz, 2002) relationship between them. 
2.3.4. Political Instability   
FDI is subject to host country risk factors, which can be classified into economic and 
political risk factors (Moosa, 2002). Political risk stems from various political factors in 
the host country that can affect entry and performance of foreign owned firms. These 
factors can include various forms of violence such as wars, riots, disorders, and labour 
unrests; stability of the host government; attitude of the host government; and changes in 
the rules and regulations governing FDI (Moosa, 2002). There are different types of 
classifications of political risk factors. For example, political risk insurance industry 
categorizes political risk into three broad categories: (1) war and political violence 
(includes civil war, uprisings and terrorist attacks), (2) expropriation and breach of 
contracts, and (3) transfer risk encompassing government restrictions on capital flows 
(Jensen, 2008). Political instability, i.e. high degree of political risks, of a host country is 
considered as one of the key concerns of potential foreign investors (Walsh & Yu, 2010), 
and therefore, is likely to discourage inflows of FDI.  
Although it is widely believed that political instability of country will impede FDI 
inflows, not many empirical studies have looked at the relationship between political 
instability and incoming FDI. Moreover, relatively few studies have empirically 
investigated the relationship between war/conflict and FDI (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, & 
Steen, 2010). These empirical studies, both surveys and cross-country studies, have 
produced mix results (Walsh & Yu, 2010; Agarwal, 1980).  
Several researchers have empirically established the negative relationship between 
political instability and FDI inflows (Root & Ahmed, 1979; Schneider & Frey, 1985; 
Suliman & Mollick, 2009; Brada, Kutan, & Yigit, 2006). Nevertheless, some studies 
have found that there is little or no relationship between political instability and FDI 
inflows (The World Bank, 1998; Wheeler & Mody, 1992; Bennett & Green, 1972; 
Kobrin, 1976; Asiedu, 2002). Bennett & Green (1972) investigating the effect of 
political instability on direct investments by US firms in marketing activities in forty-
six countries, found that political instability do not discourage such FDI flows. They 
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use a 7-point scale, which was constructed by Feierabend & Feierabend (1966) by 
assigning weights (from 0 to 6) to 30 types of politically destabilizing events. Kobrin 
(1976), investigating the effect of economic, social, and political aspects of the host 
country environment on investments of 187 major US manufacturing firms, found a 
strong relationship between market related variables and FDI but failed to find any 
relationship between FDI and variables based on political event data.   
2.3.5. Human Capital 
Human capital is widely considered as a key determinant of FDI inflows whilst both FDI 
and human capital are recognised as key drivers of economic growth (Noorbakhsh, Paloni 
& Youseff, 2001; United Nations, 1992; Abbas, 2001). However, high quality human 
capital and FDI are complementary, in the sense, that high quality human capital tend to 
attract FDI, and on the other hand, presence of MNCs is likely to improve the quality of 
human capital in the host country since MNCs provide education and training to local 
staff (Miyamoto, 2003). 
Although the importance of human capital in attracting FDI is widely recognised in the 
literature, existing empirical evidence is not consistent, particularly for developing 
countries. Based on different sets of developing countries, some have shown that there is 
a significant positive relationship between human capital and FDI inflows (Noorbakhsh, 
Paloni & Youseff, 2001; Nonnemberg & Mendonca, 2004; Suliman & Mollick, 2009; 
Suliman & Mollick, 2009), while others have found little or no relationship between these 
two (Hanson, 1996; Root & Ahmed, 1979; Schneider & Frey, 1985; Kinoshita & 
Campos, 2004; Nunnenkamp & Spatz, 2002; Cheng & Kwan, 2000).  
There can be numerous reasons for these incongruities. It is important to understand 
whether these incongruities arise due to a deficiency in the methodology of the previous 
research studies rather than due to lack of causality. Miyamoto (2003) observes that most 
of the studies that have found little or no relationship between FDI and human capital 
have been conducted for the periods prior to 1980. He argues that prior to 1980 most of 
the FDI in the developing countries were concentrated in market and resource seeking 
and/or lower-end manufacturing types, and therefore, cheap labour and/or abundant 
natural resources were more important than high level of human capital, and for this 
reason studies conducted prior to 1980 have produced weak relationship between FDI and 
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human capital. Despite the fact that human capital can be less crucial for natural resources 
and/or market-seeking FDI than efficiency seeking and/or higher-end manufacturing type 
FDI, it should be comprehended that human capital can still be important for any type of 
FDI because increased human capital contributes to civil liberties, political stability, good 
health and reduced crime/corruption, all of which that positively influence the investment 
climate of a country (Miyamoto, 2003). 
Another possible reason for the deviations in the research outputs is that the proxies that 
have been selected by researchers may not correctly relate to the quality of human capital. 
The difficulty in finding suitable explanatory variables as an indicator of human capital 
and also the difficulty in gathering consistent cross-country variables are frequently 
recognised in the literature (Miyamoto, 2003). Most widely used measures are adult 
literacy rate and secondary/primary school enrolment ratios. All these variables have 
serious limitations when used as a proxy for the level of human capital. Adult literacy rate 
is widely used because it‘s availability in most countries and it can be easily compared 
across different countries and regions. However, it is a very crude measure. Literacy rate 
does not encompass the quality of the education of a country, does not reflect any 
educational attainments on top of the acquisition of basic literacy and fails to capture 
many intricate features implied in worker skills and productivity (Miyamoto, 2003, 
WoBmaan, 2003). Secondary and primary school enrolment ratios may not relate to the 
quality of education, and therefore, these quantitative measures neglect the quality of 
human capital (Bhaumik & Dimova, 2012). Also, current school enrolment rate, which is 
a flow variable
6
, may not necessarily represent the current stock of human capital 
employed in a country (WoBmaan, 2003). On the other hand, mix results may have 
resulted because different researchers have employed different proxies to gauge the level 
of human capital of their selected countries. Furthermore, different educational 
parameters can have different impact on FDI inflows as well as on other macroeconomic 
variables that can affect FDI inflows. For example, in his study examining the effects of 
educational performance on the economic growth of Sri Lanka and Pakistan during the 
period 1970–1994, Abbas (2001) has found that education at the primary level has a 
negative relationship, secondary level has a significant positive relationship and higher 
                                                 
6
 Moreover, enrolment rate is a poor proxy for current flows itself since enrolment rates represent entry of 
students into education system rather than entry of graduates into the labour force.  
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education has a positive but insignificant relationship to the economic growth of Sri 
Lanka and Pakistan.  
2.3.6. Institutional Environment 
North (1991) defined institutions as the humanly devised formal rules (eg, constitutions, 
laws, regulations, and property rights) and informal constraints (eg, norms and values, 
conventions/customs and codes of conduct) that structure political, economic and social 
interactions. Institutional environment is considered as a crucial factor determining FDI 
inflows, particularly important for developing countries than developed-countries (The 
World Bank, 1998). Institutional environment can not only create numerous pressures on 
firms (Francis, Zheng, & Mukherji, 2009), but also shape the risks and uncertainties faced 
by the firms. Countries associated with good governance usually perform well in terms of 
economic growth and also in attracting FDI, and countries with weak institutional 
environment have generally performed poor in terms of both economic growth and 
attracting FDI.  
MNCs might prefer countries with better institutional environment due to several reasons. 
Poor institutions that enable corruption, bureaucratic hurdles and red tape are likely to 
reduce the efficiencies of the business operations and increase the cost of business 
operations, and thereby, reduce multination‘s profits (Walsh & Yu, 2010). MNCs will 
have to set aside large resources for unproductive rent seeking activities in highly 
corrupted countries, for example, paying bribes to government officials to obtain permits, 
licenses, loans, or other government services necessary to conduct business (Wei, 2000). 
Strong institutional environments increase the predictability of the environment and also 
give little room for state agents to behave in an unpredictable manner. Contrastingly, 
weak institutional environments can increase the arbitrariness of state agents, thereby, 
creating extra uncertainties to MNCs. Even when MNCs expend resources on politicians 
to compete for the economic rents that are granted by the government, the payback from 
these political connections are uncertain (Chen, Ding, & Kimand, 2010). The impact of 
uncertainties created by arbitrariness of state agents on FDI inflows can be high, and 
research has found that MNCs prefer joint ventures to minimise risk when ethical 
uncertainties and arbitrariness are high  (Demirbag, McGuinness, & Altay, 2010). There 
are many aspects of institutional environment and detail investigation of all these aspects 
are beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, my focus is on formal institutions that have 
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been repeatedly highlighted in the extant literature; following sections focus on how 
corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality and democracy can influence FDI inflows.    
Existing studies recognise corruption as a major obstruction for attracting FDI inflows 
(Zhou, 2007). Since state and politicians can influence the entry and the economic 
performance of firms through various means, such as, tax and subsidy policies, regulation 
of entry and operations of firms, controls on products and pricing, equity ownership 
restrictions, performance requirements, and nationalisation (Chen, Ding, & Kimand, 
2010), MNCs entry and operations can become much difficult and risky with a corrupt 
regime (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2009). Also, when corruption is present, productive firms 
could be discriminated because political connectedness becomes much more important 
determinant of business success than business fundamentals such as productiveness 
(Chen, Ding, & Kimand, 2010). 
However, there is a point of view that corruption can benefit MNC operations in some 
situations (Zhou, 2007). Some writers have shown a better side of corruption arguing that 
corruption is the much needed grease for the squeaking wheel of a rigid administration 
(Bardhan, 1997; Jensen, Li & Rahman, 2010). Also, corruption leads to market 
imperfections, and therefore, in some cases corruption can provide incentives for MNCs 
to internalise their operations. Moreover, in some cases, the corrupt governments might 
favour MNCs over domestic firms in order to receive more private benefits through secret 
arrangements with international firms. Furthermore, in some cases, corrupt MNCs might 
use political connections to promote their unethical practices and private agendas in the 
host countries. 
MNCs can react to corruption with different strategies. They might avoid investing in 
highly corrupt countries, and consequently, host country will lose potential FDI inflows. 
Alternatively, they might partner with domestic firms in order to guard against corrupt 
politicians (Jensen, Li & Rahman, 2010). Exceptionally, some MNCs might accept the 
risk and venture into the country hoping that they could manage the politicians and the 
corruption.  
On the empirical side, many empirical studies have found a negative relationship between 
corruption and FDI inflows (Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Zhou, 2007; Wei, 2000). Some 
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studies, for example, Egger & Winner (2005) and Adam & Filippaios (2007) have found 
a positive relationship between corruption and FDI, thus they pose corruption as a 
stimulus for FDI inflow. 
Lack of transparency and imperfect regulatory and legal systems can increase the risks 
and uncertainties of operating businesses. The more complex and less explicit the 
regulatory requirements are, the more difficult it will be for a foreign firm to adjust to 
these requirements (Demirbag, McGuinness, & Altay, 2010). MNCs might prefer a more 
independent judiciary in order to receive fair treatment. Credibility of the host country 
government is likely to be augmented with an independent judiciary. Poor enforcement of 
contract and law can increase the costs and risks to foreign firms; contracting parties may 
neglect contractual obligations towards foreign firms and, in extreme situations, 
government may even expropriate assets of foreign firms either partially or completely 
(Kinoshita & Campos, 2004). Therefore, MNCs may prefer to invest in countries where 
political rights and civil liberties are protected
7
. Since democracy is likely to improve the 
rule of law, property right protection and other aspects of institutional environment which 
can have a favourable effect on attracting FDI, some researchers have suggested that 
democratic regimes are better than autocratic regimes in terms of attracting FDI (Busse & 
Hefeker, 2007; Demirbag, McGuinness, & Altay, 2010). The premise that democratic 
regimes are better for attracting FDI has been contested by some researchers, and also the 
fact that some countries, such as  China and Singapore, which are not considered as 
democratic, being highly successful in attracting large volumes of FDI have made this 
premise highly controversial. 
The greater the institutional distance between home and host countries, the greater the 
level of complexity faced by the MNC (Demirbag, McGuinness, & Altay, 2010). MNCs 
from countries associated with good governance might not know how to approach and 
survive in a country that has a set of values and practices different from their home 
countries‘. Moreover, MNCs may be accountable to their home country governments if 
they or their joint venture partners undertake any unethical or corrupt practises in order to 
survive in the host country (Demirbag, McGuinness, & Altay, 2010). Also, available 
evidence shows that when there is a large degree of institutional distance between host 
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 Interestingly, Adam & Filippaios (2007) show that while repression of political liberties can deter FDI, 
slight repression of civil liberties may entice certain types of direct investments. 
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and home countries, MNCs prefer lower level of equity investments (Xu & Shenkar, 
2002). 
In his empirical studies, Wei has statistically proved that corruption has a significant 
negative relationship with FDI inflows and ascertains that the significance of corruption 
on FDI inflows is even higher than the significance of increases in tax rates on FDI 
inflows (Wei, 2000; Wei, 1997). Busse & Hefeker (2007), exploring the linkages among 
political risk, institutions, and FDI using a sample of 83 developing countries, find that 
government stability, internal and external conflict, corruption, law and order, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability of government, and quality of bureaucracy are highly 
significant determinants of FDI inflows. Additionally, many studies have provided 
evidence that there is a strong relationship between host country‘s institutional 
environment and inward FDI (The World Bank, 1998). Contrastingly, Wheeler & Mody 
(1992) found that corruption, bureaucracy and red tape, and quality of legal system are 
insignificant as determinants for FDI inflows. 
The difficulty in measuring institutional factors is widely recognised in the literature, and 
probably for that reason, empirical studies have produced mix results (Walsh & Yu, 
2010). Also, different studies have employed different types of institutional factors and 
different types of scores/measures published by various organisations. However, countries 
with strong institutional environments tend to have better scores in almost all of the 
institutional variables and vice versa. This is because, institutional factors are 
interconnected and dependent on each other, and therefore, weaknesses in one 
institutional factor can lead into deterioration in other institutional variables: for example, 
economic, political and social structures that are poorly differentiated and lack 
independency can facilitate and propagate corruption.   
2.3.7. Domestic Stock Market Development  
There is considerable attention given to explore the link between local financial markets 
and capital flows, however, the link between the local stock market and FDI has not been 
adequately researched. Moreover, local stock market is generally associated with foreign 
portfolio investment rather than with FDI. However, for several reasons, the domestic 
stock market is likely to play an important role in determining FDI inflows. Foreign 
investors may want to finance part of their investments through external capital and the 
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stock market plays an important role in providing avenues to find equity and credit in the 
host country (Claessens, Klingebiel & Schmukler, 2001). Also, a much developed stock 
market provides an exit route to FDI investors, and provides a relatively easy means of 
finding a potential buyer. Therefore, potential FDI investors might be reluctant to make 
large investments in countries with less developed stock markets. 
Majority of FDI take place as acquisitions rather than Greenfield investments. Stock 
markets provide a mechanism for foreign investors to acquire local businesses (Claessens, 
Klingebiel & Schmukler, 2001), and therefore, the breadth of the stock market is likely to 
be crucial for FDI. Some MNCs would want to test the ground before committing the full 
amount of capital funds (Noorbakhsh, Paloni & Youssef, 1999), and therefore, would 
prefer to acquire a small stake before totally committing to an investment. A well-
developed stock market can facilitate these requirements conveniently.  
The above points suggest that FDI and stock market developments are complementary, 
however, there are arguments favouring the opposite premise: the premise of FDI being a 
substitute for stock market development. The main argument supporting this premise is 
that FDI takes place to overcome the difficulties of investing through capital markets, and 
therefore, the countries that are riskier, financially underdeveloped, and institutionally 
weak are supposed to attract more FDI as a proportion of portfolio investment than 
countries that are otherwise (Claessens, Klingebiel & Schmukler, 2001). However, high 
political risks may encourage foreign investors to prefer assets with high liquidity, and 
therefore, to prefer portfolio investment over direct investment (Liljeblom & Löflund, 
2005). Also, investors‘ preference between FDI and FPI may vary according to their risk 
apatite, capital availability and liquidity constraints, and therefore, FDI and FPI would act 
as alternative investment opportunities (or substitutes). 
FDI is made by a company with the intention of exerting a considerable degree of 
influence on the operations of the enterprise (Benito, 1997). In contrast, investors of FPI 
gain ownership without control, and therefore, mainly due to the agency problem between 
managers and owners, FPI is considered less efficient and more volatile relative to FDI 
(Mata & Portugal, 1999; Goldstein & Razin, 2006). However, high transparency in 
developed economies makes portfolio investment in these countries more efficient than in 
developing countries, and therefore, larger ratio of FDI to FPI inflows is expected for 
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developing countries relative to developed countries (Goldstein & Razin, 2006). Thus, the 
extent to which FDI can be substituted by FPI is rather limited in the context of 
developing countries.  
Having looked at these contentions, it appears that complementary effect between stock 
market development and FDI inflows is predominant over their substitute effect, and 
therefore, stock market development is likely to be positively related to FDI inflows.  
2.3.8. Exchange Rate 
FDI inflows to a particular country can be influenced by its level of exchange rate, 
expected changes in the level of the exchange rate, volatility of exchange rate, and the 
exchange rate regime (Blonigen, 2005). Both theory and empirical studies mostly favour 
a negative relationship between a country‘s exchange rate level and inward FDI; 
depreciation of host country‘s currency can augment FDI inflows and appreciation of host 
country‘s currency can deter FDI inflows (Abbott, Cushman, & De Vita, 2012). Froot & 
Stein (1991) forwards the imperfect capital market theory to explain why a depreciation 
of host country‘s currency can lead to increased investments by foreign firms. According 
to this theory, a relative appreciation of the home country‘s currency will increase the 
relative wealth of the home country firms. In an imperfect capital market, the internal cost 
of capital is lower than the cost of capital of external borrowing, and therefore, as a result 
of relative appreciation of the home country‘s currency, home country firms will be 
provided with large low-cost funds to invest in the host country (Froot & Stein, 1991; 
Blonigen, 2005). Froot & Stein (1991) have provided empirical support to their 
theoretical reasoning with the use of US based data.  
Blonigen (1997) explains the negative relationship between host country‘s exchange rate 
level and inward FDI with the use of cheap asset (fire sale) hypothesis. Under cheap asset 
hypothesis, it is assumed that FDI flows reflect undervalued host country assets (Baker, 
Foley, & Wurgler, 2009). A relative depreciation of the host country‘s currency can make 
host country assets cheap.  However, the main opposition against this premise comes 
from the fact that the relative depreciation of the host country‘s currency will also lower 
the expected nominal returns of the purchased assets in terms of home currency 
(Blonigen, 2005; Blonigen, 1997). Blonigen (1997) counters this opposition by proposing 
that if the acquired assets are firm specific assets that are transferrable across many 
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markets (in addition to host country‘s market) to generate benefits in these markets, then 
the effect of host country‘s currency depreciation on the nominal returns will be 
proportionately less than its effect on the asset price. Blonigen (1997) have provided 
empirical support to his theoretical reasoning using data on Japanese acquisitions in the 
United States from 1975 to1992. 
Currency depreciation in a particular country can also lower its relative production costs 
in terms of foreign currency. When the local currency depreciates, the cost of production 
inputs that are sourced locally such as labour, material, land, and machines will become 
cheaper relative to the export price of the final product. Therefore, a currency 
depreciation in a country could encourage export oriented FDI inflows to that country 
(Cushman, 1985; Kohlhagen, 1977; Xing & Wan, 2006). Contrastingly, currency 
appreciation in a particular country can increase production costs relative to export prices, 
and therefore, could bring down the competitiveness of export-oriented industries.  
Many studies (Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, & LahrÈche-Révil, 2001; Blonigen, 1997; Froot 
& Stein, 1991) have empirically established the negative relationship between host 
country‘s exchange rate level and inward FDI. However, the effect of exchange rate on 
FDI is likely to depend on firm characteristics, type of FDI, motive of investing firms and 
characteristics of the industry in which FDI takes place (Blonigen, 2005; Chen, Rau, & 
Lin, 2006). Chen, Rau & Lin (2006) propose that depreciation of a host country‘s 
currency tends to stimulate cost-oriented FDI and to deter market-oriented FDI and has 
found evidence for this premise by conducting a panel study using data on Taiwan‘s 
outward FDI into China over the period 1991–2002.   
2.3.9. Infrastructure 
The presence of physical infrastructure is considered as a key determinant of FDI (Loree 
& Guisinger, 1995). Infrastructure helps to increase the productivity of both domestic and 
foreign investments, and therefore, can stimulate FDI inflows. Some studies have 
highlighted that infrastructure is much more crucial for developing countries than 
developed countries for attracting FDI (Wheeler & Mody, 1992; Kumar, 2001).  
Importance of infrastructure is increasingly recognised by developing countries, and 
therefore, infrastructure development has become a main agenda in developing countries. 
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Although not many empirical studies have given considerable attention to the effect of 
infrastructure on FDI flows, it has been a common practice to include variable(s) 
representing the level of infrastructure as an explanatory variable in studies investigating 
determinants of FDI. Empirical studies that have included infrastructure as an explanatory 
variable have relied on an array of measures to represent the level of infrastructure in a 
country. Most frequently used measure is the telephone lines per capita (see, for example, 
Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Kinoshita & Campos, 2004; Asiedu, 2002; Suliman & Mollick, 
2009). Alternatively, some studies have relied on transportation infrastructure measures 
such as road density or railway density (see for example, Cheng & Kwan, 2000; Loree & 
Guisinger, 1995) while others have used the share of transportation, energy and 
communication expenditures in GDP (Erdal & Tatoglu, 2002). The level of infrastructure 
in the host country has been a significant determinant of FDI inflows in majority of these 
studies (Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Erdal & Tatoglu, 2002; Asiedu, 2002; Suliman & 
Mollick, 2009; Wheeler & Mody, 1992) while it has been insignificant in some of the 
studies (Kinoshita & Campos, 2004).   
It is important to understand the dynamics of infrastructure-FDI relationship in order to 
reconcile these conflicting empirical results. To this end, it is important to understand, 
under what conditions, infrastructure is important and not important to FDI. Investors‘ 
sensitivity to infrastructure will depend on the type of industry; some industries depend 
more on infrastructure than others (Loree & Guisinger, 1995).  There are many categories 
of infrastructure (The World Bank, 1994), out of which four categories are fundamental 
when it comes to FDI. They are transport infrastructure, telecommunication 
infrastructure, information infrastructure, and energy availability.  Importance of each 
category will vary among different industries/sectors. For example, transport 
infrastructure is likely to be more crucial for manufacturing industries than services sector 
and information and telecommunication infrastructure is likely to be more crucial for 
services sector than manufacturing industries.  
2.3.10. Regional Integration  
Regional integration has become a global trend and many countries have resorted to 
regional integration as a means of achieving their economic objectives. As a result of 
proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs), more than 50 per cent of global trade 
is now conducted through RTAs (Aggarwal, 2008). In the past, the main intention of 
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RTAs was to augment trade through liberalisation of trade barriers, though the objective 
of attracting FDI was also in mind. However, in recent years regional agreements have 
been extended beyond reducing trade barriers, giving more emphasise to the investment 
aspect. This has given birth to a new generation of RTAs, often referred as 
comprehensive preferential trade and investment agreements (Aggarwal, 2008).  
RTAs can affect both quantity and productivity of FDI in numerous ways, and as a result 
it is often difficult to determine the impact of RTAs on FDI due to their complex 
interrelationships (Aggarwal, 2008). Also, the effects of RTA on FDI are determined by 
the type of FDI, the nature of a particular RTA, and the characteristics of regional 
countries. Aggarwal (2008) identifies that the impact of RTA on FDI is moderated by 
factors such as the degree of integration, the nature of capital flows, the patterns of trade 
and FDI, and the structural composition and the level of development of partner countries. 
These intricate relationships and channels through which RTAs affect FDI are discussed 
in the following sections. 
Effects of RTAs on FDI would largely depend on whether FDI is horizontal or vertical 
type, and whether FDI has originated from inside the trading block or outside the trading 
block. Horizontal FDI refers to a MNC establishing a foreign firm in order to serve the 
foreign market, mostly taking place due to exports being too costly as a means of serving 
the foreign market due to trade barriers and transportation costs (Protsenko, 2003). 
Vertical FDI refers to a MNC establishing a foreign firm in order to source lower cost 
inputs. Vertical FDI take place as a result of MNCs fragmenting production process 
vertically and geographically dispersing them according to relative factor advantages of 
different geographical locations (Protsenko, 2003).  
Internalisation opportunities primarily arise from market imperfections. After a firm 
seizes such an opportunity through undertaking FDI, any subsequent improvements in 
these imperfections might weaken the initial internalisation advantages, and thereafter, a 
MNC might consider shifting away from FDI. High trade barriers create market 
imperfections which encourages firms to establish foreign affiliates in order to bypass 
these imperfections. A formation of an RTA that eliminate or reduce trade barriers among 
members would weaken or eliminate the market imperfections created by trade barriers, 
and therefore, some of the tariff-jumping FDI originating from member countries might 
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become no longer necessary, and might be replaced by exports. Also, with the lowered 
trade barriers, companies with high fixed costs will have the opportunity to concentrate 
their activities in one country within the regional trading block and to serve partner 
markets through exports (Aggarwal, 2008). Therefore, trade liberalisation within the 
regional block would have a negative effect on market-seeking and tariff-jumping FDI 
that originate from member countries as a result of FDI being substituted by trade.  
However, a formation of an RTA would have different implications on market seeking/ 
horizontal FDI originating from firms outside the regional trading block. Without an 
RTA, a firm external to the regional block might prefer to supply individual countries 
through trade rather than establishing firms in each country. But after the trade 
liberalisation within the region, it would be more worthwhile for such an external firm to 
jump the common external tariff rather than supplying each individual country through 
trade. Also, firms external to the regional trading block may undertake defensive 
investments inside the region in order to bypass the external trade barriers to compete 
with firms within the region which have the tariff advantage over such external firms 
(Feils & Rahman, 2011). Moreover, external firms would want to become insiders due to 
the fear of future protection measure that might be undertaken by the region against 
external investors (Blomström & Kokko, 1997). Therefore, more market seeking FDI can 
be expected from firms external to the regional block due to the extended market effect 
(Yeyati, Stein, & Daude, 2002). 
On the other hand, trade liberalisation within the regional block would have completely 
different implications on efficiency seeking/ vertical FDI. Elimination or reduction of 
trade barriers within the region would encourage efficiency seeking FDI inside the region 
because freer trade of goods and services will allow MNCs, from both inside and outside 
the region, to locate its operations in most efficient/beneficial location; thus trade and 
investments would complement each other (Aggarwal, 2008). Additionally, harmonised 
regional trade policies could lower transaction costs, which could help both MNCs from 
inside and outside the region to develop and exploit scale economies (Banalieva, Gregg, 
& Sarathy, 2010).  
RTA could also have dynamic effects on regional firms as well as on member countries. 
RTA could stimulate competition among member countries; each member country trying 
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to improve their investment climate to the best available in the region would result in 
improvements in individual host country environments. Also, creation of a larger regional 
market can provide opportunities to regional firms to develop into larger and more 
competitive global players (Aggarwal, 2008). 
New generation of RTAs, with their investment related provisions, can have further 
effects on FDI. These investment provisions liberalise rules and regulations governing 
FDI flows and foreign ownership, and therefore, enhance the investment climate of 
member countries (Aggarwal, 2008). In addition, these investment provisions might 
provide protection for FDI (including protection from expropriation), establish dispute 
settlement mechanisms, and include common rules on how foreign investors are treated 
(Aggarwal, 2008). Such provisions would boost investor perception and confidence, and 
in turn would positively affect FDI flows. 
Regional integration leads to market enhancement, and it is believed that such a market 
enhancement will attract more FDI; several studies have supported this proposition (Feils 
& Rahman, 2011; Velde and Bezemer, 2004). Although market enhancement can have 
added positive influence on FDI inflows, market enhancement itself is not a sufficient 
condition to generate more FDI. In order to attract additional FDI, the region as a whole 
should be capable of generating effective demand for goods and services and the host 
countries in the region should possess considerable location advantages 
(Balasubramanyam, Sapsford, & Griffiths, 2002). As illustrated before, low trade barriers 
decrease regional firms‘ cost of serving regional members through trade, and therefore, 
RTAs discourage horizontal FDI originating from within the region. Contrastingly, low 
trade barriers will allow the firms to locate their operations in most suitable locations, and 
therefore, RTAs encourage vertical FDI (Yeyati, Stein & Daude, 2002). Therefore, an 
RTA would change the composition of vertical and horizontal FDI in member countries, 
possibly vertical FDI being increased at the expense of horizontal FDI (Aggarwal, 2008). 
Therefore, even if the region as a whole generate more FDI subsequent to an RTA, some 
countries may gain and some countries may lose depending on each member‘s location 
advantages, such as its position within the region, its strength of human capital and labour 
costs, its cultural/geographical distance with home country and its institutional efficiency 
relative to other members (Feils & Rahman, 2011; Velde and Bezemer, 2004). Also, an 
introduction of RTA will change the dynamics of FDI within the region, some locational 
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factors becoming more important and others becoming less important, and therefore, 
some countries can benefit more while others may even loose from the RTA (Feils & 
Rahman, 2011; Velde & Bezemer, 2004; Yeyati, Stein & Daude, 2002). Due to these 
complexities it is difficult to ascertain the net impact of an RTA on FDI inflows to the 
region as well as its impact on FDI inflows to individual countries.  
2.3.11. Labour Costs 
Not only the quality and availability of labour (human capital), but cost of labour is also 
considered as an important determinant of FDI. Particularly, labour costs are crucial for 
attracting vertical FDI, which is stimulated mainly by low factor costs. Some studies have 
advocated for a negative relationship between wage level and FDI inflows (Schneider & 
Frey, 1985; Saunders, 1982). However, labour costs per se cannot be considered as a 
determinant of FDI because what matters is cost of labour adjusted for skill level of 
labour. Usually lower wages are associated with lower skills and lower productivity and 
vice versa. This is why some countries with very low wages have failed to attract FDI due 
to their deficiencies in skills and productivities of labour.  
Empirical studies have produced mixed results on the effect of labour costs on FDI 
location choice. Cushman (1987), in a study using FDI flows between USA and five other  
industrialized  countries, has shown that lower host country wages and higher 
productivity are positively related to FDI inflows. Woodward & Rolfe (1993), analysing 
location decisions of export-oriented manufacturing FDI in the Caribbean Basin, found a 
negative relationship between wage rate and plant location. Schneider & Frey (1985) also 
found that higher wages discourage FDI. In contrast, Agodo (1978) investigating the 
determinants of US manufacturing FDI in Africa, find that low relative overseas wages 
have a non-significant influence on FDI location choice.  Kravis & Lipsey (1982), did not 
find labour cost to have a major influence on U.S. firms‘ decision on their location of 
export production.    
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2.4. Impact of FDI on the Host Country 
2.4.1 Introduction 
FDI plays an important role in facilitating international transfer of resources, technology, 
management know-how, products and services from a home country to a host country 
(Bang Nam & Se Young, 2004). Through facilitating these international transfers, FDI 
can bring an array of benefits to the host country. Literature on economic growth 
identifies the importance of expanding the quantity of the basic factors of production 
(United Nations, 1992). FDI contributes additional resources, such as capital and 
technology to the host country. These additional inputs can have an incremental effect on 
host country‘s output and growth.  
Literature on economic growth also recognises the importance of improving the 
efficiency within an economy and therefore the advancement of technical knowledge in a 
country and the qualitative improvements in the labour force are also recognised as 
important contributory factors for economic growth (United Nations, 1992). Foreign 
investors can bring in new/advance product and process technologies; and managerial 
knowledge and skills, all of which can help in improving the efficiency of existing 
operations or enabling completely new operations within the host country (Moran, 2005). 
These new/advance technologies and techniques can facilitate creation of new 
products/services and making existing products/services better or cheaper (Lipsey & 
Sjöholm, 2004c). When FDI take place in the form of take-overs (M&As), contribution to 
the output/capital stock may be less pronounced as compared to a Greenfield investment; 
however, FDI in the form of M&As can indirectly contribute by facilitating more efficient 
utilisation of existing resources (Moosa, 2002). FDI is likely to promote economic growth 
of the host country by way of generating employment, exports, and tax revenue; and by 
improving host country productivity (Blomström & Kokko, 2003a).  
FDI can facilitate products/processes/services that are either new or with better value 
proposition in terms of cost and quality. Depending on whether such 
products/processes/services are final or intermediate, they can improve consumer welfare 
or improve value proposition of other downstream operations.  This can also improve the 
competitiveness of products and services of the host country in export markets.  
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It is a well-known fact that MNCs, through their active role in R&D, produce, own and 
control majority of world‘s advanced technology (Blomström & Kokko, 2003b). 
Therefore, FDI is considered as the major channel in which technology transfer from 
advance countries to developing countries takes place. FDI is also considered as the 
fastest and most efficient way of gaining access to the cutting-edge technology (Moosa, 
2002). There is no doubt that FDI is the best vehicle for channelling tacit forms of 
technology from home to host country. Also, FDI can bring in explicit forms of 
technology more efficiently, for example, MNCs are capable of importing new capital 
goods at lower cost. However, MNCs superior negotiating powers and information 
asymmetry between MNC and host country in terms of underlying technology may allow 
MNCs to extort higher rents, particularly in the case of weaker host countries (Moosa, 
2002). 
Effects of FDI can materialise as direct effects (own firm effects) or spillover effects 
(effects on other firms and on host country environment).  Direct effects of FDI can take 
place through foreign owned firms‘ own operations (own firm effects). Foreign owned 
firms are likely to contribute through employing and training employees, achieving higher 
factor productivity; undertaking R&D; and introducing new products/processes, 
organisational innovations and superior management practices (United Nations, 1992). 
Indirect effects can take place when foreign firms affect local firms‘ performance, for 
example, through technology transfer of foreign firms to local firms and competition 
effect of foreign firms on local firms (United Nations, 1992). 
FDI carries certain advantages over other forms of financial flows. Since FDI represent a 
long term commitment than other forms of financial flows, such as portfolio equity flows 
and debt flows, FDI is considered relatively stable (Moosa, 2002). In the past, FDI has 
proven to be resilient during periods of financial calamities whereas portfolio equity 
flows and debt flows were subject to large reversals during such periods (Loungani & 
Razin, 2001). Also, due to profits of FDI being pro-cyclical to the performance of the host 
country, FDI is easy to be serviced than debt capital (Moosa, 2002).    
Whether FDI benefits a host country is a much debated argument because there are 
concerns about negative effects that MNCs may cause the host country (Bang Nam & Se 
Young, 2004). These concerns have created negative sentiments about MNC‘s 
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participation in the host country‘s economy. MNCs presence in the host country could 
affect competition negatively. Powerful MNCs can sometimes hinder the growth of 
indigenous firms and could also lead to monopolisation of the markets (Mencinger, 2008). 
MNCs undertaking import substituting FDI, which take place due to tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, may increase their lobbying efforts to maintain such barriers for their own 
advantage/survival (Loungani & Razin, 2001).  
Although initial effects of FDI on host country‘s balance of payment is likely to be 
positive, host country‘s balance of payment can be adversely affected in the long run 
through subsequent outflow of earnings and divestments and also due to increased 
imports of intermediate goods and services. To counter this, some countries restrict/limit 
profit repatriation by imposing sanctions or through taxation. The net effect of FDI 
inflows and subsequent profit repatriations is difficult to comprehend because of their 
timing differences and particularly because of the transfer pricing. Net capital inflows can 
be lower than the reported statistics because MNCs could use transfer pricing to 
artificially inflate inward investment and deflate subsequent profit repatriations. Another 
criticism comes from the fact that a significant proportion of capital contribution of FDI 
comes in the form of imported machinery or capitalised intangibles rather than cash (Lall 
& Streeten, 1997). Although FDI can contribute to the tax revenue of the host country, 
this can sometimes be limited due to tax benefits offered by host country government to 
FDI projects in order to attract FDI (Loungani & Razin, 2001). 
Empirical evidence shows that foreign affiliates tend to source their inputs from foreign 
suppliers, particularly higher value added intermediate products (Faeth, 2005). This can 
have a negative effect on the development of the local producers and may restrict them to 
low value adding activities (Faeth, 2005) and can also have a negative effect on the 
import bill of the host country. 
Benefits of FDI may also be reduced by the extent of foreign-owned firms‘ borrowing 
from the domestic market (Lall & Streeten, 1997; Loungani & Razin, 2001). Borrowing 
from the domestic credit market can not only crowd out local domestic investments (due 
to increase in interest rates) but also increase the risk of funds borrowed in the domestic 
market being repatriated (Loungani & Razin, 2001). Also, excessive local borrowing can 
not only make the venture more risky but also end up host country, rather than MNC, 
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bearing the risk of the venture. Excessive local borrowing can also make the exit of MNC 
easy in difficult times, therefore making FDI more footloose. Some critics consider 
resources, assets and practices that FDI bring in to host country are inappropriate to the 
host country. MNCs are frequently associated with industrial relations issues, and 
therefore, presence of MNCs could affect host country industrial relations adversely 
(Moosa, 2002). Host countries also worry that MNC‘s participation in the host countries‘ 
economy would undermine the sovereignty of the host country.   
Although FDI can create both positive and negative effects on the host country, current 
literature favours the proposition that FDI, in general, benefits host countries. Believing 
on this proposition of potential positive effects of FDI, many host countries have 
encouraged inward FDI by providing array of special incentives (Vahter, 2004). Given 
the focus of the study, the following section discuss the effects of FDI on productivity 
and, in order to comprehend other related research issues, the next section discuss other 
potential effects that FDI can bring into the host country. 
2.4.2 FDI and Productivity 
The presence of foreign firms in host economies as producers of goods and services is 
likely to have an impact upon the efficiency of investment within the host country (United 
Nations, 1992). If foreign ownership leads to increase in productivity in the firm (own 
firm effects), then such an increase is beneficial to the host country. Presence of foreign 
firms can also affect the productivity of local firms (spillover effects). Local firms can 
improve their productivity by observing and adopting/imitating advance technologies, and 
managerial and organizational skills that foreign firms possess. Employees trained in 
foreign firms may move to local firms or start their own firms, and such employees are 
likely to contribute to local firms‘ productivity. Local firms may be forced to improve 
their efficiencies in order to compete with foreign owned firms. Alternatively, foreign 
firms can adversely affect local firms‘ productivities by grabbing market share from local 
firms and compelling local firms to operate in less-efficient scales of production. Also, 
new product and process technologies brought in by MNCs can change the industries‘ 
cost structures; such changes can alter the market structure and competition within 
industries, which would affect efficiency of investments (United Nations, 1992). 
Spillovers of FDI are typically categorised into two types: horizontal and vertical 
spillovers. Externalities of a foreign firm on the domestic firms in its own industry are 
56 
 
categorized as horizontal spillovers and externalities of a foreign firm on the firms in 
upstream industries (backward spillovers) and downstream industries (forward spillovers) 
are categorised as vertical spillovers (Hanousek, Kočenda, & Maurel, 2011; Havranek & 
Irsova, 2012).  
Empirical evidence, except handful of exceptions (for example, Blomström, 1988; Aitken 
& Harrison, 1999; Globerman, Ries, & Vertinsky, 1994), provide strong evidence for 
positive own firm effects of foreign ownership (Vahter, 2004; Lipsey, 2004). There is 
large number of studies that have examined the productivity spillover of FDI on domestic 
firms, and these studies have produced mixed results (Lipsey, 2004). Several researchers 
have found positive spillovers from foreign firms on productivity of local firms (for 
example, Blomström & Persson, 1983; Kokko, 1994; Chuang & Lin, 1999). Some have 
found either negetive or insignificant spillovers (for example, Aitken & Harrison, 1999; 
Smarzynska, 2002; Javorcik, 2004). Conducting a meta-analysis of 32 empirical studies 
on technology spillovers from FDI in developing countries, Wooster & Diebel (2010) 
shows that past empirical evidence, collectively, provide weak support for the presence of 
horizontal spillovers in developing countries.  
Recent empirical studies on productivity spillovers recognise supply side and demand 
side factors that can moderate productivity spillovers of foreign firms. They emphasise 
that the extent of spillovers will not only depend on the degree to which foeign affiliates 
are technologically active in the host country and the extent to which they expose these 
technologies (technology leakage) but also on the level of absorptive capacity of the 
domestic firms (Marin & Bell, 2006). Also, different types of FDI, for example, whether 
FDI is export oriented or market oriented or whether FDI takes place as M&A or 
Greenfield projects can have different implications for spillovers (Vahter, 2004; Javorcik, 
2004). Many empirical studies have investigated the importance of these moderating 
factors, particularly the demand side factors, i,e. the absorptive capacity of domestic 
firms. Based on Indonesian manufacturing data from 1988 to 1996, Blalock & Gertler 
(2009) demonstrate that firms with investments in research and development and firms 
with highly educated employees benefit more than other firms. Interestingly,  Kokko, 
Zejan, & Tansini (2001), based on data from Uruguay, find evidence of positive spillovers 
associated with foreign firms established during inward-oriented trade regimes but do not 
find evidence of spillovers associated with foreign firms established during more outward 
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oriented trade regimes. They explain this observation by suggesting that foreign firms 
focusing on local market (established during inward-oriented trade regimes) are more 
likely to import technology in order to compete with domestic firms, which provide 
opportunities for spillovers. In contrast, foreign firms established during outward oriented 
trade regimes rely more on their skills in international marketing and distribution than 
new production technologies, and therefore, provides less opportunities for productivity 
spillovers. Takii (2005) provide evidence for positive productivity spillovers in his study 
exploring the extent of productivity spillovers in manufacturing firms in Indonesia for the 
period 1990-1995. He also investigated the characteristics of foreign owned firms and 
locally owned plants that influence the extent of spillovers and found that spillovers were 
generally smaller in industries where greater presence of majority or wholly owned 
foreign firms was observed. He reckons this is plausible because majority owned foreign 
plants can control/limit the diffusion of their proprietary technologies more than other 
foreign owned plant.  
Among the moderating factors of technology spillovers, technology gap is the most 
controversial factor, some arguing it as a positive moderator of spillovers and some 
arguing it as an obstacle for spillovers. Takii (2005) found relatively smaller or negative 
spillovers associated with industries where technological gap between foreign plants and 
locally owned plants were relatively large implying that domestic firms in these industries 
were not technically proficient to absorb spillovers. In contrast, Blalock & Gertler (2009), 
also based on Indonesian manufacturing data, finds that firms with lower prior technical 
competency, i.e. firms with higher technical gap with foreign firms benefit more from 
productivity spillovers. Furthermore, there are many other studies that probed the 
relationship between the extent of productivity spillovers and the size of the technology 
gap and some have found it positive and others negative (Kokko, 1994; Lipsey & 
Sjöholm, 2004c). When the technology gap is large, there is more room for domestic firm 
to catch up, and therefore, such firms can benefit more than firms that have less 
technology gap with foreign firms (Blalock & Gertler, 2009). These contradictory results 
can also be attributed to a possible non-linear relationship between technology gap and 
spillovers; it is likely that while some level of a technology gap is required for spillovers 
to take place, a larger technology cap can make foreign firms‘ technology incompatible 
for domestic firms‘ use (Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004c). Using firm level data from Lithuania 
for the period 1996-2000, Smarzynska (2002) shows that spillovers through backward 
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linkages occur only when the technological gap between local and foreign firm is 
moderate but not when the technology gap is large or negligible.  
In their meta-analysis of the empirical literature on spillovers, (Meyer & Sinani, 2009) 
find a curvilinear relationship between spillovers of FDI and the host country‘s level of 
development in terms of income, institutional framework and human capital. They find 
that spillovers are related in a U shaped form to the host country‘s per capita income, 
level of human capital, and level of institutional development.  
2.4.3 Other Potential Effects of FDI  
FDI and host country capital formation 
Total capital formation, which comprises domestic capital formation and foreign capital 
formation, is considered as a key determinant of economic growth of a country (United 
Nations, 1992; Moosa, 2002). Inward FDI can directly contribute to the host country 
capital formation, and thereby, increase the output level (Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004c). 
Contribution of FDI to capital formation is higher when it takes the form of Greenfield 
investment compared to mergers and acquisitions (M&A), where existing assets are 
simply transferred from domestic to foreign owners. Contribution of an M&A to capital 
formation will be limited to the extent that the proceeds of the sale of the assets are not 
consumed (Herzer, 2012). 
FDI can also affect domestic capital formation either positively or negatively (United 
Nations, 1992). FDI can compliment domestic investment through encouraging and 
facilitating investment in upstream and downstream industries, particularly due to 
increased demand for MNCs inputs and price/quality benefits of MNCs outputs (Faeth, 
2005). FDI can negatively affect domestic capital formation when MNCs drives out 
domestic firm through competition, undertake projects that would otherwise be 
undertaken by domestic firms or compete with local firms for scarce resources such as 
skilled labour and local finance (Herzer, 2012; Faeth, 2005).  
Since FDI can either compliment or substitute domestic investment, the net effect of FDI 
on overall capital formation of a host country is difficult to comprehend. Many empirical 
studies have dedicated their effort to answer this inquiry, and most studies have found 
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FDI to have a crowding in effect on domestic investment (Agosin & Mayer, 2000; 
Bosworth, Collins, & Reinhart, 1999; Konings, 2000; Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 
1998) while some have found FDI to have a crowding out effect on domestic capital 
formation.  
Bosworth, Collins, & Reinhart (1999), investigating the effects of capital inflows on 
domestic investment in developing countries, conclude that FDI have a highly positive 
effect (nearly a one to one effect) on domestic capital formation, superior to the effects of 
portfolio capital and bank loans on domestic capital formation. With a sample of 64 
developing countries, Razin (2002) arrived at a similar conclusion by finding that FDI 
contributes to domestic investment positively and the effect of FDI is much larger than 
that of portfolio equity and international loans inflows. Agosin & Mayer (2000), by 
conducting econometric tests on panel data for countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America for 1970-1996, shows that there has been a strong crowding in effect of FDI on 
domestic investment in Asia and to a lesser extent in Africa but a strong crowding out 
effect of FDI on domestic investment in Latin America. Authors conclude that the 
positive effects of FDI on domestic investment are not certain and therefore a complete 
open policy towards incoming FDI can be sub-optimal.  
FDI and host country employment 
FDI can affect employment in host country, quantitatively, through direct provision of 
employment within foreign firms and indirect effects on employment level of local firms, 
and qualitatively, through improving the skill level of human capital in the host country 
and influencing employment policies and practices in the host country (United Nations, 
1992). FDI in labour intensive operations, which are less advanced in technology, can 
have a larger contribution to the host country‘s employment while their contribution to 
the capability development in human capital would be marginal.  In contrast, FDI in 
capital intensive operations, which use advance technologies, can have a positive impact 
on the skill level of human capital while having a marginal effect on the quantity of 
employment (United Nations, 1992). 
Most of the empirical studies indicate that the effects of FDI on the level of employment 
in the host country is small or insignificant for most of the host countries largely due to 
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high capital intensity and import dependency of foreign firms (Moosa, 2002). In contrast, 
MNCs‘ potential contribution in improving the skill level of human capital in the host 
country is widely recognized in the literature. A number of studies have observed that 
foreign firms undertake more on-the-job training than domestic firms (see Aitken & 
Harrison, 1999 and Blomström & Kokko, 1998 for an outline of these studies). However, 
the number of local workers who are likely to undergo training might not be very large 
because of the capital intensive nature of most FDI (Moosa, 2002).  
FDI and wages 
Foreign firms are generally expected to pay higher wages than domestic firms due to 
several reasons. First, due to superior technology of foreign firms, they are inclined to 
hire skilled workers, and therefore, they need to pay higher wages to attract better 
workers. Also, due to higher productivity of foreign firms, not only foreign firms are 
expected to pay higher wages but they could also afford to pay higher wages.  But there 
can be many other reasons why a foreign firm may be inclined to pay a higher wage even 
above that should be paid for a given skill level. MNCs may be encouraged to pay higher 
wages because of host and home country pressures or for better public relations (Lipsey, 
2004).  Furthermore, local workers may prefer local firms, thus foreign firms will have to 
pay a wage premium to overcome this preference (Lipsey, 2004). Most importantly, 
foreign firms may want to pay a wage premium to reduce worker turnover in order to 
slow down the phase of leakage of their superior technology to local firms (Urban, 2010). 
It may be the case that since local firms are more knowledgeable in terms of identifying 
and attracting better workers they can source workers at the optimum wage, but foreign 
firms may have to pay a extra premium because of their imperfect knowledge about local 
firms (Lipsey, 2004).  Higher wages can also be associated with foreign firms because of 
their inclination to take over high-wage domestic firms or highly productive domestic 
firms or because foreign firms tend to invest in relatively high-wage sectors (Lipsey & 
Sjöholm, 2004b; Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004c). 
In addition to the direct effects on wage level of foreign owned firms (own firm effects), 
FDI can also have a spillover effect on wage level of domestic firms. Foreign firms could 
have both positive and negative effects on wage level of domestic firms, and therefore, 
the net effect of foreign firms‘ effect on wage level of domestic firms is unclear. Wage 
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spillovers can be negative if foreign firms cream-skim high-waged workers from 
domestic firms or MNCs acquire higher paying domestic plants (Lipsey, 2004). In 
contrast, local firms wage level can be positively affected if competition in the labour 
market compels local firms to increase their wage levels to match foreign firms‘ wage 
level (Lipsey, 2004).  
Overall effect of foreign firms on host country wages depend on the net effect of direct 
and indirect effects.  If foreign firm poach high wage workers or MNCs acquire firms 
with high wage levels, then foreign firms‘ wage premium will be at the expense of wage 
level of local firms, and therefore, average industry wage level will be largely unaffected. 
If foreign firms pay higher wages without poaching skilled workers from domestic firms 
or if foreign firms pay higher wages while influencing domestic firms to pay higher 
wages (wage spillovers), then average industry wage level is likely to be raised.   
Empirical studies provide strong consistent evidence for a wage premium in foreign firms 
(Lipsey, 2004; Moller, Markusen, & Schjerning, 2007) and this wage premium persists in 
both developed and developing countries and in different industries (Lipsey & Sjöholm, 
2004b; Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004c; Lipsey, 2004). Some of these studies have attributed 
this wage premium to one or many of foreign firms‘ superior characteristics such as their 
larger size, higher capital intensiveness, higher productivity and higher skill intensity of 
labour (Globerman, Ries, & Vertinsky, 1994; Conyon et al., 1999) while some have found 
a wage premium in foreign firms even after controlling for some of these variables 
(Moller, Markusen, & Schjerning, 2007; Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004b; Haddad & Harrison, 
1993; Feliciano & Lipsey, 1999).  
Compared to empirical studies on foreign firms‘ own firm wage effects, only a handful of 
studies have looked into the foreign firms‘ spillover effect on domestic firms‘ wages 
(Görg & Greenaway, 2001). These studies have produced mix results, some observing 
positive wage spillovers (Lipsey & Sjoholm, 2001) and others observing negative or 
insignificant wage spillovers (Feliciano & Lipsey, 1999).  Moreover, Aitken, Harrison, & 
Lipsey (1996), exploring the relationship between wages and foreign investment in 
United States, Mexico and Venezuela, find wage spillovers in United States but not in 
Mexico and Venezuela. However, their estimates show that the effect of foreign 
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investment on aggregate wages (for foreign and domestic combined) is positive for all 
three countries. 
FDI and host country economic growth 
Economic growth is an outcome of the interrelationship between many economic, 
political and social factors (United Nations, 1992). Literature on economic growth 
identifies the importance of expanding the quantity of the basic factors of production, 
expanding markets and improving the efficiency within an economy (United Nations, 
1992). Advancement of technical knowledge in a country and the qualitative 
improvements in the labour force are also recognised as important contributory factors for 
economic growth (United Nations, 1992). Factors those contribute to growth are 
themselves interdependent; therefore, progress in one can facilitate advancement in 
another and poor performance in one can hinder progress in another (United Nations, 
1992). FDI can affect these growth determinants. For example, FDI can affect host 
country‘s capital stock, technology infrastructure, productivity, human capital and trade. 
Therefore, FDI is likely to have an impact on host country‘s economic growth.  
Technological progress of a country is now considered as the most important determinant 
of growth (Moosa, 2002; Blomström & Kokko, 2003b). Moreover, it is recognised in 
recent growth literature that growth rate of a developing country is largely dependent on 
its ability to adopt and implement new technologies from more advance countries 
(Moosa, 2002). Also, it is more cost effective for a developing country to use existing 
technology rather than to generate new technology through investment in R&D 
(Blomström & Kokko, 2003b). Developing countries can potentially be exposed to 
foreign technology through different channels, such as through imports of high 
technology products, licensing arrangements with MNCs, FDI projects and employing 
human capital that were foreign educated/experienced. Technology advancement can not 
only promote host country‘s growth through the production of new/advance products but 
also enables the host country to obtain a greater output from any given combination of 
input through increase in factor productivity (United Nations, 1992). Also, for small 
countries that rely heavily on their export performance, technology is critical in order to 
improve their export composition; strength of export performance will largely depend on 
the technology content of the exports (United Nations, 1992).  
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Although FDI is considered as a positive moderator for most of the determinants of 
growth such as capital stock, technology infrastructure, and productivity; as it was 
highlighted before, these positive effects are not assured. Also, its effects on some areas 
are vague. For example, its effect on trade and balance of payment is not clear due to 
higher import propensity of foreign firms and remittances of foreign firms.  
An increase in foreign investment could stimulate economic growth, and at the same time, 
economic growth can also be a powerful stimulant for FDI inflows (Nonnemberg & 
Mendonca, 2004; Agrawal, 2000). Therefore, the direction of causality, whether FDI 
causes growth in GDP or growth in GDP creates more FDI, is a much debated issue, and 
may depend on various factors such as factor endowment, geographical location, level of 
infrastructure, quality of human capital, market size and trade regime of the country 
(Faeth, 2005). Furthermore, empirical studies have produced mix results on the direction 
of causality, equally supporting both premises, and therefore, proved the existence of the 
endogeneity problem in empirical investigations.  
Many studies have being conducted to empirically investigate the effect of FDI on 
economic growth and their results are not unanimous. Studies concentrating on developed 
countries generally show positive effects but studies concentrating on developing 
countries present inconsistent results, finding positive effects, negative effects or no 
effects (Beugelsdijk, Smeets, & Zwinkels, 2008). 
Complicating this further, there is expanding literature that indicates the impact of FDI on 
the host country‘s growth is moderated by various host country factors such as level of 
human capital, trade policy and trade openness, level of financial development, level of 
economic development, the level of institutional quality, and the technology gap between 
host country and home (Solomon, 2011).  
Using a sample of 46 developing countries and considering the period 1970-1985, 
Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford (1996) shows that growth enhancing effects of 
FDI is stronger in countries that pursue an outward oriented trade policy (EP policy) than 
countries pursue an inward oriented trade policy (IS policy).  
Host country‘s capacity to absorb advance technology and other skills that MNCs bring in 
depend on the quality of human capital in the host country (United Nations, 1992; Moosa, 
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2002). Based on FDI flows from industrial countries to 69 developing countries during 
1970-1989 and proxing human capital by level of schooling, Borensztein, De Gregorio, & 
Lee (1998) show that FDI contributes to economic growth only when the host country has 
a minimum threshold level of human capital.  
Using time series data from 1959 to 2002 and employing an econometric framework of 
co-integration and error correction mechanism, Athukorala (2003) has examined the two-
way relationship between FDI and GDP in the context of Sri Lanka. His econometric 
results indicate that GDP growth rate and FDI is positively related. However, his results 
shows that GDP growth rate influence FDI directly but the direct influence of FDI 
inflows on GDP growth is weak. Further, using Engle-Granger method to see the 
direction of causality, he shows that the direction of causation is from GDP growth to FDI 
but not from FDI to GDP growth. In sum, he finds no evidence of a direct growth impact 
of FDI on the Sri Lankan economy.  
FDI and host country trade 
Foreign firms present in a host country can affect both exports and imports of that country 
through their own trade performance (direct effects) and by influencing the trade 
performance of the local firms (indirect effects). FDI can affect the terms of trade of the 
host country positively if FDI increases exports more than imports. On the other hand, 
FDI can affect the terms of trade of the host country negatively if FDI increase imports 
more than exports. The effect of FDI on trade largely depends on whether FDI and trade 
are complements or substitutes, and this largely depends on whether FDI is horizontal or 
vertical. 
Due to MNCs‘ knowledge of the markets, consumer preferences, and business practices in 
their home countries and their wider international reach, MNCs are better able to compete 
in export markets. Exporting involves international marketing, distribution, and servicing 
of products, all of which are associated with high fixed costs, and therefore, due to their 
larger size and greater resources, MNCs are better equipped to meet these requirements 
than resource constraint local firms, particularly those in developing countries 
(Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Kokko, Zejan, & Tansini, 2001). Also, through their 
marketing skills and ability to specialize across international borders, MNCs could aid the 
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host country to capitalize on its comparative advantages (Blomström & Kokko, 1998).  It 
is a well established fact that foreign firms are more export oriented than domestic firms 
(Faeth, 2005). Contribution of FDI to the host country‘s exports will depend on whether 
FDI is export oriented or market oriented. Many countries have relied on export oriented 
FDI to improve their export performance.  
Foreign firms can also affect export performance of local firms (export spillovers) 
through various channels. Local firms can benefit from technology/knowledge spillovers 
from foreign firms to improve the value propositions of their exports. Local firms could 
gain valuable knowledge about foreign markets, international marketing and distribution 
networks through foreign firms (Kokko, Zejan, & Tansini, 2001). Moreover, through their 
vertical linkages, foreign firms can affect export performance of local firms in upstream 
and downstream industries (Anwar & Nguyen, 2011).   
Foreign firms can affect host country imports through their own import activities. Foreign 
firms are notoriously popular for relying more on inputs of foreign origin, and therefore, 
foreign firms are likely to import more than their domestic counterparts. On the other 
hand, import substituting FDI is likely to bring down hosts imports. Foreign firms could 
also affect imports of downstream sectors; local firms could source from foreign firms in 
upstream sectors instead of importing. 
Several studies have provided evidence for export spillovers by showing that local firms‘ 
exports can benefit from the presence of foreign firms. Buckley, Clegg, & Wang (2002), 
based on Chinese manufacturing industries in 1995, show that both local firms‘ export 
intensities and local firms‘ propensity to develop new and high-tech products is positively 
related to the degree of foreign presence in the industry. Kokko, Zejan, & Tansini (2001) 
show that export propensity of local firms in Uruguay is positively related to the presence 
of outward oriented foreign firms but not related to the presence of import substituting 
foreign firms. Based on firm level data from Vietnam‘s manufacturing sector, Anwar & 
Nguyen (2011) investigated spillovers taking place through local firms‘ horizontal and 
vertical linkages with foreign firms. They found that the presence of foreign firms has a 
significantly positive effect on both the decision of domestic firms to export and on the 
export share of domestic firms, but only through horizontal and forward linkages. In 
contrast, they found that presence of foreign firms has a negative effect on export 
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activities of local firms in upstream industries. Except few country studies that have 
compared firm level import intensities of foreign firms and local firms, empirical studies 
on the effect of FDI on host country imports are scarce. 
FDI and balance of payment of the host country 
Through its associated foreign exchange flows, FDI can affect balance of payment (BOP) 
of the host country both directly and indirectly. Since foreign exchange is considered as a 
scarce resource in most of the developing countries, the BOP effect of FDI is much more 
crucial for developing countries (Moosa, 2002).  
FDI can have both direct and indirect effects on host country‘s balance of payment 
account. Direct effects results from inflows and outflows of foreign exchange associated 
with the foreign investment. Inflows results from equity capital and loans inflows 
associated with FDI and export income generated from activities of foreign firms. 
Outflows result from profit repatriation, loan repatriation, interest payments paid to 
service foreign loans, divestments, royalties and technical fees paid abroad and payment 
for imports of capital goods, raw material and intermediary goods.  
The net effect of FDI on balance of payment is difficult to comprehend, mainly due to 
difficulty in observing the indirect effects and because it is difficult to assess the 
opportunity cost of FDI, i.e. to answer the counterfactual question: what would have been 
the situation if the foreign investment had not occurred (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; 
Moosa, 2002). Indirect effects can have many forms. Flows associated with FDI can 
affect the exchange rate and the changes in the exchange rate can affect host country‘s 
export and import competitiveness. Foreign firms can replace some of the imports via its 
domestic sales and use of local content. FDI can also affect domestic firms‘ exports and 
imports. Complicating further, foreign firms can affect BOP by affecting and influencing 
income and consumption patterns of the residents of the host country (Moosa, 2002).   
Another complication in assessing the effect of FDI on BOP is the timing differences of 
associated flows. The initial investment (net of any imported machinery) is likely to 
improve the capital account. Continuing effects from subsequent flows can either improve 
or weaken the capital account and current account, depending on the extent of subsequent 
equity and loan flows, repatriation of profits and other payments to parent companies, 
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divestments and imports. The continuing effect of FDI on the current account will depend 
on the type of FDI. Resource based and export processing investments as well as Import 
substituting FDI are likely to affect the current account positively (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008; Moosa, 2002). Market seeking investment can either replace or increase host 
country‘s imports, and therefore, the effect on the current account can either be positive or 
negative.  
Empirical evidence on the BOP effects of FDI is scarce, particularly for developing 
countries. Available evidence indicate that although developing countries benefit from 
FDI in extraction, they do not benefit from FDI in manufacturing, largely due to high 
import content of foreign firms‘ output and transfer pricing mechanisms of MNCs 
(Moosa, 2002). In his empirical study using a sample of 159 firms distributed in Jamaica, 
Kenya, India, Iran, Colombia and Malaysia, Lall  & Streeten (1997) concluded that 
overall direct effects of these firms on the balance of payment of the respective countries 
are negative, except for Kenya. Studying the relationship between FDI and the current 
account balance in EU new member states, Mencinger (2008) conclude that FDI improves 
the current account balance through the trade account but deteriorates current account 
balance through the investment account.  
2.4.4 Concluding remarks 
Technological progress of a country is now considered as the most important determinant 
of growth (Moosa, 2002; Blomström & Kokko, 2003b). It is more cost effective for a 
developing country, such as Sri Lanka, to use existing technology in the developed world 
rather than to generate new technology through its own R&D investment (Blomström & 
Kokko, 2003b). Developing countries can potentially be exposed to foreign technology 
through different channels, such as through imports of high technology products, 
licensing arrangements with MNCs, FDI projects and employing human capital that were 
foreign educated/experienced. Out of these channels, FDI is considered the most effective 
channel in which technology transfer from advance countries to developing countries 
takes place. Technology advancement can not only promote host country‘s growth 
through the production of new/advance products but also enables the host country to 
obtain a greater output from any given combination of input through increase in factor 
productivity (United Nations, 1992). Also, for a small country such as Sri Lanka that rely 
heavily on its export performance, technology is critical in order to improve their export 
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composition since the strength of export performance will largely depend on the 
technology content of the exports (United Nations, 1992). As per the IDP theory, inward 
FDI plays a major role in upgrading local firms‘ competencies, which will enable the 
indigenous firms to later on undertake outward FDI (Dunning, 1981; United Nations, 
2006; Dunning, Kim, & Lin, 2001; Dunning, 2003). IDP theory advocates for a strong 
association between a country‘s direct investment position and its level of development.   
Preceding sections identified many other benefits that FDI can bring in to the host 
country. Although there are concerns about few negative effects that MNCs may cause to 
the host country, in general, FDI can benefit host countries enormously. Hence, it is 
important to examine the impact of FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. Therefore, Chapter 
seven presents an empirical study conducted to examine the impact of FDI on firm level 
productivity in the context of Sri Lanka. Given the scope of this study, this thesis does not 
attempt to examine the other potential effects of FDI discussed in the section 2.4.3, which 
could be a potential topic for future research.  
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Chapter 3 : Geographic, Demographic, Policy and Economic 
Environment in Sri Lanka 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a context analysis of the economy of Sri Lanka. Special attention is 
given to recognise salient features in Sri Lanka that are relevant for FDI before detailed 
descriptive analysis of FDI in Sri Lanka is provided in the following chapter. Both 
chapters intend to offer the background information for the rigorous empirical studies to 
be reported in chapter 5-7. Section 3.2 reviews geography and resource endowments, 
followed by the summary of Sri Lanka‘s demographic characteristics. Sections 3.3 and 
3.4 outline the general policy environment and the FDI policy framework, respectively. 
The chapter then moves on to examine the individual economic and financial indicators 
including economic growth and composition of GDP, savings and investments, human 
development indicators, external trade, fiscal and monetary sectors in section 3.5. Section 
3.6 gives attention to political factors, i.e. civil war and internal conflicts. Finally, section 
3.7 offers concluding remarks.  
During 1505-1948, Sri Lanka was under the rule of several colonial European powers; 
namely the Portuguese, the Dutch and, then finally, the British (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2012). Post independent Sri Lanka was widely considered as a 
country with excellent prospects for economic development and was regarded as one of 
Asia‘s most promising new nations (Snodgrass, 1998; Kelegama, 2000). For example, 
when Sri Lanka received its political independence from UK in 1948, Sri Lanka had the 
third highest per capita income in Asia, after Japan and Malaysia (Rajapatirana, 1988). 
Even by 1965, Sri Lanka‘s per capita income was higher than that of South Korea, China 
and Thailand (The World Bank, 2012b). However, Sri Lanka encountered severe 
economic and political complications in its post independent progress and ended up with 
a reputation for weak economic growth indicators but strong development indicators 
(Snodgrass, 1998).  
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3.2 Geography, Resource Endowments and Demography 
Sri Lanka is a relatively small sized island economy with a geographical area of 65,610 
square kilometres and a population of 20.8 million in 2010 (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2012). It is located south of India in the Southern Asia in the Indian Ocean. Sri 
Lanka is situated at the crossroads of major shipping routes connecting South Asia, Far 
East and the Pacific with Europe and the Americas (Board of Investment Sri Lanka, 
2011). 
Sri Lanka has a tropical climate with average monthly temperature ranging from 25.1 to 
28.1 degrees Celsius (The World Bank, 2012b) with only marginal seasonal and regional 
variations (Wenzlhuemer, 2008). The country is endowed with a rich natural resource 
base. Its resource base includes forests covering about 23% of the country; a rich 
biodiversity
8
; productive coastal and inland fisheries; fertile soils; diverse gem and 
mineral resources; and an intricate system of rivers, reservoirs, and groundwater aquifers 
that captures annual rainfall three times that of the world‘s mean (Asian Development 
Bank, 2008). Hydro power is a main source of power generation and contributes 46% of 
the total electricity generation in the country (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010). Sri 
Lanka is home to numerous unique tourist attractions and is considered as one of the best 
tourist attractions in the world. For example, NEW YORK TIMES ranked Sri Lanka as 
the number one travel destination for 2010 (The New York Times, 2010) and the Lonely 
Planet, the world's largest travel guide publisher, ranked Sri Lanka as the number one 
travel destination for 2013 (Lonely Planet, 2013).      
The Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims are the three largest ethnic groups in the country 
accounting for 73.8%, 8.5%, and 7.2% of the population, respectively (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2012). Sinhala and Tamil are the most widely spoken languages 
with about 74% and 17% of speakers in 1993, respectively (Gordon, 2005). Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity are the most prevalent religions in Sri Lanka 
accounting for 69.1%, 7.1%, 7.6%, and 6.2% respectively (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2012). Only 14% of the population is urban and the rate of urbanization is low at 1.1% 
annual rate (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).  
                                                 
8
 Sri Lanka is considered as one of the 25 biodiversity ―hot spots‖ in the world 
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3.3 Post-Colonial Context and Policy Environment 
Sri Lanka, which was previously known as Ceylon, had been considered as the model 
crown colony of the nineteenth-century British Empire (Wenzlhuemer, 2008). When Sri 
Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948, Sri Lanka‘s economy was an open 
economy and was largely a plantation-based economy dependent on the export of three 
primary commodities: tea rubber and coconut (Rajapatirana, 1988). Because these 
commodities were highly demanded in the world market during this time, Sri Lanka had a 
smoothly functioning export economy (Snodgrass, 1998). Agricultural sector accounted 
for more than 40% of national income, out of which plantation sector alone accounted for 
one-third of national income and 90% of foreign exchange earnings (UNCTAD, 2004; 
Kelegama, 2000). Sri Lanka had the third highest per capita income in Asia, after Japan 
and Malaysia (Rajapatirana, 1988). Moreover, Sri Lanka had high human development 
indicators, which was far higher than that of most of the Asian countries (Abeyratne, 
2008). It also inherited a well-developed infrastructure, an efficient administrative 
mechanism and a democratic political system from the British colonial rule (Abeyratne, 
2008).  Sri Lanka‘s external assets at the end of 1950 were equivalent to almost an entire 
year of imports, a figure that was well above that of other small countries that were also 
highly dependent upon international trade (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1950). All these 
favourable aspects positioned Sri Lanka in a very promising state, and therefore, Sri 
Lanka was considered as the most prospective development success in Asia (Abeyratne, 
2008). 
Sri Lanka‘s continuous reliance on these relatively price inelastic primary commodities 
(tea, rubber and coconut) and expending bulk of the export income on subsidised food 
imports weakened the terms of trade in subsequent years and resulted in negative trade 
balances and balance of payment deficits after 1960s. This tempted to a shift towards 
protectionist import-substituting policies (Kelegama, 2000; Athukorala and 
Rajapathirana, 2000). From early 1960s, Sri Lanka started introducing inward oriented 
development strategies coupled with import substitution policies, and Sri Lankan 
economy ended up being one of the most inward-oriented and regulated economies 
outside the communist bloc by mid-1970s (Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004). Moreover, 
policy environment was largely concerned about achieving equality and was largely 
driven by wealth redistribution strategies (through extensive welfare programmes) while 
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giving less attention to wealth creation (Abeyratne, 2008). Expanding the social welfare 
system was seen as a convenient means to achieve political popularity among masses 
(Abeyratne, 2008). Due to a change in political power from left-wing to right-wing in 
1965, Sri Lanka gasped some limited liberalisation during 1965-1970 (Snodgrass, 1998). 
However, the left-wing regained political power in 1970, and thereafter, Sri Lanka 
resumed its inward oriented controlled economy (Snodgrass, 1998).  During these 
periods, state intervention in the economic activities became commonplace, and the Sri 
Lanka‘s economy was dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) while private sector 
receiving less attention by the state (Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004). Most sectors 
including manufacturing, trade, transport, telecommunications and financial services were 
under state monopolies and were subject to state controls (The World bank, 2007). Due to 
these inward looking and short-sighted policies, Sri Lanka experienced slow growth rates 
with rising unemployment in this era, and instead of relieving the balance of payment 
problem, these policies aggravated it by discouraging export expansion (Abeyratne, 
2008).  Dismal outcomes of these inward oriented policies led to a major shift in political 
power from left-wing to right-wing in 1997 with the elected party, United National Party, 
securing majority of the votes (Snodgrass, 1998).  
The new government, with the strong mandate, initiated extensive economic liberalisation 
process in 1977 by liberalising trade, price and investment controls (Athukorala & 
Jayasuriya, 2004; Rajapatirana, 1988). Previously imposed quantitative restrictions on 
imports were removed and a more uniform tariff structure was introduced. Also, 
exchange rate was realigned in 1978 which had been overvalued due to pre-existed trade 
suppression (The World Bank, 2007). In addition to relaxing several impediments to FDI, 
the new government established the Greater Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC) in 
1978 to promote export oriented foreign investment (The World Bank, 2007). GCEC is 
the forerunner to the Board of Investment, which is the incumbent establishment 
responsible for FDI. GCEC was responsible in establishing several export-processing 
zones (EPZ‘s) and formulating and implementing an incentives package for foreign 
investments (The World Bank, 2007). 
However, as a result of delays and inconsistencies in the implementation of the 1977 
reform process, mostly caused by the internal civil conflict, the 1977 reform process lost 
its momentum in early 1980s. Thereafter, a second wave of liberalisation was initiated in 
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1990s (Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004). The 1990s reform process focused more on 
export expansion and included further tariff cuts, simplification of tariff structure, 
opening up of the current account, and privatization of large state-owned enterprises  
(Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004; The World bank, 2007). Since 1989, privatisation has 
been pursued aggressively and 92 enterprises, largely in the plantation, industry, 
insurance, telecom, hotel, and airline sectors, were privatised during 1989-2005 (Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, 2007, table 116). In addition to these, 92 bus depots in the public 
transport sector were also privatised (Salih, 2000). Since 1994, political power changed 
back and forth between the two major political parties in several occasions; however, 
these changes did not lead to radical changes in economic policy (Snodgrass, 1998). 
However, the privatisation trend was halted, if not reversed, after 2005. Incumbent 
government advocates state control of what it believes to be strategic enterprises, and 
have halted some of the privatisations that were in the process and have reversed several 
previous privatisations (Bureau of Economic, 2011). Furthermore, in 2011, 37 privately 
owned companies, some of which were foreign-invested firms, were expropriated by the 
Sri Lankan government through passing a controversial law in the parliament. The bill 
was termed as The Revival of Under-Performing Enterprises and Under-Utilised Assets 
Act, and targeted 37 private enterprises that had previously received land or aid from the 
government (The Economist, 2011; Brown, 2011). In addition to these, Sri Lankan 
military is also gradually increasing its involvement in some of the activities that were 
earlier reserved for the private sector such as air and sea transport and tourism (Bureau of 
Economic, 2012).  
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3.4 FDI Policy Framework 
BOI, which was established in 1992 as the successor to GCEC, is the principal 
government authority responsible for investment in the country, with a focus on foreign 
investment (Bureau of Economic, 2011). BOI has extensive authority of tax relief and 
administrative discretion in all matters related to FDI (Pravakar, 2006). BOI grants these 
concessions to firms fulfilling stipulated eligibility criteria on minimum investment, 
exports and employment (Bureau of Economic, 2011). However, major investments in Sri 
Lanka, such as infrastructure projects, require cabinet approval (Bureau of Economic, 
2011). 
Majority of sectors are open to foreign investment; however, Sri Lanka maintains a long 
list of sectors in which FDI is completely restricted
9
  or only allowed with minority 
stakes
10
 (Pravakar, 2006; Bureau of Economic, 2012). Furthermore, foreign investments 
in several strategic sectors
11
 are regulated and subject to approval by the BOI and various 
government agencies (Bureau of Economic, 2012). Nevertheless, Sri Lanka is relatively 
more open to FDI than other south Asian countries (Pravakar, 2006; Bureau of Economic, 
2011). 
Until February 2013, foreign investors could purchase land from private sellers subject to 
a 100% tax
12
 although the government, which owns about 80% of the land in Sri Lanka, 
usually leased land on 50 year-term or on 99 year-term on case by case basis. (Bureau of 
Economic, 2012). In February 2013, Sri Lankan government brought in new regulations 
prohibiting sale of state owned and private owned land to foreigners (Reuters, 2013). 
Foreign investors are allowed to access credit on the local market and to raise foreign 
currency loans (Bureau of Economic, 2011). 
                                                 
9
 Areas of non-bank money lending, pawn-brokering, retail trade with a capital investment of less than $1 
million, and coastal fishing are completely restricted for foreign investments. 
10
 Foreign investment in growing and processing of primary commodities, production for export of goods 
subject to international quotas, timber based industries using local timber, deep sea fishing, mass 
communications, education, freight forwarding, and travel agency and shipping agency business are 
partially restricted, i.e. foreign investors are allowed to invest up to 40% or a higher percentage if approval 
of BOI is granted. 
11
 Air transportation; coastal shipping; large scale mechanized mining of gems; lotteries and manufacture of 
military hardware, military vehicles and aircraft, dangerous drugs, alcohol, toxic, hazardous or carcinogenic 
materials, currency and security documents 
12
 This tax is applicable if the foreign stake of a venture is not less than 25% 
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Sri Lanka has bilateral Investment Protection Agreements with 27 countries and bilateral 
double tax avoidance agreements with 38 countries (Board of Investment Sri Lanka, 
2012). The repatriation of capital and profits is guaranteed (Pravakar, 2006). Sri Lanka 
has 12 free trade zones, 11 of which are export processing zones and one of which is an 
industrial park (Figure 3-1).  
Figure 3-1: Free Trade zones in Sri Lanka 
 
Source: Board of Investment Sri Lanka, 2012 
  
Free Trade 
Zones in Sri 
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3.5 Economic and Financial Indicators 
3.5.1 Economic growth and composition of GDP 
Despite its inward looking economic policies in the past and decades of civil war, Sri 
Lanka has managed to record relatively moderate economic growth during past 6 decades 
(Table 3-1). As a result of the economic liberalisations initiated after 1977, Sri Lanka 
witnessed an average GDP growth rate of 5.4% during 1977-1983 (Table 3-1).  
Sri Lanka‘s economy has been growing rapidly in the recent years while recording an 8 
percent growth in year 2010 and 8.3 percent growth in year 2011, which is the highest 
GDP growth rate achieved in the last three decades (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010; 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011). Sri Lanka has also been graduated to a ‗middle 
income‘ economy status by the international monetary fund (IMF) in January 2010 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010).   
Table 3-1: Economic growth rates under distinctive periods  
Period/Sub period 
Real Gross Domestic Product 
(Percentage change per year) 
1948-1956: Populism with open economy 3.2* 
1956-1965: Populism with controlled economy 4.3* 
1965-1970: Limited Liberalisation 5.8 
1970-1977: Resumption of controlled economy 3.8 
1977-1983: Liberalisation with relative peace  5.4 
1983-1989: Start of civil war 3.5 
1989-1995: Second round of reform 5.6 
1995-2009: post reform period with civil war 4.9 
2009-2011: post war 8.2 
Source: The World Bank, 2012 and Snodgrass, 1998 
FDI is generally considered as a positive moderator for most of the determinants of 
growth such as capital stock, technology infrastructure, human capital and productivity. 
Therefore, FDI is likely to have a positive impact on host country‘s economic growth. 
However, in his econometric analysis examining FDI and GDP growth relationship in the 
context of Sri Lanka, Athukorala (2003) shows that although FDI and GDP growth are 
77 
 
positively related, this relationship is a result of GDP growth causing FDI. He finds no 
evidence of a direct growth impact of FDI on the Sri Lankan economy. 
Main contribution to the GDP comes from the services sector which accounts for almost 
60% of GDP in 2011. Industrial sector accounts for about 30% of GDP and agricultural 
sector accounts for only 11% of GDP (Table 3-2). Sri Lanka‘s dynamic private sector is 
the main contributor to the GDP and it accounts for more than 85% of the GDP (Asian 
Development Bank, 2008). 
Economic growth in Sri Lanka has been mainly driven by services and industrial sectors 
while growth in agricultural sector has been very low (Table 3-3). Therefore, the 
proportion of agricultural sector has continuously contracted while proportion of 
industrial and services sectors have increased (Table 3-2).  
Table 3-2: Composition of economic sectors (as a share of GDP) 
 
As a share of GDP (%) Composition of economic sectors  
 
1981 1991 2001 2011 
Agriculture 24.6 22.6 20.1 11.2 
Industry 22.1 27.0 26.8 29.3 
Services 53.3 50.4 53.1 59.5 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, (various years), Annual Reports, various issues 
Table 3-3: Growth in GDP by economic sector 
 
Growth in GDP by economic sector (Rate of change %) 
 
1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 2011 
Agriculture 3.2 1.9 3.0 1.5 
Industry 6.2 8.0 5.2 10.3 
Services 4.7 5.2 5.9 8.6 
GDP 4.3 5.2 5.2 8.3 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, (various years), Annual Reports, various issues 
Sri Lanka‘s industrial sector is narrowly concentrated in a few sectors with little 
participation in technical intensive sectors (Figure 3-2). OECD Directorate for Science, 
Technology and Industry has classified manufacturing industries into four categories 
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based on R&D intensities
13
; (1) high-technology industries, (2) medium-high-technology 
industries, (3) medium-low-technology industries, and (4) low-technology industries 
(Economic Analysis and Statistic Division, 2011). Except chemical and chemical 
products sector, which account for only 5% of the total value addition in 2011, all other 
sectors come under either medium-low-technology industries category or low-technology 
industries category.  
Figure 3-2: Composition of value added by industry in 2011  
 
     Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011 
3.5.2 Savings and Investments 
Sri Lanka‘s national savings rate is low compared to countries in East Asia and to India 
(Table 3.4). Sri Lanka‘s historical savings rate has also been very low, averaging below 
12% during 1965-1993. Contrastingly, countries in East Asia and India have had 
comparatively high average savings rates of around 24%-33% and 18% respectively 
(Radelet, Sachs, & Lee, 1997, Table 14).  However, this may not be surprising due to the 
political instability that prevailed in the country
14
. Gross capital formation as a percentage 
of GDP stands at 27.8% in 2010 and it is lower than India and some of the East Asian 
countries. The main contribution to GCF comes from the domestic private sector and 
                                                 
13
 ISIC Rev. 3 technology intensity definition 
14
 Radelet, Sachs, & Lee (1997) have shown that political instability has a negative effect on national 
savings. 
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contribution to GCF from public investment remains low (Athukorala, 2003). The 
contribution from FDI to GCF is very low, particularly compared with countries in South 
East Asia.  
Table 3-4: Key economic indicators of selected Asian countries 
Country 
FDI as 
% of 
GDP 
FDI as a 
% of 
GCF 
GCF 
(Investment)/
GDP 
Savings/
GDP 
Exports 
as a % 
of GDP 
Imports 
as a % 
of GDP 
Average 
Inflation 
South Asia 
2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 
(2001-
2011) 
Sri Lanka 1.62 5.40 29.93 15.38 23.05 37.60 10.37 
India 1.72 4.85 35.45 29.00 23.88 30.33 6.59 
Pakistan 0.62 4.75 13.07 8.00 14.16 19.23 9.19 
Bangladesh 1.02 4.04 25.15 16.44 22.90 31.61 6.79 
Nepal 0.50 1.52 32.54 8.62 8.91 32.83 6.98 
        East Asia 
       China 3.83 7.93 48.31 50.89 31.39 27.32 2.45 
Hong Kong  38.65 160.31 24.11 27.21 224.57 221.47 0.89 
Korea, Rep. 0.43 1.47 29.51 31.53 56.03 54.02 3.26 
        South East Asia 
       Malaysia 4.17 17.67 23.58 39.48 91.56 75.66 2.30 
Singapore 22.82 102.85 22.19 49.81 207.19 179.57 1.95 
Thailand 2.25 8.45 26.63 31.16 76.94 72.41 2.73 
Vietnam 6.01 17.17 34.98 30.77 86.96 91.17 8.73 
Philippines 0.81 3.96 20.46 16.81 31.97 35.62 4.64 
Indonesia 2.27 6.90 32.94 34.38 26.36 24.92 8.30 
Source: The World Development Indicators, 2013 
Sri Lanka has a negative savings investment gap, largely due to low domestic savings, 
and such a negative savings investment gap has to be financed by external financing, 
either in the form of FDI or borrowing (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2012). Sri Lanka‘s 
negative savings investment gap is largely funded by foreign borrowings and these 
borrowings have led Sri Lanka to accumulate large external debt. Poor performance in 
attracting foreign investment during the past is likely to be a reason for deteriorating 
external debt situation. For example, in 2012, FDI inflows amounted to US$ million 891 
while medium and long-term loan inflows to the government alone amounted to US$ 
2,869 million (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2012). Sri Lanka‘s total external debt as a 
percentage of GDP stood at 47.9 per cent in 2012 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2012).  
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Inward FDI can directly contribute to the host country capital formation (Lipsey & 
Sjöholm, 2004c). Contribution of FDI to capital formation is higher when it takes the 
form of Greenfield investments compared to mergers and acquisitions (M&A), where 
existing assets are simply transferred from domestic to foreign owners. Contribution of 
M&A to capital formation will be limited to the extent that the proceeds of the sale of the 
assets are not consumed (Herzer, 2012). FDI can also affect domestic capital formation 
either positively or negatively (United Nations, 1992). FDI can complement domestic 
investment through encouraging and facilitating investment in upstream and downstream 
industries, particularly due to increased demand for MNCs inputs and price/quality 
benefits of MNCs outputs (Faeth, 2005). FDI can negatively affect domestic capital 
formation when MNCs drives out domestic firm through competition, undertake projects 
that would otherwise be undertaken by domestic firms or compete with local firms for 
scarce resources such as skilled labour and local finance (Herzer, 2012; Faeth, 2005). 
Since FDI can either compliment or substitute domestic investment, the net effect of FDI 
on overall capital formation in the host country is difficult to comprehend. Many 
empirical studies have dedicated their effort to answer this inquiry. Although few studies 
have found FDI to have a crowding out effect on domestic capital formation in some 
countries (Agosin & Mayer, 2000), most studies have found FDI to have a crowding in 
effect on domestic investment (Agosin & Mayer, 2000; Bosworth, Collins, & Reinhart, 
1999; Konings, 2000; Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998). Due to these beneficial 
effects of FDI, instead of relying on foreign borrowings, Sri Lanka needs to put more 
attention on bringing in larger volumes of FDI in order to bridge its inherent savings 
investments gap. 
3.5.3 Human Development Indicators 
Although Sri Lanka‘s economic performance indicators are not admirable, Sri Lanka is 
well known for its impressive development indicators (Pradhan, 2001). Expanding the 
social welfare system was seen as a convenient means to achieve political popularity 
among masses, and possibly, for this reason, Sri Lanka‘s post-colonial governments had a 
strong commitment to social development, often policy environment driven mainly by 
wealth redistribution strategies (Abeyratne, 2008). Prior to economic reforms introduced 
in 1977, Sri Lanka maintained extensive social welfare strategies, for example, providing 
free education and health services, food rationing, subsidising agriculture, carrying out 
land reforms and controlling the prices of essential food items (Semasinghe, 2011). 
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Although some of these provisions were discontinued after the economic reforms 
introduced in 1977, Sri Lanka‘s social welfare system continued to provide free health 
care and social services and free education to all people (United Nations Development 
Programme, 1998; Semasinghe, 2011). Due to decades of prioritised attention given to 
human development, Sri Lanka ended up with very good human development indicators. 
For a country that has recently been graduated to a middle-income country (Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka, 2010), social indicators in Sri Lanka are unusually high (Table 3-5). Such 
exceptional human development indicators made Sri Lanka stand out in the Asian region 
in the past; nevertheless, Sri Lanka has now become less distinctive because most of the 
faster growing countries in Asia have caught up Sri Lanka‘s previously outstanding 
human development indicators (Table 3-5; Snodgrass, 1998; United Nations 
Development Programme, 1998; UNDP Sri Lanka, 2012). 
Table 3-5: Human Development Indicators in selected Asian countries 
Country 
Male Life 
expectancy at 
birth, male 
(years) 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth, female 
(years) 
Infant 
Mortality Rate 
(per 1,000 live 
births) 
Average years 
of Schooling 
Literacy rate, 
adult total (% 
of people ages 
15 and above) 
Secondary 
education 
enrolment rate (in population 
age 25+) 
 
1970 2010 1970 2010 1970 2011 1960 2010 
1979-
1982 
2008-
2009 
1976 2008 
South Asia 
            
Sri Lanka 61 72 65 78 56 14 4.2 10.8 87 91 49 87 
India 50 64 48 67 127 48 0.9 4.4 41 63 26 60 
Pakistan 53 64 53 66 130 70 0.9 4.9 26 56 18 34 
Bangladesh 40 68 44 69 156 38 0.9 4.8 29 56 16 45 
Nepal 43 68 43 69 163 41 0.1 3.2 21 59 12 44 
East Asia             
China 62 72 64 75 78 16 1.4 7.5 66 94 57 78 
Hong Kong SAR, China 68 80 75 86 N/A N/A 4.4 10 N/A N/A 49 85 
Korea, Rep. 58 77 65 84 41 4 3.2 11.6 N/A N/A 58 96 
South East Asia             
Malaysia 63 72 65 76 43 5 2.3 9.5 70 92 47 69 
Singapore 65 79 72 84 22 2 2.8 8.8 83 95 N/A N/A 
Thailand 57 71 62 77 73 11 3.4 6.6 88 94 25 75 
Vietnam 45 73 50 77 N/A 19 2.2 5.5 84 93 37 77 
Philippines 59 65 63 72 57 23 3.7 8.7 83 95 57 83 
Indonesia 50 67 53 71 100 27 1.1 5.8 67 92 22 70 
 
Source: The World Bank, 2012 and Barro & Lee, 2010 
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3.5.4 External Trade 
When Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948, export sector was dominated 
by three primary commodities; tea, rubber, and coconut. Since these commodities were 
highly demanded in the world market, Sri Lanka not only enjoyed a significant trade 
surplus but also a strong external financial position. Sri Lanka‘s external assets at the end 
of 1950 were equivalent to almost an entire year of imports, a figure that was well above 
that of other small countries that were also highly dependent upon international trade 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1950).  
However, Sri Lanka‘s continuous reliance on these relatively price inelastic primary 
commodities and spending bulk of the export income on subsidized food imports 
weakened the terms of trade in subsequent years and resulted in negative trade balances 
and balance of payment deficits after 1960s (Kelegama, 2000). The reforms introduced in 
late 1970s helped Sri Lanka‘s trade and industrial structure to transform from a one based 
on land-intensive plantation exports to a one based on labour-intensive manufacturing 
(The World bank, 2004). Thereafter, proportion of agricultural exports has declined while 
proportion of industrial exports has increased (Table 3-6). However, industrial exports 
growth has been primarily driven by textile and garment exports. Textile and garment 
exports have now become Sri Lanka‘s most important industry employing about 15% of 
the labour force (The World Bank, 2004) and accounting for about 40% of all exports 
(Table 3-6). Almost all exports are generated in resource and/or labour intensive sectors 
with low technology intensity. Sri Lanka has yet failed to diversify its exports 
composition to medium or high technology intensive sectors. 
In the recent past, Sri Lanka‘s imports have grown faster than exports and currently 
imports expenditure is about two times as exports income
15
.  This has led to a large 
current account deficit
16
. This situation would have been worse if not for the large amount 
of remittances from migrant workers, Sri Lanka‘s largest source of foreign exchange.  
 
                                                 
15
    In 2011, Sri Lanka's exports and imports stood at $10.5 billion and $20.2 billion, respectively (Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011). 
16
 Current account deficit ($9.3 billion) was almost as the same size as the value of exports ($10.6 billion) in 
2011 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011). 
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Table 3-6: Composition of Exports  
Category Composition of Exports (as a percentage of total exports) 
1960 1981 1991 2001 2011 
Agricultural Exports 90.5 57.83 31.45 19.35 23.9 
Tea 59.8 30.62 21.17 14.32 14.1 
Rubber 20.7 13.73 3.13 0.50 2 
Coconut 10 6.83 3.10 1.70 2.5 
Spices 
    
2.2 
      Industrial Exports 
 
34.67 60.13 77.02 75.7 
Textiles and Garments 
 
14.36 39.42 52.79 39.7 
Rubber products 
   
3.57 8.4 
Petroleum Products 
 
16.04 3.90 1.41 5.2 
Gems, Diamonds and Jewellery 
 
3.01 2.79 5.54 5 
      Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, (various years), Annual Reports, 1960, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011 
Sri Lanka‘s exports income is generated through a very narrow product range while more 
than half of the exports coming from tea and garments (Table 3-6). Closely corresponding 
to Sri Lanka‘s industrial structure, almost all industrial exports are associated with very 
low technical intensity.  Also, Sri Lanka‘s exports destinations are narrowly concentrated 
in few markets, particularly in western markets. More than half of the export goes to USA 
and EU (Figure 3-3). Moreover, more than 90% of garment exports go to USA and EU 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011, Table 69). Sri Lanka enjoyed duty free privileges for 
exports to the EU under the "EU GSP-Plus" incentive agreement, but this concession was 
withdrawn in 2010 due to Sri Lankan government‘s failure to implement three human 
rights conventions (Bureau of Economic, 2011). However, Sri Lanka continues to enjoy 
duty free privileges for exports to the USA under US GSP program (Bureau of Economic, 
2012).  
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Figure 3-3: Exports by destination in 2011 (as a percentage of total exports) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011 
In the early decades after independence, Sri Lanka was spending bulk of its export 
income to subsidize food imports, and therefore, imports of consumer goods dominated 
import expenditure at that time (Table 3-7). With the expansion of manufacturing and 
services industries, imports expenditure on intermediate goods has become more 
significant.  Currently, more than 60% of imports expenditure is incurred on intermediate 
goods. Import of petroleum goods, which is categorised under intermediate goods, 
accounts for about quarter of total imports. This shows the extent to which Sri Lanka is 
dependent on oil imports. Due to this dependency, Sri Lanka is highly susceptible to 
world oil price fluctuations. Therefore, import expenditure on petroleum goods has 
fluctuated significantly. Majority of imports takes place in consumer goods sectors and 
low technology intensive sectors. Absence of imports into advance technology sectors is 
not surprising due to lower level of industrialization in Sri Lanka.  
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Table 3-7: Composition of Imports 
Category Composition of Imports (as a percentage of total imports) 
1960 1980 1990 2000 2010 2011 
Consumer Goods 46.70 29.90 26.38 16.87 18.40 18.00 
Food and Beverages 34.10 18.90 14.50 8.93 9.80 7.70 
 
      
Intermediate Goods 8.90 45.70 51.76 51.76 59.90 60.60 
Petroleum Goods 6.00 23.80 13.34 12.31 22.60 23.70 
Textiles   
12.49 20.10 13.50 11.40 
 
      
Investment Goods 6.70 24.00 21.73 23.73 20.50 21.10 
Machinery and Equipment 1.30 12.40 9.18 10.75 10.00 10.60 
 
      
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, (various years), Annual Reports, various issues 
Although Sri Lanka‘s majority of exports goes to western markets, Majority of Sri 
Lanka‘s imports originate from Asian destinations (Figure 3-4). More than 60% of 
imports are sourced from Asia. India is the largest source of imports which accounts for 
about a quarter of total imports. Therefore, Sri Lanka has a large trade surplus with the 
western countries while having a large trade deficit with Asia, primarily with India and 
China.  
Figure 3-4: Imports by destination in 2011 (as a percentage of total exports) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011  
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3.5.5 Fiscal and Monetary sectors 
Sri Lanka‘s government faces budget constraints largely due to high public sector 
expenditure, large interest payments on public debt and military expenditure
17
. Sri 
Lanka‘s bureaucracy is one of the largest in the Asian region, which employs 3.9% of the 
total population as civil servants (The World Bank, 2004). Sri Lanka‘s large bureaucracy 
is highly inefficient, and therefore, largely subsidised (Pradhan, 2001; The World Bank, 
2004). State owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in many sectors including transport 
(bus, railway, and aviation), utilities (electricity, water supply, petroleum imports and 
retail, and telecommunications), TV and Radio broadcasting, newspaper publishing, 
banking and insurance (Bureau of Economic, 2011). Most of the SOEs are inefficient, 
overstaffed and loss making enterprises (The World Bank, 2004). More than 30% of 
government‘s current expenditure is spent on salaries and wages for public sector 
employees (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011, table 6.3). Although Sri Lanka‘s 
Government debt as a percentage of GDP is declining primarily because of fast economic 
growth, it remains high at 78.5% (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011). This has imposed a 
severe interest burden on the government budget. Interest payment on government debt is 
the single largest recurrent expenditure and currently consumes 35.4% of current 
expenditure. Even though civil war ended in May 2009, military expenditure has not 
declined after 2009. Currently defence expenditure consumes about 16% of current 
expenditure (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011). Interest payments, public sector wages 
and defence expenditure taken together consume almost all of the tax revenues. As a 
result, capital expenditure of Sri Lankan government is largely constraint, the primary 
reason why Sri Lanka remains with a large infrastructure deficit. 
Sri Lanka is notorious for high inflation rates in the past; however, inflation pressures 
were relatively lower since the end of war (Table 3-8). Sri Lanka is also associated with 
high interest rates, and as a result, businesses face high borrowing costs, and this has been 
a main barrier for entrepreneurship in the country (Bureau of Economic, 2011). Low level 
of domestic investment is also partly attributed to higher interest rates (Pradhan, 2001).   
 
 
                                                 
17
 Fiscal deficit stood at 6.9% of GDP in 2011(Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011) 
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  Table 3-8: Annual Inflation, annual % increase in consumer prices index 
Year/Period Yearly/Average Minimum Maximum 
1981-1990 12.4 1.5 21.5 
1991-2000 9.7 4.7 15.9 
2001-2010 10.7 3.4 22.6 
2010 6.2   
2011 6.7   
Source: The World Bank, 2012 and Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011 
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3.6 Civil War and Internal Conflicts  
Sri Lanka much like Singapore is home to two distinct ethnic communities - the Tamils 
and Sinhalese. Unlike in Singapore, the two groups have not been able to forge unity in 
promoting the interests of one and all. Sri Lanka has recently emerged from a long drawn 
out internecine conflict between these two main ethnic communities in Sri Lanka. 
Sri Lanka has faced several phases of violent internal conflict and each phase has 
adversely affected the growth prospects of the country. Two major types of conflicts were 
evident in the past. First is the civil war which was waged between the government of Sri 
Lanka and a separatist guerrilla group representing Tamil minority (LTTE) who sought to 
break off the north and east regions of the country as a separate sovereign state 
(Abeysekera, 2011). Second is an armed revolution led by the radical Sinhalese youth-
based movement, the JVP, against the Sri Lankan government (Arunathilaka, Jayasuriya 
& Kelegama, 2000). 
After Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948, Sri Lankan politicians opt to 
pro-Sinhalese nationalism in order to gain political gains by posturing and pandering the 
majority Sinhalese (Petesch & Thalayasingam, 2010). This led to several legislative 
changes that marginalised and discriminated the Tamil minority. In 1956, Sri Lankan 
parliament passed the Sinhala only bill making the Sinhala language the only official 
language (DeVotta, 2010; DeVotta, 2000). In addition to this, introduction of language-
based quota system for allocating university admissions in 1972
18
 and the change in the 
constitutional definition of Sri Lanka to a Sinhala-Buddhist country are the major 
legislative changes that increasingly marginalised the Tamil minority (Abeyratne, 2008; 
Petesch & Thalayasingam, 2010). These ethnic discriminations led to a rise in Tamil 
militarism in the mid-seventies, and these Tamil separatist movements developed to a 
fully-fledged civil war between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE (DeVotta, 
2004; Abeyratne, 2008). 
The civil war took place in four phases with cease fire arrangements in between these 
phases; phase one during 1983-1988, phase two during 1990-1994, phase three during 
1995-2002, and phase four during 2004-2009 (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & Kelegama, 
                                                 
18
 Although this language based quota system was changed to a district- base quota system in 1974, there 
has been a significant decrease in the share of Tamil students in Universities (Abeyratne, 2008). 
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2001; Duma, 2007; Various issues of Central Bank annual reports). In May 2009, Sri 
Lanka‘s government declared victory over LTTE, bringing to an end to the 26 years of 
brutal war, which was the bloodiest conflict in Asia (DeVotta, 2010). The JVP based 
armed uprising took place in two occasions, in 1971 and in 1989-1990, and in both 
occasions the uprisings were violently crushed by the incumbent government with the use 
of armed forces (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & Kelegama, 2001). The on and off nature of 
these conflicts can be represented in the timeline shown in Figure 3-5. Extent of variation 
in conflict intensity can be comprehended by observing the number of total confirmed 
fatalities (Figure 3-6). 
Even though the civil war was largely confined to north and east (Asian Development 
Bank, 2008), LTTE occasionally attacked other regions, particularly Colombo, the capital 
of Sri Lanka. They targeted some of the key places, for example, Colombo International 
Airport and Central Bank, and bombed Colombo‘s financial and business districts causing 
extensive damage in terms of both casualties and property damage (Bureau of Economic, 
2011).   
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Figure 3-5: Timeline of the conflicts in Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Number of total confirmed fatalities (killed) in conflict related incidents  
 
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2011. 
Global Terrorism Database   
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3.7 Concluding Remarks  
This chapter provided the necessary background to extend this research study on FDI in 
Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka had been considered, and continued to be considered, as a country 
with excellent prospects for economic development. However, Sri Lanka‘s economic 
performance has so far failed to achieve its potential. 
Subsequent to the policy reforms introduced in 1977, Sri Lanka remains an open 
economy. Sri Lanka possesses significant resource and location advantages and 
impressive human development indicators but its growth indicators are not impressive. 
Civil war has been considered as one of the main barriers to economic development. Sri 
Lanka has a predominantly factor driven economy that rely on low skilled labour. It‗s 
economy is characterised by a lower level of industrialisation and is narrowly 
concentrated in a few sectors with little participation in technical intensive sectors. These 
structural deficiencies along with weak export structure could undermine Sri Lanka‘s 
competitiveness in the global marketplace. Low savings and investment rates; fiscal 
constraints due to high public sector expenditure, large interest payments on public debt 
and military expenditure; high inflationary pressures and high interest rates appear to be 
major issues that inhibit growth prospects of Sri Lanka.    
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Chapter 4 : FDI in Sri Lanka 
4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a context analysis of FDI and related aspects of 
FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. Section 4.1 provides an overview of current status of FDI 
in Sri Lanka. Dimensions of FDI in terms of distribution by sector and origin is explored 
in section 4.2. Section 4.3 investigates the opportunities that Sri Lanka can offer to 
potential foreign investors. Finally, section 4.4 presents a preliminary overview of factors 
that can influence FDI flows to Sri Lanka.  
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4.2 FDI in Sri Lanka: an Overview 
When Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948, Sri Lanka‘s economy was an 
agricultural economy, largely based on plantation crops, tea, rubber, and coconut. The 
plantation sector, much of which was owned by foreign investors, was nationalized in the 
early 1970s (UNCTAD, 2004). Thereafter, foreign involvement in direct investment was 
very limited until 1977s liberalisation initiatives. Although 1977s reforms and the 
establishment of GCEC improved FDI inflows in 1980s, FDI did not surge until the 
1990s. FDI inflows jumped in the 1990s mainly due to the ambitious privatisation 
programme (Table 4 1). Out of the total privatisation proceeds realised during 1989-2005, 
59% was financed by foreign investors (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2007, table 116). 
With the relaxation of several impediments to FDI and establishment of the Greater 
Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC) in 1978, FDI started picking up after 1978. 
GCEC was responsible for establishing several export processing zones (EPZ‘s) and 
formulating and implementing an incentives package for foreign investments (The World 
bank, 2007). However, GCEC‘s mandate was confined to the outskirts of Colombo. In 
1992, the GCEC was reconstituted as the Board of Investment of Sri Lanka (BOI) with its 
mandate extended to the entire island (Board of Investment of Sri Lanka, 2012).   
Although FDI inflows have considerably increased in the last two decades relative to pre-
liberalisation era, Sri Lanka‘s performance in generating FDI has been low by the 
standards of the best performers in Asia (Table 4-2). For example, Malaysia, a country 
with a population comparable to that of Sri Lanka, has attracted 20 times as much FDI as 
Sri Lanka (Table 4-2). 
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Table 4-1: Privatisation programme and FDI 
Year 
FDI inflow 
(US Dollar 
Million) 
Privatisation Programme 
No of firms 
privatised 
Local Investment 
(US $ Million) 
Foreign Investment 
(US $ Million) 
Total Investment 
(US Dollar Million) 
1989 17.90 1 0.14 2.50 2.64 
1990 43.35 5 2.64 10.87 13.51 
1991 67.00 4 25.84 0.00 25.84 
1992 122.63 13 116.89 39.12 156.01 
1993 194.49 13 100.49 172.82 273.30 
1994 166.41 7 25.29 19.36 44.65 
1995 65.00 10 52.28 55.42 107.70 
1996 133.00 10 78.90 71.84 150.74 
1997 433.00 8 156.15 385.66 541.82 
1998 150.00 5 24.41 139.36 163.77 
1999 201.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
2000 172.95 2 0.16 0.00 0.16 
2001 171.79 2 20.46 162.84 183.30 
2002 196.50 3 56.73 0.00 56.73 
2003 228.72 7 212.27 202.42 414.69 
2004 233.00 1 0.50 0.00 0.50 
2005 272.00 1 11.24 0.00 11.24 
Total 2868.74 92 884.37 1262.22 2146.58 
Source: The World Bank, 2012 and Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011 
Table 4-2: Comparative FDI performance of Sri Lanka, 2011 
Country 
FDI Inflow 
(Millions of 
US$) 
FDI Stock 
(Millions of 
US$) 
FDI Inflow 
Per capita 
(US$) 
FDI Inflow 
as a % of 
GCF 
FDI Stock Per 
capita 
(US$) 
FDI Stock as a 
% of GDP 
 
South Asia 
      
Sri Lanka 981.10 5989.50 46.62 6.12 284.60 10.12 
India 36190.40 206434.60 29.15 5.90 166.28 10.88 
Pakistan 1327.00 20916.00 7.51 5.54 118.34 10.01 
Bangladesh 1136.38 6165.81 7.55 4.33 40.97 5.81 
Nepal 95.49 348.10 3.13 2.43 11.42 1.88 
East Asia 
      China 123985.00 711802.00 92.01 3.72 528.21 9.88 
Hong Kong  96125.39 1184511.36 13496.61 180.51 166312.87 486.85 
Korea, Rep. 10246.50 133660.00 211.74 3.35 2762.06 11.97 
South East 
Asia 
      Malaysia 12197.58 115063.98 422.66 19.14 3987.09 39.96 
Singapore 55922.66 625744.75 10779.37 91.89 120615.43 240.81 
Thailand 7778.68 150517.17 111.89 8.39 2165.14 40.71 
Vietnam 7430.00 64162.30 83.68 20.44 722.61 51.91 
Philippines 1816.00 28230.00 19.15 4.18 297.62 12.56 
Indonesia 19241.25 185803.73 79.40 7.10 766.75 21.94 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2013 and UNCTAD, 2013 
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4.3 Dimensions of FDI: Distribution by Sector and Origin 
Until plantation sector was nationalised in early 1970s, a significant proportion of the 
plantation sector was owned by foreign investors. Thereafter, foreign involvement in 
direct investment was very limited until 1977s liberalisation initiatives. The reforms 
introduced in late 1970s helped Sri Lanka‘s trade and industrial structure to transform 
from a one based on land-intensive plantation exports to a one based on labour-intensive 
manufacturing (The World bank, 2004). Also, post-reform trade and investment policies 
strongly promoted export oriented industries. As a result, FDI inflows started flowing to 
manufacturing industries and by 1983 more than 90% of FDI stocks were concentrated in 
manufacturing industries (Table 4-3). Up to 1980s, services sector did not attract much 
FDI. FDI in service sector started picking up in 1990s largely due to privatisation 
programme. Thereafter, FDI in services became more prominent than FDI in 
manufacturing. Currently FDI in services accounts for more than 70% of total FDI stocks 
while FDI in manufacturing has shrunk to less than 30% of total FDI stocks (Table 4-3).  
Majority of manufacturing FDI has taken place in textile and garments related sector, 
which accounts for about one third of total realised manufacturing FDI stocks. However, 
this sector‘s prominence in attracting FDI has shrunk from its dominant position in 1980s 
and 1990s (Table 4-3). Communication sector had attracted over 50% of service FDI by 
early 2000s (UNCTAD, 2004) and have continued to dominate service FDI to date by 
attracting over 50% of service FDI during 2005-2010 (Table 4-4).  However, tourism 
sector has recently started attracting considerable attention from foreign investors, largely 
due to the end of war. Hotels and tourism sector, surpassing the conventionally dominant 
telecommunication sector, attracted the largest share of service FDI in 2011 (Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011). Since nationalisation of plantation sector in early 1970s, 
agricultural sector has failed to attract attention from foreign investors.  
 
Similar to Sri Lanka‘s industrial structure, FDI in Sri Lanka is also narrowly concentrated 
in a few sectors with little participation in technical intensive sectors (Figure 4-2). Almost 
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all the FDI
19
 has taken place in either medium-low-technology industries or low-
technology industries
20
.  
                                                 
19
 Only exception is the chemical sector, which is categorised as a medium-high-technology industry. 
However, FDI in Chemical sector is not reported separately and it is reported with FDI in Petroleum, Coal, 
Rubber and Plastic Products, and therefore, FDI in chemical sector is unlikely to be substantial. 
20
 As per the ISIC Rev. 3 technology intensity definition (Economic Analysis and Statistic Division, 2011) 
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Table 4-3: Realised FDI in Sri Lanka: Sectoral distribution 
Sector 
1983 1991 2001 2011 
FDI (US$) 
% from 
total FDI 
FDI (US$) 
% from 
total FDI 
FDI (US$) 
% from 
total FDI 
FDI (US$) 
% from 
total FDI 
Total manufacturing industries 54.3 92.4 210.3 77.3 581.1 36.8 1760.9 29.6 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco Products 0.3 0.6 2.3 0.8 56.6 3.6 262.5 4.4 
Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Products 27.2 46.3 76.5 28.1 246.3 15.6 568.7 9.6 
Wood and Wood Products 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.0 14.5 0.9 76.0 1.3 
Paper Products, Publishing and Printing 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.7 5.8 0.4 38.9 0.7 
Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products 10.8 18.3 67.5 24.8 113.9 7.2 355.8 6.0 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 2.0 3.4 11.7 4.3 34.9 2.2 115.0 1.9 
Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Transport Equipment 2.6 4.5 29.2 10.7 42.8 2.7 142.5 2.4 
Manufactured Products (n.e.s) 11.0 18.7 21.2 7.8 66.3 4.2 201.6 3.4 
Services 4.5 7.6 61.6 22.7 999.6 63.2 4187.5 70.4 
Total FDI 58.7 100 271.9 100 1580.7 100 5948.4 100 
Source: Board of Investment Sri Lanka 
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Table 4-4: Sector-wise FDI inflows to Sri Lanka 
   FDI inflows in Sri Lanka (US $ Mn.) 
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Manufacturing 42.02 78.52 80.46 122.60 135.32 234.78 174.02 189.18 164.47 159.65 
- Food, Beverages & Tobacco   8.28 10.39 23.01 29.38 34.10 25.93 14.74 11.34 17.54 
- Textile, Wearing Apperal & Leather  18.11 20.51 22.10 26.82 47.28 103.48 62.60 72.28 51.40 37.56 
- Wood & Wooden Products   17.10 6.35 0.35 0.92 4.39 0.77 2.21 1.69 1.43 
- Paper,Paper Products& Printing    8.97 0.79 0.09 8.16 0.76 0.00 0.86 20.77 8.71 
- Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal & Plastics 17.95 2.24 14.80 8.85 4.31 10.89 1.14 5.25 1.75 28.02 
- Rubber Products         15.83 32.27 47.90 34.68 13.64 16.38 
- Electronics & Electricals         5.90 6.88 7.67 14.61 23.15 7.86 
- Non-Metalic & Mineral Products 0.25 11.00 8.63 51.74 5.90 5.27 4.71 12.77 11.18 10.50 
- Fabricated Metal, Machinery &  1.81 10.42 10.51 3.60 15.34 14.08 12.54 14.38 14.04 14.91 
- Other Manufactured Products 3.90   6.89 8.14 2.31 22.67 10.75 17.41 15.50 16.74 
                     
Agriculture         0.47 0.67 0.42 2.65 3.69 6.45 
                      
Services and Infrastructure 42.03 141.4 130.14 111.68 151.41 368.24 559.93 697.10 434.09 350.20 
    - Housing, Property Development           13.43 58.32  30.16 19.86 17.74 42.06 
      and Shopping & Office complexes          
 
        
    - Telephone & Telecommunication 
      Network         111.74 263.43 403.63 553.10 296.06 205.16 
    - Power Generation         15.78 7.81 92.68 87.86 67.73 58.44 
    - Hotels & Restaurants         2.43 6.19 7.83 3.13 5.56 5.57 
    - IT and BPO         2.16 14.34 8.71 15.22 12.61 11.48 
    - Other Services         5.87 18.14 16.92 17.93 34.38 27.48 
GRAND TOTAL 84.05 219.92 210.60 234.28 287.20 603.69 734.36 888.94 602.25 516.30 
Source: Board of Investment Sri Lanka
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Figure 4-2: Composition of FDI (realised FDI) in industrial production – 2011 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011 
Leading sources of FDI in Sri Lanka are presented in Table 4-5 and Table 4-6. Up to 
2000, FDI in Sri Lanka had been dominated by seven home countries, which altogether 
accounted for about 80% of total invested value during 1979-2000 (Table 4-5). Malaysia 
has emerged as the largest FDI investor in recent past. India is recently emerging as an 
important foreign direct investor while contributing the largest FDI inflow in 2010 (Table 
4-6). 
Table 4-5: Home country distribution of FDI in Sri Lanka, cumulative, 1979-2000 
(percentages) 
Home Country 
Share in the number  
of projects 
Share in total FDI 
Singapore 3.9 16.5 
United Kingdom 5.4 13.9 
Japan 6 12.1 
Republic of Korea 10.6 11.5 
Hong Kong (China) 6.6 10 
British Virgin 
Island 0.6 8 
Australia 2.4 7.5 
Source: UNCTAD, 2004 
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Table 4-6: FDI inflows by country (% of total), 2005-2010  
Country 
FDI inflow by country (% of total), 2005-2010 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005-2010 
Malaysia  34.66 27.28 40.36 16.92 27.36 14.08 26.11 
India 6.22 4.48 5.84 14.17 12.93 21.35 11.06 
U.K 9.18 6.69 13.05 9.84 14.81 11.97 11.04 
Netherland 0.21 2.09 3.90 13.19 7.31 5.36 6.35 
Hong Kong 5.39 7.66 4.91 8.31 4.40 5.58 6.25 
Luxemburg 6.03 8.95 0.81 9.25 3.97 1.00 5.19 
U.S.A 4.44 5.89 3.59 6.39 3.58 2.88 4.62 
Singapore 10.66 4.90 2.72 2.32 3.59 8.21 4.54 
Sweden 3.53 8.26 4.28 4.25 3.29 2.26 4.42 
Japan 1.43 6.40 6.64 1.88 3.22 2.62 3.89 
UAE. 2.47 3.32 2.18 1.05 2.80 12.76 3.72 
China 0.33 0.73 1.46 3.08 3.28 0.79 1.85 
Italy 3.68 3.22 2.48 0.79 1.18 0.36 1.77 
Belgium 2.92 1.34 1.89 1.50 0.48 0.56 1.36 
Mauriteus 1.41 1.23 0.03 0.16 0.29 2.92 0.82 
Other 
Countries 
7.44 7.57 5.84 6.92 7.51 7.31 7.00 
 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Board of Investment Sri Lanka 
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4.4 FDI Potential in Sri Lanka 
This section will provide an analysis of Sri Lanka‘s potential in attracting various FDI, 
may it be resource-seeking, market-seeking or efficiency seeking. As reviewed in the 
previous chapter, Sri Lanka is a country with abundant resources in the form of national 
resource endowments and human capital and a strategic geographical location. However, 
it is also weak in terms of level of industrialisation and the extent of participation in 
technical intensive sectors. These salient features have significant impact on what type of 
FDI the country can attract, subsequently, the impact of FDI on the economy.  
 
4.4.1 Resource-seeking FDI  
Global FDI in the early 19
th
 century was dominated by resource seeking investments in 
the primary sector and this trend was reversed in the latter part of the century where 
primary sector played a minor role in inward FDI. But, recently the importance of 
resource seeking investment in the primary sector has increased considerably in the 
global context, partly contributed by resource seeking investments from emerging 
economies such as China and India (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).   
 
Sri Lanka‘s rich natural resource base offers ample resource seeking opportunities to 
MNCs; Sri Lanka‘s export performance in agricultural and mineral products (Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010) and recent discovery of oil drilling prospects demonstrates the 
degree of resource abundance in Sri Lanka. The large extent of physical resource seeking 
investments that have been recently undertaken by Chinese and Indian MNCs in Africa 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008) should be of great interest to Sri Lanka as Sri Lanka might 
have an opportunity to attract physical resource seeking investments from its 
neighbouring giants. Some FDI in services can also depend on location bound resources, 
for example, performance of tourism industry in a particular country depends on the 
availability of numerous attractions in that country (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Sri 
Lanka is home to numerous unique tourist attractions and is considered as one of the best 
tourist attractions in the world
21
.  
 
 
                                                 
21
 Lonely Planet, the world's largest travel guide publisher, ranked Sri Lanka as the number one 
travel destination for 2013 (Lonely Planet, 2013) 
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The second type of resource that is sought by multinationals is human resources; MNCs, 
usually manufacturing and service MNCs from countries with high real labour costs, 
seek supplies of cheap unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled labour (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). Sri Lanka has a relatively cheap but highly trainable labour supply as indicated by 
Sri Lanka‘s impressive human capital indicators. Sri Lanka faces two major challenges in 
terms of materialising this benefit. Although Sri Lanka has the highest literacy rate in 
South Asia, Sri Lanka might not have a significant comparative advantage in terms of 
labour costs against most of its neighbouring countries, such as India and China. Thus, 
Sri Lanka could face a home region disadvantage (Banalieva, Gregg, & Sarathy, 2010) 
because it is surrounded by countries with comparable traits. Therefore, the better option 
would be to look out for countries with high real labour costs, but for this, Sri Lanka will 
have to attract MNCs from countries that are in distant waters and unfamiliar cultures.  
 
The second challenge comes from the fact that most of this type of human resource 
seeking investments has been taken place in the more advanced industrialising 
developing countries such as Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
Sri Lanka has undergone a very little structural transformation; the shift from agriculture 
to higher value added manufacturing and services is not very significant (UNCTAD, 
2004). Therefore, this underdevelopment will become a major obstacle in attracting 
MNCs that seek cheap labour.  
 
The third type of resource seeking FDI arises from the MNC‘s aspiration to acquire 
technological capabilities, management or marketing expertise, and organisational skills. 
It is doubtful whether Sri Lanka possesses considerable amounts of such tacit skills since 
Sri Lanka is lagging far behind its developed counterparts in terms of technology and 
other business related skills and expertise. 
 
4.4.2 Market-seeking FDI 
With 20 million population and low per capita income (The World Bank, 2011), Sri 
Lanka would not be able to offer considerable market seeking opportunities, relying 
solely on the internal market. Although the internal market size of the country is not 
significantly large, the proximity to India and Sri Lanka‘s favourable geographical 
location have provided Sri Lanka with a lucrative opportunity to attract MNCs that want 
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to target Indian and other regional markets. However, Sri Lanka faces a home region 
disadvantage because most of the adjacent countries are developing nations with low per 
capita income (The World Bank, 2011), which might to some extent make the 
opportunity of targeting the regional markets not so lucrative.  
 
Since Sri Lanka has a limited internal market, Sri Lanka might want to attract market 
seeking FDI that target nearby regional markets. Therefore, higher level of regional 
integration will be advantageous in terms of attracting such FDI. Literature on FDI and 
regional integration advocate that following accession to a regionally integrated area 
(RIA), the individual member‘s market size will no longer be a limiting factor in 
attracting FDI (Buckley et al., 2001). Also, Feils & Rahman (2011) have empirically 
proven that, subsequent to regional integration, market size of an individual member 
country becomes less important as a determinant of FDI inflows. MNCs would prefer to 
serve a market from an adjacent facility when the production and transaction cost of 
doing so is less than serving the market from a distance (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
Therefore, it is crucial for Sri Lanka to have lower trade costs and lower transport costs 
with its regional partners in order to attract such facilities. It is important that Sri Lanka 
accommodates correct policies and incentives in order to attract market seeking MNCs. 
Due to the limited market size of Sri Lanka, export promotion policies are likely to be 
suitable over import substituting policies for attracting larger volumes of FDI. 
 
4.4.3 Efficiency-seeking FDI 
Some authors have argued that MNCs now gives less importance to the size of the 
domestic market due to the effects of globalisation (Nunnenkamp, 2002; Miyamoto, 
2003; Blomström & Kokko, 2003a). Furthermore, some studies have shown that the 
motivation for FDI is shifting from ―market-seeking‖ to ―efficiency-seeking‖ (Ruane, 
2008). Sri Lanka‘s sufficiently skilled labour market and low labour costs could 
complement efficiency seeking investments of MNCs. 
 
Dunning & Lundan (2008) has highlighted two types of efficiency seeking FDI. First 
type takes place as a result of MNCs trying to benefit from factor price differences 
among different countries. The most prominent factor price differential that is exploited 
by MNCs is the relative costs of labour in different skill levels. Developing countries, by 
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and large, contribute low cost unskilled or semi-skilled labour while developed countries, 
generally, contribute skilled labour. Sri Lanka‘s low labour costs and highly admired 
human capital level indicate Sri Lanka is in a better position to attract MNCs that seek 
low cost unskilled or semi-skilled labour. Since Sri Lanka‘s lower level of 
industrialisation, it is unlikely that Sri Lanka could supply skilled labour, at least in the 
near future. However, Sri Lanka will have to compete with its regional counterparts to 
attract efficiency seeking investments because most of the Asian countries and 
particularly the South Asian countries possess comparable labour costs, and therefore, 
further improvements in the skills and quality of labour is crucial for Sri Lanka in order 
to attract efficiency seeking FDI. 
 
The second type of efficiency seeking FDI take place as a result of MNCs trying to 
benefit from scale and scope economies, and differences in consumer tastes and supply 
capabilities (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Sri Lanka, as a standalone country cannot offer 
considerable scale or scope economies to MNCs due to its relatively small and not so 
affluent internal market. Although income levels are not so high, South Asia is a highly 
populated region with rising income levels. This fact can provide both opportunities and 
treats to Sri Lanka in terms of attracting MNCs seeking scale and scope economies. Such 
MNCs is likely to give their attention to countries with large populations, and therefore, 
may overlook Sri Lanka. On the other hand, if Sri Lanka can provide a better 
environment and comparatively low cost inputs than those of highly populated countries, 
and also maintain very low levels of trade and logistic costs with these countries, then Sri 
Lanka could provide a better proposition for MNCs seeking scale and scope economies. 
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4.5. Factors that can Influence FDI in Sri Lanka: a Preliminary 
Overview  
4.5.1. Introduction 
There are numerous factors that can encourage and discourage FDI in a country. These 
factors and their significance vary with different country settings. Detail analysis of these 
factors is essential for formulating correct policies in order to increase FDI inflows as 
well as to improve the benefits of the FDI. However, studies based on Sri Lanka are 
scarce. The most relevant study is Wijeweera & Mounter (2008); an econometric 
analysis that uses  vector autoregressive model (VAR) to regress FDI against GDP, total 
trade, wage rate, exchange rate, and interest rate. Proceeding sections provides a 
preliminary investigation of various factors that can influence FDI inflows to Sri Lanka. 
Priority is given to identify salient features of Sri Lanka that could encourage or 
discourage FDI inflows. 
 
4.5.2 Size and growth of the economy 
The market potential of a country will depend on the size of the population and income 
levels of the country (Hoang, 2006). Sri Lanka‘s internal market size is small, with a 
population of 20 million only, which could constrain the market seeking FDI potential of 
Sri Lanka. Therefore, the significance of the GDP to FDI inflows is unlikely to be strong. 
However, Wijeweera & Mounter (2008) have found that Sri Lanka‘s GDP has a positive 
impact on its FDI inflows in the long run, while having a negative impact in the short 
run.  
     
4.5.3. Trade regimes and degree of trade openness  
Sri Lanka has gone through three phases of trade regimes. When Sri Lanka gained 
political independence from Great Britain in 1948, Sri Lanka‘s economy was an open 
economy and specialized in export of three crops; tea, rubber and coconuts. Sri Lanka 
continued to remain an open trading nation until 1960, (Rajapatirana, 1988; Athukorala 
& Jayasuriya, 2004) in which the incumbent government at that time introduced inward 
oriented development strategies and started relying on import substituting policies 
(Rajapatirana, 1988; Wijeweera & Mounter, 2008). This closed economy; which 
embraced strict trade and exchange controls, strict regulation, and state intervention; 
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continued until 1977 (Wijeweera & Mounter, 2008).  Also, in this period Sri Lanka‘s 
economy was dominated by SOEs while private sector receiving less attention by the 
state. As a result, Sri Lankan economy became one of the most inward-oriented and 
regulated economies outside the communist bloc by mid-1970s (Athukorala & 
Jayasuriya, 2004). 
Responding to the fruitless outcomes of these inward-oriented policies, Sri Lankan 
government initiated an extensive economic liberalization process in 1977 by liberalising 
trade, price and investment controls (Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004; Rajapatirana, 
1988). This reform introduced a significant trade reform by replacing quantitative 
restrictions on imports with tariffs, and also revising the tariff structure to achieve greater 
uniformity (Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004). 
As a result of delays and inconsistencies in the implementation of the 1977 reform 
process, mostly caused by the internal civil conflict, the 1977 reform process lost its 
momentum in early 1980s, and a second wave of liberalisation was initiated in 1990s. 
The 1990s reform process focused more on export expansion and employed further tariff 
cuts and simplified tariff structure (Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004). Since 1990‘s trade 
liberalisation, Sri Lanka has maintained its trade openness and continued bringing down 
its tariffs further. However, some believe a pressure for protectionism is gradually 
building up in recent years (Pursell & Ahsan, 2011), a development which is unlikely to 
be favourable for future FDI inflows.  
4.5.4. Political instability  
Both Sri Lanka and the South Asian region are renowned for their internal political 
instability (Javorcik, 2004; Kumaraswamy, 2007). Quazi & Mahmud (2004) has pointed 
out that political instability in South Asian region has been a major deterrent in attracting 
FDI to South Asian region.   
Many writers and international institutions attribute the reason for Sri Lanka not been 
able to perform well in both FDI and economic growth to the political instability that 
prevailed in the country, mainly due to the civil war (Pradhan, 2001, Zita & Kapur, 
2004). However, to the best of my knowledge, the impact of the civil war on FDI in Sri 
Lanka has not been investigated in any empirical study.  
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Significance of the war on past FDI inflows to Sri Lanka can be studied by comparing 
the performance of FDI against the timeline shown in Figure 3-5. However, it should 
be noted that the intensity of these conflicts varied significantly over time (Duma, 
2007), and therefore, ignoring the intensity of the conflicts at different times might, to 
a certain extent, undermine the accuracy of the findings. One way to account for these 
different intensities of conflicts is to use the political stability variables published by 
various institutions such as World Bank (Figure 4-3) or other rating agencies. 
Although these estimates do not capture all the intricate variations in the political 
stability in a country and may capture multiple dimensions of political instability, 
such estimates can be useful for factoring the intensity of the internal conflicts. 
Alternatively, we can use the number of conflict related causalities (Figure 3-6) or 
measure of conflict related physical damages to proxy the intensity of conflict.  
War could not only affect FDI inflows, but also cause foreign direct divestments. 
Therefore, the extent of divestments caused by the civil war should also be 
ascertained in order to determine the overall impact of the civil war on FDI 
performance. 
Figure 4-3: Variation of the political stability variable in Sri Lanka 
 
Source: The World Bank. 2010 
Available evidence shows that Sri Lanka lost several high profile potential foreign 
investments due to the civil war. With the emergent of civil war in 1983, Motorola 
and Harris Corporation, both of which are major electronic MNCs, aborted their 
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investment plans and withdrew from Sri Lanka
22
 (Kelegama, 2000). In addition to 
these MNCs, Sony, Marubeni, Sanyo, Bank of Tokyo and Chase Manhattan Bank, all 
of which were in the pipeline to invest in Sri Lanka, decided against investing in Sri 
Lanka when the civil war erupted in 1983 (Kelegama, 2000).     
 
4.5.5. Human capital 
Sri Lanka is widely known for its high rating in human capital index in terms of literacy 
rate and schooling rates (Table 4-7). Sri Lanka is a country with free education from 
kindergarten to university (Ganegodage & Rambaldi, 2011; Ranasinghe & Hartog, 2002) 
and its educational achievements are highly praised by researchers (Ganegodage & 
Rambaldi, 2011; Duma, 2007) as well as international bodies such as World Bank 
(UNDP Sri Lanka, 1998; UNDP Sri Lanka, 2012; Duma, 2007). Also, some research 
studies suggest that Sri Lanka has a low wage rate but a high relative labour productivity 
(Wijeweera & Mounter, 2008; Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004). 
It is true that Sri Lanka‘s education system is a success story compared to other 
developing countries in terms of providing universal access to general education, 
achieving high literacy rates and school enrolment rates, and achieving gender parity in 
education attainment (Aturupane, 2009). However, Sri Lanka‘s economic performance, 
and performance in FDI inflows in particular, are far behind that of East Asian countries 
which have similar educational achievements (Ganegodage & Rambaldi, 2011; 
UNCTAD, 2004). To add to this, Ganegodage & Rambaldi (2011) has found that the 
returns of education investment in Sri Lanka is lower than those found for other 
developing economies. 
Host country‘s capacity to absorb advance technology and other skills that MNCs bring 
in depend on the quality of human capital in the host country (United Nations, 1992; 
Moosa, 2002). Based on FDI flows from industrial countries to 69 developing countries 
during 1970-1989 and proxing human capital by level of schooling, (Borensztein, De 
Gregorio, & Lee, 1998) shows that FDI contributes to economic growth only when the 
host country has a minimum threshold level of human capital. Therefore, Sri Lanka‘s 
human capital indicators can have implications on realising the benefits of FDI.  
                                                 
22
 Harris Corporation left a half-built plant with an initial employment capacity of 1,850. 
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Table 4-7: Human capital indicators of selected countries in Asia 
   
Literacy Rate  
Percentage of population 
aged 15 and over(2010)   
Percentage of population 
aged 25 and over(2010)   
GDP per person 
engaged 
(constant 1990 
US$ at PPP)  
   
Most recent 
figure from 
2005-2010 
Who enrol  
secondary 
education 
Who 
completed  
secondary 
education 
Who enrol  
tertiary 
education 
Who 
completed  
tertiary 
education 
Labour 
Productivity 
South Asia                 
 Sri Lanka  90.56 66.3 52.1 16.4 10.5 15622 
India  62.75 40.7 1.3 5.9 3.7 8401 
Pakistan  55.53 34.6 22.5 6.4 5.2 8525 
Bangladesh  55.9 39.9 23.9 4.4 2.8 3917 
East Asia  
      China  93.98 60.4 46 6.2 4 12593 
Mongolia  97.49 67.7 34.4 12.5 8 n/a 
South  East 
Asia  
      Malaysia  92.46 61.4 38.9 13.9 5 25058 
Singapore  94.71 46.3 22.3 18.8 12.3 44524 
Thailand  93.51 27.9 14.6 9.1 8.9 15743 
Vietnam  92.78 31.6 16.1 4.5 2.9 5898 
Philippines  95.42 42.1 21.3 29.6 22.4 10587 
Indonesia  92.19 27.6 22.8 2.5 1.6 n/a 
Myanmar  92.03 13.7 5.2 6.5 4.2 n/a 
Brunei  95.29 52.9 27.1 9.8 6.3 n/a 
    Source: The World Bank, 2012 
4.5.6. Institutional Environment 
Sri Lanka is a constitutional, multiparty republic; however, the government is dominated 
by president‘s family23 (Bureau of Democracy United States, 2012). Investment climate 
of Sri Lanka is contaminated by corruption, lack of good governance, bureaucratic 
inertia, and poor law and order (Athukorala, 2003). Sri Lanka scores medium to low in 
all governance indicators according to the scores published by the World Bank (The 
World Bank, 2010). Weak institutional environment in the country is likely to further 
deteriorate due to the current political climate in the country and increasing concentration 
of the political power. For example, in 2010, president of Sri Lanka exercised his 
authority under the 18th amendment to take control of appointments to public institutions 
                                                 
23
 Three of president‘s brothers hold three key positions, i.e. defence secretary, minister of economic 
development, and speaker of parliament while number of other relatives, including president‘s son hold 
key political or diplomatic positions (Bureau of Democracy United States, 2012). 
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that oversee the judiciary, police, and human rights, which were previously independent 
(Bureau of Democracy United States, 2011).   
Sri Lanka scores a negative figure of -0.43 from a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, with a 
percentile rank of 40.7 in the ‗control for corruption‘ score published by the World Bank. 
Sri Lanka‘s score is better than the South Asian regional average but slightly worse than 
East Asian average (Table 4-8). 
Table 4-8: Control for corruption for selected countries for the year 2010 
Country 
Percentile Rank Governance Score 
(0-100) (-2.5 to +2.5) 
Afghanistan 1 -1.62 
Bangladesh 16.3 -0.99 
Bhutan 75.1 0.83 
China 32.5 -0.6 
Hong Kong Sar, China 94.7 1.94 
India 35.9 -0.52 
Maldives 32.1 -0.63 
Nepal 28.7 -0.69 
Pakistan 12 -1.1 
Singapore 98.6 2.18 
Sri Lanka 40.7 -0.43 
Vietnam 33 -0.58 
Sub-Saharan Africa 32.1 -0.6 
South Asia 30.2 -0.64 
East Asia 45.8 -0.18 
OECD 89.8 1.61 
  Source: World Wide Governance Indicators 2010b  
 
Sri Lanka scores a negative figure of -0.09 from a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, with a 
percentile rank of 40.7 in the ‗Rule of Law‘ score published by the World Bank. Sri 
Lanka‘s score is better than the South Asian regional average but slightly worse than East 
Asian average (Table 4-9). 
In terms of ‗Regulatory quality‘ score published by the World Bank, Sri Lanka scores 
a negative figure of -0.21 from a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, with a percentile rank of 
45.5. Sri Lanka‘s score is better than the South Asian regional average and also 
slightly better than the East Asian average (Table 4-10). 
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Table 4-9: Rule of law for selected countries for the year 2010 
Country 
Percentile Rank Governance Score 
(0-100) (-2.5 to +2.5) 
Afghanistan 0.5 -1.9 
Bangladesh 26.5 -0.77 
Bhutan 58.8 0.11 
China 44.5 -0.35 
Hong Kong Sar, China 91 1.56 
India 54.5 -0.06 
Maldives 45.5 -0.33 
Nepal 16.1 -1.02 
Pakistan 25.6 -0.79 
Singapore 93.4 1.69 
Sri Lanka 52.6 -0.09 
Vietnam 38.9 -0.48 
Sub-Saharan Africa 28.4 -0.74 
South Asia 35 -0.6 
East Asia 50.8 0.02 
OECD 90.4 1.5 
  Source: World Wide Governance Indicators 2010b 
Table 4-10: Regulatory quality for selected countries for the year 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The World Bank, 2010 
 
 
Country 
Percentile Rank Governance Score 
(0-100) (-2.5 to +2.5) 
Afghanistan 4.8 -1.56 
Bangladesh 21.5 -0.86 
Bhutan 12 -1.13 
China 45 -0.23 
Hong Kong Sar, China 99.5 1.89 
India 39.2 -0.39 
Maldives 37.8 -0.41 
Nepal 24.4 -0.74 
Pakistan 30.1 -0.6 
Singapore 98.6 1.8 
Sri Lanka 45.5 -0.21 
Vietnam 31.1 -0.58 
Sub-Saharan Africa 29 -0.71 
South Asia 26.9 -0.74 
East Asia 41.1 -0.29 
OECD 90.4 1.44 
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Although Sri Lanka‘s governance indicators are weak compared to developed nations 
and some FDI success stories such as Singapore and Hong Kong, they are better than the 
South Asian regional average and more or less in par with East Asian regional average. 
However, a possible downward revision in these scores can be expected due to some 
recent events that have undermined the democracy of the country (DeVotta, 2010). 
The ultimate risk a foreign firm faces due to a poor institutional environment is the risk 
of expropriation. The threat of partial or total nationalisation is a major institutional and 
political risk factor that affects FDI inflows. The likeliness of such an action is perceived 
to be dependent on the intentions of the host government, and the possibility of the 
government to enact such an intention is largely dependent on institutional factors. For 
example, if there is a strong constitution which protects property rights and provides 
freedom from expropriation, then even if the government desires to expropriate assets, 
such an action would be difficult to implement.  
Prior to the introduction of economic reform in 1977, Sri Lanka had a history of 
nationalisation of private enterprises; local subsidiaries of several international oil 
companies were nationalised in 1961, and tea and rubber plantations were nationalised 
under the Land Reform Act in 1972 (The Economist, 2011). Realising the negative 
impacts of previous nationalist/socialist actions, the Sri Lankan government guaranteed 
freedom from expropriation under the new constitution adopted in 1978. Thereafter, as 
per available evidence, except a one expropriation in cement manufacturing industry in 
1990 (Hajzler, 2006), foreign investments have been safe until 2011. In 2011, 37 
privately owned companies, some of which were foreign-invested firms, were 
expropriated by the Sri Lankan government through passing a controversial law in the 
parliament. The bill was termed as The Revival of Under-Performing Enterprises and 
Under-Utilised Assets Act, and targeted 37 private enterprises that had previously 
received land or aid from the government. Although the expropriation was justified by 
the government stating that the firms were either under-utilised or being used for 
purposes other than those originally envisaged, the criteria and the process of selecting 
these firms were not explicit. Ironically, some of the expropriated firms were performing 
well in terms of profitability and growth.  Despite widespread opposition from opposition 
political parties, the island‘s bar association, trade chambers, Buddhist religious leaders, 
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and rights activists; the bill was passed as an urgent bill preventing public scrutiny and 
pre-enactment review (The Economist, 2011; Brown, 2011).  
The likelihood of expropriation is perceived to be dependent on the ideologies of the host 
government - more likely with a left-wing orientation and less likely with a right-wing 
orientation (Schneider & Frey, 1985). Since Sri Lanka became an independent nation in 
1948, the political power in Sri Lanka has swing between two major parties: UNP 
(United National Party) and SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party), former having a more 
right-wing orientation than the latter. It would be interesting to know under which 
regimes these expropriations have taken place, in order to identify the relationship 
between ideologies of the host government and the likeliness of expropriation. 
4.5.7. Domestic stock market development  
Sri Lanka‘s stock market is a relatively small sized market with severe liquidity 
constraints (Elyasiani, Perera, & Puri, 1998). There are only 267 companies listed in the 
Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) (by end of 2011) and the market suffers from a high 
concentration of market capitalisation in blue chip stocks (Various issues of Colombo 
Stock Exchange annual reports; Elyasiani, Perera, & Puri, 1998). Therefore, Sri Lanka‘s 
less developed stock market can hinder FDI in Sri Lanka. 
Sri Lanka‘s stock market is considered to be highly manipulated (Daily Mirror, 2012) 
and financial reporting has issues of transparency. Although, insider trading is prohibited 
on paper (Jaleel & Samarakoon, 2009), insider dealing is explicitly entertained 
(Jayasinghe, 2012; Perera, 2011). Countries with better legal systems and shareholder 
protection attract more attention from foreign investors (Claessens, Klingebiel & 
Schmukler, 2001). Therefore, Sri Lanka needs to improve in these factors in order to 
attract both portfolio investment as well as FDI inflows. 
Moreover, CSE is dominated by local investors and foreign holdings of the CSE at end 
the end of year 2011 was only Rs. 437 billion (US$ 3.9 billion), representing 20% of the 
market (CSE). The degree of internationalisation of the stock market is positively 
correlated with FDI inflows (Claessens, Klingebiel & Schmukler, 2001), and therefore, 
level of internationalisation in the Sri Lanka‘s stock market is likely to affect FDI 
inflows. 
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4.5.8. Exchange rate 
As per Sri Lanka‘s central bank‘s official pronouncement, Sri Lanka maintains a floating 
exchange rate (Rajan, 2010). However, Sri Lanka‘s central bank‘s interventions to 
maintain a fixed peg arrangement with the US$ is not a secret. According to IMF‘s 
exchange rate classification Sri Lanka falls into the ‗other conventional fixed peg 
arrangement‘ category (International Monetary Fund, 2008). Type of exchange rate 
regime adopted by a country is an important aspect that could affect FDI. The exchange 
rate regime has an effect on current and future exchange rate levels as well as volatility 
of exchange rates. All of these could affect FDI (Abbott, Cushman, & De Vita, 2012; 
Blonigen, 2005; Campa, 1993; Cushman, 1985; Cushman, 1988). Most importantly, 
exchange rate regime will also determine the degree of undervaluation and overvaluation 
of currencies, which will certainly have a major effect on FDI flows. Although the effect 
of different exchange rate regimes on capital flows has been a popular topic, particularly 
related to Asian financial crisis and global financial crisis of 2008-2009 (Rajan, 2010), its 
effect on FDI is an understudied area.  
The exchange rate regimes can be arranged in a continuum of fixed to floating spectrum 
according to their relative degrees of flexibility. The available regimes can be categorised 
into nine regimes, ranging from the most fixed arrangement to the most floating 
arrangement: Currency union, Currency board, ―Truly fixed‖, Adjustable peg, Crawling 
peg, Basket peg, Target zone or band, Managed float, and Free float (Frankel, 1999). One 
of the main advantages of a fix exchange rate regime is that fixing the exchange rate is 
supposed to reduce the transaction costs and exchange rate risks, and therefore, supposed 
to encourage trade and investments (Frankel, 1999; Abbott, Cushman, & De Vita, 2012). 
Along this line, it can be hypothesised that fixed exchange rates can positively influence 
FDI flows. Fixing of exchange rate would reduce the exchange rate volatility, at least 
until there is no balance of payment crisis, and therefore, would affect FDI flows 
indirectly through reducing exchange rate volatility.  
To the best of my knowledge, Abbott, Cushman, & De Vita (2012) is the only empirical 
study that has looked at the effect of different exchange rate regimes on FDI. Abbott, 
Cushman, & De Vita (2012) has established that both fixed and intermediate exchange 
rate regimes are better than floating exchange rate regimes for attracting FDI flows. 
However, the notion that fixed exchange rate regime is preferable for attracting FDI 
115 
 
inflows may not be a universal truth. This is because if the currency is not freely floated, 
then the currency can either be undervalued or overvalued. The degree of over/under 
valuation and how long the country would be capable of maintaining this artificial 
valuation is likely to have an effect on FDI inflows. For example, if a particular country 
maintains its currency at a high value through intervention while its currency goes 
through real depreciation due to high relative inflation, then such a currency is 
overvalued. If the country is also facing severe balance of payment problems due to 
excessive balance of payment deficits then the credibility of the fixing of the currency 
will also be low, and therefore, investors might anticipate a currency devaluation in 
future. This might deter and delay FDI inflows as investors would abstain in investing 
just before currency devaluation. Moreover, due to the positive inflation differential, 
local currency will be increasingly overvalued, and this in turn will make the 
competitiveness of export goods to fall while competitiveness of imports to rise. This 
will make the foreign production attractive compared to domestic production, and 
therefore, FDI inflows will be discouraged while FDI outflows are being encouraged.  
Along with the soft-pegged exchange rate, Sri Lanka‘s large current account deficit and 
high inflation rates (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010) places an enormous pressure on its 
exchange rate. Due to this Sri Lanka‘s real exchange rate has appreciated significantly 
during the past (Figure 4-4 and Table 4-11), and therefore, Sri Lanka‘s currency is 
deemed to be overvalued and this fact will have implications on FDI inflows. It‘s quite 
extraordinary that being a developing country, Sri Lanka‘s real exchange rate has 
appreciated relative to most of the countries in Asia, even against the developed countries 
in Asia.  
Such an overvalued exchange rate is likely to have devastating impact on exports and 
thereby export oriented FDI. This negative impact on export oriented FDI can be quite 
severe given that real exchange rates of South Asian countries have depreciated during 
the same period.  
 
 
116 
 
Figure 4-4: Exchange rate (against US$) in South Asian countries during 1990-2010 
 
 
Table 4-11: Real exchange rate appreciation (against US$) in selected countries in Asia 
during 1990-2010 
Country 
Real exchange rate  
appreciation 
Sri Lanka 43  
India  -7  
Pakistan  -4  
Bangladesh  -21  
China  5  
Hong Kong  5  
Taiwan  -36  
South Korea  -14  
Malaysia  12  
Singapore  12  
Thailand  3  
Vietnam  156  
Philippines  26  
Indonesia  60  
 
The effect of Sri Lanka‘s real exchange rate appreciation on exports and thereby export 
oriented FDI is self-evident. During the last decade, Sri Lanka‘s exports growth rate is 
significantly low than its imports growth rate (Figure 4-5); a consequence inevitable with 
an overvalued exchange rate. Due to this, Sri Lanka‘s trade deficit has been increasing 
alarmingly. Moreover, Sri Lanka‘s exports growth rate has been significantly lower than 
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that of its regional counterparts (Table 4-12). Therefore, Sri Lanka is likely to be losing 
exports and export oriented FDI to its nearby regions. For example, both Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh rely heavily on textile exports and compete with each other for textile 
exports; therefore, Sri Lanka may be losing textile exports to Bangladesh largely due to 
its overvalued currency and consequently loosing export oriented FDI as well.    
Figure 4-5: Exports and imports performance in Sri Lanka (US$ millions) 
 
Source: The World Bank, 2012 
 
Table 4-12: Average annual growth rates (%) in exports and imports during 2000-2010 in 
south Asian countries 
Country 
Merchandise 
imports 
Merchandise 
exports 
Sri Lanka 8.5 5.9 
Bangladesh 13.2 13.0 
India 23.2 19.8 
Pakistan 16.1 10.2 
Source: The World Bank, 2012 
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Overvalued exchange rate can also have implications on the timing of FDI. Kohlhagen 
(1977) points out that the timing of FDI will certainly be affected by expected future 
exchange rate. A foreign investor who is expecting a devaluation of host country‘s 
currency would prefer to invest after the devaluation rather than before the devaluation 
which would enable him to make the investment for a lesser amount of foreign exchange 
(Kohlhagen, 1977). Therefore, an overvalued exchange rate may signal future 
devaluations, and therefore, the expected devaluation of the currency could deter, or at 
least delay, FDI inflows.   
4.5.9. Infrastructure 
Sri Lanka has serious infrastructure bottlenecks that could discourage FDI into the 
country. A comparison of the most common infrastructure indicators for Sri Lanka and 
for its regional counterparts is presented in Table 4-13 and Table 4-14. Sri Lanka‘s 
transport infrastructure is very poor. Although Sri Lanka‘s road density is relatively high 
compared to regional and international standards (Table 4-13), roads are poorly 
maintained, and therefore, not in a good condition and roads do not connect remote areas 
to main markets (The World Bank, 2007). Due to congestion and poor quality of the 
roads, average travel speed is low at 39 km/h. It is estimated that poor quality roads 
reduce corporate productivity by as much as 44% (Asian Development Bank, 2008). 
Moreover, many studies conducted by the Sri Lankan government, ADB and World 
Bank have found that transport is a major obstacle to start and operate a business, 
particularly in rural areas (Asian Development Bank, 2008). Sri Lanka‘s railway system 
is no better than the road infrastructure and suffers from similar issues due to decades of 
neglect (Asian Development Bank, 2008). 
Sri Lanka has only one international airport, which has capacity and efficiency issues. 
However, Sri Lanka is currently in the process of constructing a new international airport 
in Mattala. Direct comparison of Sri Lanka‘s aviation standards with the standards of 
other regional airports is not possible due to Sri Lanka‘s airport not being assessed or 
ranked by international rating agencies. On the other hand, world airport awards, an 
entity that assesses airport quality, has ranked several Indian airports, and also ranked 
Delhi International Airport as the world‘s most improved airport in 2012. Therefore, it is 
obvious that India‘s airports have become superior to Sri Lanka‘s airport, which would 
further aggravate Sri Lanka‘s aviation infrastructure weaknesses.  
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Table 4-13: Comparison of transport Infrastructure in selected countries in Asia 
 
Roads Rail lines Air transport Sea Transport 
Country total network 
per 1000 sq. 
Km of land 
area 
Per 1000 
Population
** 
% of paved 
roads 
total network 
per 1000 sq. 
Km of land 
area 
Per 1000 
Population** 
registered 
carrier 
departures 
worldwide 
Container port 
traffic (TEU: 20 
foot 
equivalent units) 
 
2000-2009* 2000-2009* 
2000-
2009* 
2000-2009* 2000-2010* 2000-2010* 2000-2010* 2010 2010 
Sri Lanka 97,286 1551.36 4.664 81.0 1,463 0.023 0.070 17248 4080000 
India 4,109,592 1382.22 3.356 49.5 63,974 0.022 0.052 629991 9752908 
Pakistan 258,350 335.14 1.488 65.4 7,791 0.010 0.045 50217 2149000 
Bangladesh 239,226 1837.80 1.609 9.5 2,835 0.022 0.019 12182 1356099 
Nepal 19,875 138.65 0.663 53.9 n/a n/a n/a 2102 n/a 
China 3,860,823 413.92 2.885 53.5 66,239 0.007 0.049 2390793 129610695 
Hong Kong  2,050 1967.37 0.290 100.0 n/a n/a n/a 150961 23699 
South Korea 25,554 212.22 1.050 2.8 n/a n/a n/a 665 n/a 
Mongolia 49,250 31.70 17.870 3.5 1,814 0.001 0.658 7535 n/a 
Malaysia 98,722 300.48 3.476 81.3 1,665 0.005 0.059 240468 18247032 
Singapore 3,356 4794.29 0.661 100.0 n/a n/a n/a 81074 29178500 
Thailand 180,053 352.43 2.605 98.5 4,429 0.009 0.064 122066 6648532 
Vietnam 160,089 516.30 1.842 47.6 2,347 0.008 0.027 103462 5983583 
Philippines 200,037 670.88 2.145 9.9 479 0.002 0.005 169405 4946882 
Indonesia 476,337 262.94 1.986 56.9 3,370 0.002 0.014 404547 8371058 
* Data are for the most recent year available in the period shown.           ** 2010 population figure is used for the calculation  
Source: The World Bank, 2012 
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Port infrastructure is in better terms compared to other transport infrastructure elements 
in Sri Lanka. Colombo port is one of the two major hub ports in the southern Indian 
region
24
. Colombo Port was ranked 28th in the world in terms of container traffic 
(American Association of Port Authorities, 2010). It handled over four million TEUs of 
containers in 2010, which is considerable given Sri Lanka‘s low trade volumes compared 
to countries like China, India and Singapore. This achievement is a result of high 
volumes of transhipment business generated due to its strategic location in the Indian 
Ocean. Sri Lanka is in the process of developing another large port in Hambantota.   
Sri Lanka‘s weak power infrastructure in terms of availability, reliability and costs is 
another major constraint in conducting businesses. Some parts of the country, 
particularly rural areas, do not have access to the main power grid, and for areas that 
access is available, the supply is unreliable and costs are high. It is estimated that access 
to the main power grid increases corporate productivity by 25% (Asian Development 
Bank, 2008).  
Table 4-14: Power, telecommunication and information infrastructure 
Country 
Mobile cellular 
subscriptions  
(per 100 people) 
Internet users  
(per 100 
people) 
Electric power 
consumption 
v(kWh per 
capita) 
Telephone 
lines  
(per 100 
people) 
Population 
covered by 
mobile 
cellular 
network % 
2010 2010 2009 2010 2008 
Sri Lanka 83.22 12.00 408.48 17.15 95 
India 61.42 7.50 570.93 2.87 61 
Pakistan 57.14 16.78 449.32 1.97 90 
Bangladesh 46.17 3.70 251.63 0.61 90 
Nepal 30.69 7.93 90.95 2.81 60 
China 64.19 34.38 2631.40 22.00 97 
Hong Kong  195.16 71.85 5924.58 61.71 100 
South Korea 103.87 82.52 8979.71 58.40 - 
Mongolia 91.09 12.90 1410.58 7.01 82 
Malaysia 119.22 56.30 3613.53 16.10 92 
Singapore 145.45 71.13 7948.91 39.32 100 
Thailand 103.62 21.20 2044.83 10.02 38 
Vietnam 177.16 27.85 917.57 18.87 70 
Philippines 85.67 25.00 593.46 7.27 99 
Indonesia 91.72 9.90 590.15 15.83 90 
Source: The World Bank, 2012 
                                                 
24
 India‘s Jawaharlal Nehru Port is the other major hub port in the southern Indian region 
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Sri Lanka has one of the highest electricity tariffs in Asia (The World bank, 2007). Due 
to the unreliable nature of the electricity supply, it is estimated that more than 80% of 
urban firms own a generator and these firms spend, on average, an equivalent of 12% of 
their fixed costs to purchase these generators and 3–4 times of the standard costs of 
electricity to generate electricity from these generators (Asian Development Bank, 2008). 
Sri Lanka‘s telecommunication and information infrastructure has improved a lot during 
the last decade due to fast expansion in the telecoms network. Sri Lanka‘s telecoms have 
grown really fast mainly due to high volume of FDI in the telecommunication sector 
(Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7). Access to mobile and fixed-line networks have increased 
significantly in recent years, but access to internet and internet penetration still remains 
very low (Table 4-14).  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
Figure 4-6: Fixed Access Telephone Growth 1990-2012  
 
  Source: (Telecommunications Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka 2012) 
 
Figure 4-7: Mobile Telephones Growth 1992-2012  
Source: (Telecommunications Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka 2012) 
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4.5.10. Labour cost and productivity 
In 1970s, Sri Lanka was ranked above most of Asian countries such as Philippines, 
Taiwan, Korea and India in terms of relative labour productivity (Athukorala & 
Jayasuriya, 2004). Since then Sri Lanka‘s real wage has declined and this real wage 
decline has been accompanied by strong labour productivity growths (Athukorala & 
Jayasuriya, 2004). Therefore, it can be assumed that Sri Lanka has a high relative labour 
productivity; however, a detailed comparison of relative labour productivities in the 
region is necessary to validate this assumption. 
Even though Sri Lanka is considered to be having low wages (Wijeweera & Mounter, 
2008; Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004, Table 4-15), low wages itself will not provide a 
comparative advantage in attracting FDI. This is because countries in Asia and South 
Asian region in particular have comparable labour costs. Due to data limitations, direct 
comparison of wage rates in these countries is not possible, however, available evidence 
point out that labour costs in these countries are comparable (Table 4-15).   
Table 4-15: Score for ―Compensation costs‖ in the Global Services Location Index by 
AT Kearney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kearney, 2011 
However, the advantage of having low wages is somewhat eroded by strict labour 
regulations present in the country; Sri Lanka has some of the most restrictive labour 
regulations in Asia and one of the most generous severance pay clauses in the world (The 
 
Score for ―Compensation costs‖  
Sri Lanka 7.12 
India 6.86 
Pakistan 7.08 
China 5.74 
Malaysia 5.77 
Singapore 1.41 
Thailand 6.54 
Vietnam 7.07 
Phillipines 6.87 
Indonesia 6.95 
United States 0.54 
United Kingdom 1.12 
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World bank, 2007). Also, Sri Lanka‘s industrial sector frequently experience labour 
unrest mainly due to the presence of strong labour unions often attached to political 
parties (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2002, Teitelbaum, 2007). Workers employed extreme 
and violent measures in some labour protests and scared off prospective foreign investors 
and in some situations chased away existing foreign investors (Teitelbaum, 2007). 
4.5.11. Regional context and the degree of regional integration 
South Asian countries, in total, have a market size of $4.5 trillion (in PPP terms); which 
ranks the South Asian region fourth in the world after the US, EU and China. South 
Asian region has a population of 1.5 billion, which accounts for 23 per cent of the total 
world population (Aggarwal, 2008). Also, South Asian countries have recorded high 
economic growth rates in the recent past with average growth rates of above 6% 
(Pravakar, 2006; Aggarwal, 2008; The World Bank, 2011). This massive size and rapid 
growth of SAARC region can provide high prospects for attracting downstream FDI to 
the region. However, the low per capita income and high levels of poverty (Guha-
Khasnobis & Bari, 2000) associated with this region will to a certain extent undermine 
the prospects created by size and growth attributes of the region. 
In the past, South Asia has only being able to attract a very small amount of FDI, less 
than 2% of global FDI inflows (Aggarwal, 2008), a performance that is not worthy for a 
region of its size. South Asia not only has underperformed in terms of attracting FDI 
from outside countries, but also has performed extremely poor in terms of generating 
intra-regional FDI (Aggarwal, 2008). Except Sri Lanka and Nepal, which have received 
considerable amount of FDI from India, none of the South Asian countries have attracted 
a noteworthy amount of FDI from the regional partners (Aggarwal, 2008).  
Majority of intra-regional FDI have flown from India to Sri Lanka; Sri Lanka has 
received more than 50% of India‘s outward FDI in the SAARC region (Aggarwal, 2008). 
India-Sri Lanka FTA has been instrumental for bilateral investment flows between Sri 
Lanka and India. When the India-Sri Lanka FTA came into effect in 2000 (Aggarwal, 
2008), India accounted for just about two per cent of Sri Lanka‘s FDI stocks (Jayasuriya 
and Weerakoon 2001 cited in Aggarwal, 2008). Within five years India became the 
fourth-largest investor (Aggarwal, 2008) and by 2010 India has become the main 
contributor of the Sri Lanka‘s FDI inflows (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010). FDI flows 
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from Sri Lanka to India have also increased significantly. Although this volume of FDI is 
insignificant relative to India‘s volume of inward FDI, Sri Lanka has emerged as the 
largest investor in India from the South Asian region (Aggarwal, 2008). 
Apart from generating little intra-regional FDI, South Asia has also not been able to 
generate considerable amount of intra-regional trade: Intra-SAARC trade (4.5%) has 
been very small compared to Intra-EU trade (55%), intra-NAFTA trade (61%) and intra-
ASEAN trade (25%) (Aggarwal, 2008).  Most of South Asian countries are comparable 
in terms of their resources, skills and capabilities, income levels, and quality and cost of 
labour (The World Bank, 2011), and therefore, there is little opportunity for these 
countries to develop comparative advantage among themselves. This in turn will result in 
low levels of intra-regional trade and investment in the South Asian region (Aggarwal, 
2008). Also, vertical FDI is likely to take place between countries with considerable 
differences in factor endowments (Yeyati, Stein, & Daude, 2002). Furthermore, countries 
in South Asia are said to have broadly similar production structures and competing 
exports, a fact which further undermines the potential of generating trade and FDI among 
the SAARC countries. However, a comprehensive study is warranted to analyse 
similarities and dissimilarities among South Asian nations in order to investigate whether 
there are any opportunities to develop comparative advantages among themselves. Such 
an exercise will be of great value in terms of improving intra-regional trade and 
investments in the South Asian region.    
Sri Lanka is included in several multilateral and bilateral trading agreements which can 
be utilised to promote export oriented FDI. Sri Lanka is linked to South Asian nations 
through three multilateral agreements: South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), 
South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and South Asian Association for 
Regional Co-operation (SAARC) Framework Agreement on Trade in Services. Asia-
Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) is the only regional trade agreement that links Sri 
Lanka to East Asia (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010). Sri Lanka also has bilateral trade 
agreements with India and Pakistan: India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) and 
Pakistan-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (PSFTA) (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010). 
Despite being included in several regional trade agreements, Sri Lanka‘s exports 
performance to nearby regions has not been significant. In 2010, USA and EU in 
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combine have accounted for 56% of total exports and Asia has only accounted for 16% 
of total exports (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010). The only positive export performance 
in terms of regional trade partners is that India has been the third largest export 
destination, behind USA and UK (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010). Even though Sri 
Lanka has not been able to achieve significant exports to its neighbouring countries, Sri 
Lanka‘s imports have come mainly from Asian destinations. In 2010, Asian destinations 
in combine have accounted for 60% of total imports; while India, Singapore, and China 
contributing 21%, 8% and 7% respectively (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010). In light of 
these facts, it is apparent that Sri Lanka has not been able to benefit much from its 
proximity to regional counterparts and regional trade agreements in terms of generating 
exports while some of its regional partners have clearly benefitted from the proximity 
and regional ties.  
With the possible use of export promotion (EP) strategies, Sri Lanka could capitalise on 
its regional trade agreements and attract export oriented FDI that target nearby regions. 
Alternatively, with the use of import substitution (IS) policies, and understandably with 
lesser trade liberalisation with its nearby regions, Sri Lanka could attempt to attract 
import substitution FDI from its regional counterparts. Pursuing import substitution FDI 
from its regional counterparts looks appealing over pursuing export oriented FDI that 
target regional markets due to Sri Lanka‘s very low level of exports to regional partners 
and high level of imports from regional partners. But such a strategy has many negative 
aspects. First, it is recognised in the literature that, generally, EP strategy is likely to both 
attract a higher volume of FDI and promote more efficient utilisation thereof compared 
to IS strategy (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 1996). Furthermore, potential EP 
oriented FDI is considered to be larger than potential IS-induced FDI because IS-induced 
FDI is limited by the constraints of host-country market (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & 
Sapsford, 1996). Therefore, due to the limited market size of Sri Lanka compared to 
some of its outsized trading partners, opportunity costs of import substitution policy/ 
trade restrictions is very high; Sri Lanka will lose the prospect of grabbing slices of 
larger export markets of its regional partners by trying to generate import substitution 
FDI from its regional imports which cater to a comparatively small internal market. 
Export promotion policies are useful in providing incentives to MNCs to locate facilities 
in the country and to export to larger regional markets. Contrastingly, import substitution 
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policies would make the intermediary goods expensive, and therefore, make the exports 
less competitive (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
Majority of Sri Lanka‘s imports are low technology products; consumer and intermediate 
goods accounts for 78% of total imports and intermediate goods imports are dominated 
by basic low technology products (Figure 4-8). Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed 
that majority of the imports that come from regional trading partners are low technology 
products. Rajapaksha & Arunathilake (1997) has also concluded that majority of Sri 
Lanka‘s trade in the SAARC region is limited to basic consumer goods. If this is the 
case, import substituting FDI will take place in low technology industries. FDI in low 
technology products is likely to generate little technology spillovers (Malik, 2010), and 
therefore, potential spillovers of IS-induced FDI in Sri Lanka is likely to be limited.  
Figure 4-8: Imports by commodities for the year 2011 
 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2011 
 
Also, EP induced FDI is considered much more efficient in promoting growth since such 
FDI is allowed to operate in a distortion-free environment (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & 
Sapsford, 1996). Since IS oriented strategy creates distortions, it provides widespread 
incentives for rent seeking and directly unproductive profit seeking activities 
(Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 1996), which has resulted in large corrupted 
public sectors in some developing countries, as in the case with Sri Lanka (Pravakar, 
2006). Also, free play of market forces, which is associated with EP strategy, enables the 
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country to develop long term sustainable competencies through the allocation of 
resources on the basis of comparative advantage.    
Due to above reasons, pursuing EP-oriented FDI rather than import- oriented FDI in the 
region is likely to be more beneficial for Sri Lanka. Along these lines, more trade 
liberalisation within the region can be advocated. However, whether such a trade 
liberalisation would promote FDI in Sri Lanka will largely depend on Sri Lanka‘s 
location advantages and comparative advantages relative to other member countries as 
well as the potential of the region as a whole to generate market seeking FDI 
opportunities. 
Sri Lanka is situated at the crossroads of major shipping routes connecting South Asia, 
Far East and the Pacific with Europe and the Americas (Board of Investment Sri Lanka, 
2011). Sri Lanka also has the advantages of being adjacent to India, close to Southeast 
Asia and the Middle East, and not too distant from China.  Therefore, MNCs that target 
these markets have the option of locating their operations in Sri Lanka. Moreover, such 
MNCs could also gain preferential trade access to Asian markets via regional and 
bilateral trading agreements such as SAFTA, SAPTA, APTA, ISFTA, and PSFTA. The 
only downside of Sri Lanka‘s geographical location is that Sri Lanka has India as the 
only adjoining country while other countries in South Asia have contiguous neighbours 
besides India (Dash, 1996). Undeniably, this fact would make Sri Lanka a bit 
uncompetitive in terms of attracting MNCs that target other South Asian markets.  
Empirical evidence suggests that, following accession to an RIA, geographic distance 
between the home and the host country and the geographical location of the host country 
within the region becomes more important determinants for attracting inward FDI (Feils 
& Rahman, 2011; Velde & Bezemer, 2004). Moreover, Velde & Bezemer (2004) have 
shown that countries located close to the largest country or close to the core of the region 
benefit more from being part of a region. Therefore, being included in regional RIAs is 
likely to boost the strength of Sri Lanka‘s favourable geographical location.  
FDI can be categorised into two types according to the motives of MNCs: downstream 
FDI and upstream FDI. FDI in search for increased sales is defined as downstream FDI 
and FDI in search of increased production/sourcing efficiency is defined as upstream 
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FDI. In general, downstream FDI is attracted by the regions that have largest market 
potential and upstream FDI is attracted by countries with low-cost labour, greater labour 
productivity and better institutional efficiency (Feils & Rahman, 2011). Sri Lanka‘s 
small internal market may limit the potential of downstream FDI. However, both the 
literature and empirical studies suggest, subsequent to regional integration, market size of 
an individual member becomes less important as a determinant of FDI inflows (Buckley 
et al., 2001; Feils & Rahman, 2011). Following accession to an RIA, a country‘s labour 
cost becomes more important in attracting FDI (Buckley et al., 2001)
25
. Therefore, 
regional integration would provide an opportunity for Sri Lanka to attract MNCs that 
want to serve other regional markets. The imperative question is whether MNCs would 
want to locate their operations in Sri Lanka instead of locating their operations inside the 
country where their target market is. For example, why would a MNC that target Indian 
market want to locate their operation in Sri Lanka instead of locating in India itself? This 
question cannot be answered without a comprehensive comparison of location 
characteristics, and comparative advantages of Sri Lanka with those of other countries in 
the region. 
Therefore, Sri Lanka might have a good opportunity to attract upstream FDI due to its 
cheap but productive labour capital. However, since most of the South Asian countries 
have comparably low wage rates, Sri Lanka will have to have a considerable advantage 
in labour productivities over other countries in the region in order to become the prime 
candidate for upstream FDI. However, as it was highlighted earlier, Sri Lanka has a poor 
institutional infrastructure, which would be a constraint in attracting upstream FDI. 
Nevertheless, other countries in the region are at least not better than Sri Lanka in terms 
of institutional infrastructure. Therefore, improvements in institutional efficiency are 
crucial for Sri Lanka, in order to stay ahead among other South Asian countries and to 
reach standards of other Asian countries. 
  
                                                 
25
 However, rather ironically, Feils and Rahman (2011) have shown that, following accession to an RIA, 
labour cost efficiency becomes less important in attracting intra-regional FDI. 
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4.6. Concluding Remarks  
This chapter provided a preliminary analysis of FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. Sri 
Lanka had been considered, and continued to be considered, as a country with excellent 
prospects for economic development. However, Sri Lanka‘s economic performance and 
performance in FDI have so far failed to achieve their potential. FDI inflows have been 
recently dominated by FDI into services. Manufacturing sector continues to attract 
diminishing attention from foreign investors while agriculture sector remains largely 
unexplored by foreign investors. Manufacturing FDI in Sri Lanka is narrowly 
concentrated in a few sectors with little participation in technical intensive sectors. 
Furthermore, export oriented manufacturing FDI has largely taken place in low-end 
export oriented industries that are largely labour intensive. Although FDI in labour 
intensive operations with less advanced technology can have a larger contribution to the 
host country‘s employment, these operations do not attract advance technologies to the 
host country and make limited contribution to the capability development in human 
capital (United Nations, 1992).   
After observing the industrial structure, composition of trade and composition of FDI in 
third and fourth chapters, it can be comprehended that Sri Lanka is still in the stage one 
of the investment development path (IDP). While almost all exports are generated in 
resource and/or labour intensive sectors (with low technology intensity), majority of 
imports takes place in consumer goods sectors and low technology intensive sectors. 
Inward FDI flows have been modest and have gone into labour or resource intensive 
manufacturing sectors and market oriented services sectors. Annual outward FDI flows 
have been negligible, if not zero.  
Civil war, which was considered as one of the main barriers to economic development 
and to attract FDI, ended in 2009. This has given renewed hopes for Sri Lanka. Sri 
Lanka‘s impressive human capital indicators remain as one of the key strengths but Sri 
Lanka has yet failed to capitalise on this strength. Past political instability, poor 
infrastructure, weak institutional factors, lower level of industrialisation and weaknesses 
in export structure, ineffective and weak policy environment, and poorly managed 
exchange rate policies appear to be major issues in terms of boosting future FDI inflows. 
Regional context within which Sri Lanka operates pose both opportunities and 
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challenges. However, it appears that regional integration within the South Asian region 
has yet failed to generate any tangible benefits to Sri Lanka, in general, and in terms of 
boosting FDI flows.  
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Chapter 5 : Civil War and FDI –A Time Series and a Panel 
Data Study 
 
5.1 Introduction 
FDI is subject to host country political risk in addition to economic factors, e.g. market 
size, trade and trade-related factors, labor costs, tax and exchange rates, commonly 
identified in the literature (Chakrabarti, 2001; Moosa, 2002). Political risk stems from 
various political dynamics in the host country, including violence such as wars, riots, 
disorders, labor unrests; stability of the host government; attitude of the host government; 
and changes in the rules and regulations governing FDI. 
Civil war is a major source of political instability of a country and, is likely to discourage 
FDI. Due to a war that prevailed for three decades, Sri Lanka has gone through a 
considerable degree of variation in conflict intensity, periods with war, without war, and 
with ceasefire arrangements. It as a case study provides an excellent opportunity to 
analyze the implications of war on FDI inflows. 
This chapter presents two econometric studies conducted to determine the effect of the 
civil war on FDI inflows to Sri Lanka. By employing time series and panel data 
econometric analysis, these two econometric studies investigate the degrees of impact of 
war on FDI, as a whole, FDI in manufacturing and FDI in services and manufacturing 
FDI by market-orientation.  First study employs time series econometric analysis based 
on three series of FDI inflows: annual gross FDI inflows to Sri Lanka during the period 
from 1980 to 2012, and annual net FDI inflow (increase in realised FDI stock) to 
manufacturing sector and service sector during the period from 1984 to 2012.  Second 
study employs a panel study based on annual sector wise net FDI inflows (increase in 
realised FDI stock) to manufacturing industries during the period from 1984 to 2012.  
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5.2 Effect of War on FDI 
Politically instability, i.e. high degree of political risks, of a host country is considered as 
one of the key concerns of potential foreign investors (Walsh & Yu, 2010). War and 
political violence (including civil war, uprisings and terrorist attacks) is a major source of 
political instability of a country. War and political violence in a country is likely to 
discourage inflows of FDI, and therefore, should have a negative relationship with FDI 
inflows. Some countries and regions that are associated with high level of political 
conflict have performed very badly in terms of attracting FDI. For example, despite 
having rich natural resources, competitive labour and large population (markets), Muslim 
countries in the developing world are among the most unpopular destinations for FDI 
mainly due to their political instability
26
 (Rahman, 2010).  
Civil war can degrade the investment climate of the host country and increase the risk 
to foreign investors. It can affect FDI both directly and indirectly. Direct effects  
capture the possibility of destruction and damage to physical and human assets of FDI 
due to violence. In addition to the loss of value to the assets, these damages can lead 
to time delays, revenue losses due to stock outs, missed opportunities, reputation 
damage and even complete close down of production lines, plants or firms (Jain & 
Grosse, 2009).  
Indirect effects can take many forms and be more widely spread than direct effects  
(Czinkota, Knight , Liesch, & Steen, 2010). From the perspective of business, 
profitability of MNCs can be adversely affected by war due to potential damages, 
uncertainty and extra costs, such as costly insurance covers, extra security measures, 
and business continuity plans. Conflicts can negatively affect the efficiency of 
operations and efficiency of resource use and allocation in businesses; for example, 
logistic issues due to extra security measures and travel restrictions, interruptions to 
operations due to curfew and emergency situations. Moreover, host government can 
bring in new regulations, policies and procedures to counter potential threats, which 
could obstruct smooth business operations and increase transaction costs (Czinkota  et 
al., 2010). For example, many governments have increased their scrutiny of shipping 
containers and have implemented new security programmes to safeguard ports and 
                                                 
26
 57 Muslim countries received only 2.0 per cent of the world's total FDI in 2003 
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airports from terrorism, all of which have lower the efficiency of international 
shipping and logistics (Czinkota et al., 2010). Firms may also have to incur additional 
costs in complying with enhanced compliance and reporting requirements.  
Disruptions in local operations can cause shortages or delays of critical inputs and 
lead to interruptions in international supply chains (Czinkota et al., 2010). 
From the perspective of demand, civil war can cause decline in buyer demand which 
can have an adverse effect on market seeking FDI that cater to host country market. 
Conflict related acts can create fear, panic and uncertainties which can negatively 
affect demand for both consumer and industrial goods/services (Czinkota et al., 
2010).  
War can also have a significant negative effect on the business environment in which 
MNCs operate. There is a general consensus in the literature that war is the reason 
why some countries fail to sustain adequate economic growth (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal, 2003; Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & Kelegama, 2001; Barro, 1991; 
Blomberg, Hess, & Orphanides, 2004). For example, in their attempt to assess the 
economic costs of War in Sri Lanka for the period 1984-1996, Arunatilake, 
Jayasuriya, & Kelegama (2001) shows that WAR has contracted GDP growth rates in 
Sri Lanka significantly. Also, extra military expenditure by the government can 
crowd out expenditure in infrastructure which will have a negative impact on FDI 
inflows. In the context of Sri Lanka, Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & Kelegama (2001) 
have shown that military expenditure has crowded out government investment 
significantly. Quality of labour force can be affected due to displacements, disability, 
death and emigration caused by internal conflicts (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & 
Kelegama, 2001). Complicating this further, MNCs may be hesitant or find it difficult 
to post their staff to conflict prone areas (Czinkota et al., 2010). MNCs will have to 
duly compensate employees when they are posted in conflict prone areas, which can 
increase labour costs considerably. Furthermore, host government may carry out extra 
scrutiny on people entering the country and even tight immigration policies for 
security reasons (Jain & Grosse, 2009; Enderwick, 2001). This can lead to delays in 
issuing visas to foreigners and sometimes intimidate visiting foreign business people. 
These HR related issues are likely to have an effect on operations of foreign 
businesses and also on potential FDI. War may also weaken other institutional 
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dimensions. Presence of internal conflict can indirectly contribute to higher levels of 
corruption (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & Kelegama, 2001), deterioration of rule of law, 
fall in transparency and governance, and curtailment of civil liberties  (Pradhan, 
2001), all of which could have a negative impact on FDI inflows (Busse & Hefeker, 
2007). 
Empirical studies that give explicit attention to the effect of war/conflict on FDI 
flows are in short supply (Czinkota et al., 2010), possibly due to researchers taking 
the negative effect of war/conflict as granted. On the other hand, there exist a handful 
of studies exploring the effects of broad political instability which normally 
encapsulates war/conflict as a sub-component. These studies have largely relied on 
composite measures of political instability published by various risk reporting 
agencies. These empirical studies, both surveys and cross-country studies, have 
produced mix results (Walsh & Yu, 2010; Agarwal, 1980). Some have found a 
negative relationship between political instability and FDI inflows (Root & Ahmed, 
1979; Schneider & Frey, 1985; Suliman & Mollick, 2009; Brada, Kutan, & Yigit, 
2006) while some have found that there is little or no relationship between these two 
variables (The World Bank, 1998; Wheeler & Mody, 1992; Bennett & Green, 1972; 
Green and Cunningham, 1975; Kobrin, 1976; Asiedu, 2002). 
Bennett & Green (1972), investigating the effect of political instability on direct 
investments by US firms in marketing activities in forty-six countries, found that 
political instability do not discourage such FDI flows
27
. Kobrin (1976), investigating 
the effect of economic, social, and political aspects of the host country environment on 
investments of 187 major US manufacturing firms, found a strong relationship between 
market-related variables and FDI but failed to find any relationship between FDI and 
variables based on political event data. (Suliman & Mollick, 2009), investigating the 
determinants of FDI in 29 sub-Saharan African countries from 1980 to 2003, find that the 
incidence of war exerts strong negative effects on FDI inflows. Brada, Kutan, & Yigit 
(2006), examining FDI flows to the transition economies of Central Europe, the Baltics 
and the Balkans, report that while transition economies unaffected by conflict and 
political instability received more FDI flows than comparable west European countries, 
                                                 
27
 Bennett & Green (1972) use a 7-point scale, which was constructed by Feierabend & Feierabend (1966) 
by assigning weights (from 0 to 6) to 30 types of politically destabilising events. 
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Balken countries, due to conflict and instability, received less FDI than comparable west 
European countries.     
Inconsistencies in these research outputs can be due to various reasons. These studies 
have employed different kinds of data and methodologies and also have used different 
definitions for political instability (Agarwal, 1980). Also, the risk faced by MNCs in 
different industries and also from different home countries will vary according to the 
context of the political instability (Agarwal, 1980). Furthermore, some countries offer 
various incentives and guarantees for the investments in order to mitigate the effect of 
political risk, and effects of such schemes are usually not incorporated in these research 
studies (Agarwal, 1980). 
Moreover, most of these studies have looked at the impact of broad political instability 
variable which encapsulates many dimensions of political instability and many studies 
rely on composite measures of political instability published by various risk reporting 
agencies. Use of broad measures of political instability can bias results due to various 
reasons. First, each dimension of political instability can have different effects on FDI. 
For example, risk of changing policy environment and risk of potential damages from a 
civil war are likely to have completely different implications on incoming FDI. Most of 
the policy environmental factors usually change slowly, and therefore, may have a 
limited explanatory power to explain inter-temporal variations of FDI flows; in contrast, 
civil war can vary fast, and therefore, are likely to be more important in explaining inter-
temporal variations of FDI flows (Fielding, 2004). Also, cross section studies that look 
into the relationship between a composite measure of different dimensions of political 
instability and FDI flows are likely to generate bias results. Moreover, slope coefficients 
of political instability variable in cross country studies are the average effect of political 
instability on FDI flows across all the countries in the sample, and therefore, the effect of 
various types of political instability on various countries/contexts become ambiguous 
(Fielding, 2004).  
One way to overcome these issues and to understand the true effect of civil war on FDI is 
to conduct time series studies and panel data studies on a country that have gone through 
a considerable degree of variation in conflict intensity. To this end Sri Lanka becomes a 
valuable case study to analyse the impact of political conflict on FDI flows.  
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Sri Lanka as a case study provides an excellent opportunity to analyse the implications of 
war on FDI inflows because intensity of war in Sri Lanka has varied significantly during 
different timeframes, consisting of periods with war, without war, and with ceasefire 
arrangements. As guided by the literature and past empirical studies, it is hypothesised 
that civil war negatively affects FDI inflows.   
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5.3. Impact of Civil War on FDI by Sector 
War can increase the risks to investments and undermine the host country location 
advantages. Therefore, MNCs might opt for alternative forms of serving the host market 
such as exporting or licensing over FDI or completely avoid serving the host country. 
However, are manufacturing and services FDI affected differently by civil war? Do both 
export-oriented FDI and market-seeking FDI react to civil war in the same way? Studies 
investigating the relationship of civil war to different sorts of FDI or FDI in different 
sectors is almost non-existent (Czinkota et al., 2010; Driffield, Jones, & Crotty, 2013). 
But there are reasons to believe that the determinants of services FDI might differ from 
those of manufacturing FDI and determinants may also vary by the market-orientation of 
manufacturing FDI.  
The degree to which FDI being substituted or avoided can largely depend on type of FDI 
(whether horizontal or vertical), characteristics of the investment (size and degree of sunk 
cost) and characteristics of products/services. Foreign firms may be less inclined to 
undertake FDI in conflict zones in sectors that need large investments and the degree of 
sunk costs associated with the investments is high, and may substitute FDI with 
alternative forms or may completely avoid it. Therefore, FDI in different sectors can have 
different sensitivities to conflict. 
As is established in the literature, firms may prefer undertaking FDI over exporting when 
marginal costs of exporting are high compared to fixed costs of FDI (Greenway & 
Kneller, 2007) but the threshold required to shift from exports to FDI may vary by sector 
in the presence of war. Due to distinctive characteristics of services, mainly simultaneity, 
inseparability and perishability
28
, most services are usually non-tradable or very costly to 
trade and are location bound (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Dunning, 1989). These 
characteristics and shorter life cycle of services therefore imply that service FDI is not 
easily substituted by other forms. If service firms intend to service countries in conflicts, 
they have to undertake FDI. Service FDI also tend to require substantially lower levels of 
                                                 
28
 Simultaneity means that services tend to be produced, delivered and consumed simultaneously. 
Inseparability refers to the impossibility of separating service production from service consumption and 
difficulty of separating service from the service provider. Perishability signifies that service cannot be 
inventoried like products. These characteristics tend services to be normally geographically linked, i.e. the 
service firm needs to be present at the time of production and consumption.    
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financial resource commitments than manufacturing (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). 
Therefore, I posit that service FDI is less sensitive to conflict than manufacturing.  
Conflict may also affect manufacturing FDI differently by market-orientation. For 
market-seeking FDI, i.e. when FDI is undertaken to cater to local market, both the FDI 
operation and target market are prone to conflict; however, the potential damage is 
completely localized. In contrast, when export-oriented FDI is undertaken in a conflict 
zone, the FDI operation and the target market are in different locations. Disruption in the 
conflict zone can have a wider impact on other markets. With shortening of lead times 
particularly due to practices such as just-in-time manufacturing, lean manufacturing, and 
made to order strategies, locating part of global supply chain in a conflict zone increase 
vulnerability to the potential disruptions to the entire global operations, something which 
manufacturing MNCs cannot afford (Czinkota et al., 2010; Enderwick, 2001; Jain & 
Grosse, 2009). Conflict can increase uncertainty and amplify inherent risk that 
entrepreneurs face, and therefore, can divert economic resources from productive use, 
and thus, can decrease factor demands (Colino, 2012). These demand uncertainties can 
have a major impact on export-oriented manufacturing FDI while having a limited 
impact on market-seeking manufacturing FDI. Furthermore, a firm undertaking offshore 
export-oriented manufacturing may have several location options that provide similar 
locational benefits, and therefore, may be relatively convenient in locating the 
manufacturing operations in a conflict free alternative location. In contrast, when market-
seeking manufacturing FDI is substituted by exports, a firm may have to incur additional 
marginal costs (tariff/transportation costs). Therefore, export-oriented FDI is likely to be 
more sensitive to war than market-seeking FDI.  
Following from the above discussion, the following hypotheses are derived. These 
hypotheses will be tested using Sri Lanka‘s experience: 
1) Civil war has higher level of impact on manufacturing FDI than service FDI  
2) Civil war has higher level of impact on export-oriented manufacturing FDI 
than market-seeking FDI.  
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5.4 Time Series Study Based on Aggregate FDI Inflows and FDI in 
Manufacturing and Services 
5.4.1 Methodology  
This econometric study employs three sets of time series analysis based on annual gross 
FDI inflows to Sri Lanka during 1980-2012, and annual net FDI inflows to 
manufacturing sector and service sector during 1984-2012
29
. Each FDI series will be 
regressed against civil war variables and an appropriate set of control variables. Three 
different proxies are used to represent civil war: WAR, CONFLICT and NKILL. WAR is 
a binary variable identifying whether an internal conflict was present in Sri Lanka. 
Suliaman & Mollick (2009) and Kravis & Lipsey (1982) have also used such dummy 
variable to capture the presence and absence of war.  CONFLICT includes two sets of 
dummy variables, C1 and C2, which are constructed from the conflict intensity variable 
published by Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Centre for the Study of Civil 
Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). C1 indicates the presence of 
minor war and C2 indicates the presence of major war. NKILL is also a measure of 
conflict intensity and is the number of conflict related deaths reported by National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). In the 
extant empirical literature, ‗deaths per year‘ is widely used and is considered as an 
appropriate measure to gauge the civil war severity (Murdoch & Sandler, 2002; Drakos, 
2011 and Hicks & Jeff, 2009). 
Guided by the existing literature on FDI determinants and on the availability of time 
series data for Sri Lanka, four measures of control variables are selected: market growth, 
interest rate, trade openness and infrastructure. Market size is expected to positively 
affect FDI. Many studies use real GDP growth rate to control for market demand of the 
host country (Chakrabarti, 2001; Suliman & Mollick, 2009). Three different growth rates 
are used in this study in order to relate to different types of FDI: GDP growth rate (GR), 
growth rate in value added in manufacturing (GRM) and growth rate in value added in 
services (GRS) are used for total FDI, FDI in manufacturing and FDI in services, 
respectively.  
                                                 
29
 Annual gross FDI inflows are realized FDI reported at the end of each year. Since sector-wise FDI 
inflows are not reported, sector-wise FDI for each year were taken as the difference between cumulative 
realized FDI figure for that year and previous year. Therefore, the FDI figure for manufacturing and 
services considered here is the net FDI (net of any divestments or any capital erosions due to negative 
profits) rather than gross FDI. 
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Lower real interest rates (RIR) can augment investment and increase the profitability, 
therefore, could augment FDI. Real interest rates can also be used as an ancillary variable 
to measure overall macroeconomic stability (Erdal & Tatoglu, 2002). Macroeconomic 
stability can lead to higher sustainable growth rates, smaller fiscal and trade deficits, all 
of which again can have a positive effect on incoming FDI (Busse & Hefeker, 2007). 
Therefore, real interest rate is included as a control variable. I expect a negative 
relationship between real interest rate and FDI (Erdal & Tatoglu, 2002).  
Trade openness (TO) is another widely used control variable (Chakrabarti, 2001; 
Suliman & Mollick, 2009) and is expected to have a positive or negative relationship 
with FDI depending on whether FDI and trade substitute or complement each other. It is 
often measured by trade intensity. Since majority of empirical studies supports for a 
positive relationship between trade openness and FDI (see, for example Erdal & Tatoglu, 
2002; Suliman & Mollick, 2009; Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef, 1999; Abbott, 
Cushman, & De Vita, 2012), I expect to see a positive relationship between FDI and TO. 
Finally, telephone density (TP) measured by telephone lines per 100 people is included 
as a measure of the level of infrastructure. Previous studies on FDI determinants have 
highlighted the importance of level of infrastructure for incoming FDI, and majority of 
studies have used telephone density as a proxy for the level of infrastructure in the host 
country (Suliman & Mollick, 2009). Description and sources of variables used in this 
time series study is given in Table 5-1. Table 5-2 presents descriptive statistics.  
The following three initial specifications will be estimated with suitable estimation 
methods. 
  FDI   = ƒ (X, GR, RIR, TO, TP)  5.1   
 FDIS  = ƒ (X, GRS, RIR, TO, TP)  5.2 
 FDIM  = ƒ (X, GRM, RIR, TO, TP) 5.3  
Where, X is the conflict related variable which is either WAR, CONFLICT or NKILL. 
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Table 5-1: Description of variables used in the Time series Study for Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description 
Broad 
measure 
Source 
FDI Gross FDI Inflows to Sri Lanka FDI UNCTAD, 2012 
FDIM Net FDI inflows (increase in 
realised FDI stock) to 
manufacturing sector  
FDI Board of Investment of Sri Lanka 
and  central bank annual reports 
FDIS Net FDI inflows (increase in 
realised FDI stock) to service 
sector 
FDI Board of Investment of Sri Lanka 
and  central bank annual reports 
GR Growth of GDP (in constant 
prices) 
Host market 
growth 
UNCTAD, 2012 
GRM Growth of value added (in constant 
prices) for manufacturing sectors 
Host market 
growth 
World Development Indicators and   
Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2012 
GRS Growth of value added (in constant 
prices) for service sector 
Host market 
growth 
World Development Indicators and   
Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2012 
RIR Real interest rate (lending interest 
rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator) 
Interest rate  World Development Indicators and   
International Monetary Fund, 2011 
 
TO Trade openness represented by 
trade intensity, i.e. total trade 
(imports plus exports of goods and 
services) as a percentage of GDP 
Trade 
openness 
UNCTAD, 2012 
TP telephone density measured by 
telephone lines per 100 people 
Infrastructure World Development Indicators and   
Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2012 
War  A binary variable representing 
whether an internal conflict was 
present in Sri Lanka.  
0    No war 
1    War 
 
Presence of 
conflict 
Compiled using various sources 
including central bank annual 
reports, newspapers and  journals  
(Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & 
Kelegama, 2001; Duma, 2007) 
CONFLICT A variable representing whether an 
internal conflict was present in Sri 
Lanka and the intensity of the 
conflict 
C1=1 if minor war (between 25 
and 999 deaths) and zero otherwise 
C2=1 if major war (at least 1,000 
deaths) and zero otherwise 
Presence of 
conflict 
/severity of 
conflict 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP)/Centre for the Study of 
Civil Wars, International Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 
Armed Conflict Dataset  
NKILL Number of total confirmed 
fatalities (killed) in conflict related 
incidents (in thousands) 
Severity of 
conflict 
National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism 
(START). (2011). Global Terrorism 
Database [Data file]. Retrieved 
from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
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Table 5-2: Descriptive statistics for variables used in time series study 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max Correlation Matrix 
     
WAR C1 C2 NKILL GR GRM GRS RIR TO TP 
FDI 236.986 254.599 17.9 956 -0.25 -0.30 0.05 -0.36 0.49   0.01 -0.34 0.90 
FDIS 162.952 234.363 -77.732 965.669 -0.38 -0.30 -0.11 -0.45   0.43 -0.08 -0.35 0.81 
FDIM 58.860 68.153 -47.455 265.921 -0.55 -0.13 -0.12 -0.31  0.11  -0.23 -0.09 0.53 
WAR 0.667 0.479 0 1  -0.05 0.55 0.64 -0.37 0.09 -0.38 0.22 -0.03 -0.31 
C1 0.212 0.415 0 1   -0.72 0.10 -0.17 0.00 -0.22 -0.17 -0.28 -0.30 
C2 0.515 0.508 0 1    0.26 -0.12 0.07 -0.04 0.34 0.35 -0.05 
NKILL 0.501 0.504 0 1.822     -0.26 0.27 -0.24 -0.06 -0.10 -0.53 
GR 5.092 1.926 -1.37 8.3        -0.12 -0.01 0.38 
GRM 6.198 3.208 -4.162 12.254        -0.11 -0.01 -0.21 
GRS 5.470 2.104 -0.517 8.601        -0.20 0.16 0.27 
RIR 3.838 4.487 -5.944 12.742         0.23 -0.12 
TO 70.921 9.647 49.149 88.637          -0.44 
TP 4.754 5.970 0.359 17.155           
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In order to avoid spurious regression, it is important to identify the order of integration of 
each variable prior to estimating the models.  Except the civil war variables, which are 
dummy variables, all other variables are of time series nature, therefore, can be 
potentially nonstationary. All variables are tested for unit roots. The results of 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are reported in Table 5-3.  
Table 5-3: Results of the Unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests) 
 
Reported test statistic (with two 
lags) 
Reported test statistic (with one 
lags) 
 Level First Difference Level First Difference 
FDI 1.107 -4.494*** 0.044 -6.447 
FDIM -1.814 -3.766*** -2.679* -6.526*** 
FDIS 0.500 -3.799*** -1.148 -7.580*** 
GR -2.120 -4.066*** -2.934** -6.104*** 
GRM -1.950 -3.651*** -2.560 -5.860*** 
GRS -2.141 -4.050*** -3.202** -6.381*** 
RIR -2.329 -4.313*** -4.486*** -6.799*** 
TO -0.874 0.0827* -1.153 -3.963*** 
TP 0.209 -2.614* -0.818 -2.842* 
WAR -3.394** -3.270** -2.804* -4.084*** 
C1 -2.360 -4.318*** -2.604*            -5.324*** 
C2 -2.133 -2.841* -2.424 -4.861*** 
NKILL -1.530 -2.534 -1.603 -4.724*** 
 
 
Results of the unit root tests indicate all three dependent variables, i.e. FDI, FDIM, and 
FDIS are integrated of order one, I (1). All explanatory variable are either stationary, I 
(0), or integrated of order one, I (1). Since some of the variables are integrated of order 
one, statistically it would be more appropriate to test these variables in their first 
difference form than in their levels. This is because direct application of ordinary least 
squares regression to non-stationary data produces regressions that are misspecified or 
spurious in nature (Engle & Granger, 1987). However, the process of differencing 
variables to achieve stationarity results in loss of long-run information in the data (Ang, 
2007).  An alternative approach to using first difference in a regression model is using 
Error Correction Model (ECM) and this model can be used to capture both short term 
and long term effects of explanatory variables. In order to use ECM, first, we have to 
establish whether there is co-integration among these variables. To test for co-integration 
among these variables, both Engle-Granger residual base approach and Johansen co-
integration test were employed.  
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Since WAR is a dummy variable, inclusion of the variables in the Johansen co-
integration test was not possible due to collinearity between error and the dummy 
variables. However, we can carry out the co-integration test for non stationary time series 
to detect co-integration relationship, and then safely plug in other I (0) variables into the 
model and still expect the identified co-integration relationship to persist (Charemza & 
Deadman, 1997). Therefore, the Johansen co-integration test was conducted for the rest 
of the variables except WAR, for example, co-integration test for specification 5.1 was 
carried out for variables FDI, GR, RIR, TO and TP. For all specifications, Johansen co-
integration test was carried out using a lag level of one, which was suggested by Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC). 
Results of the Johansen co-integration tests are presented in Table 5-4. For all three 
specifications, as per the Trace test, null hypothesis of no co-integration (r=0) can be 
rejected at 5% significant levels but null hypothesis of at most 1 co-integration 
relationship (r ≤ 1) cannot be rejected30. Therefore, test results indicate that there is one 
co-integration relationship in all three specifications. 
Alternatively, Engle-Granger residual based approach was also used to test co-integration 
between these variables. For co-integration to be present, there should be a linear 
combination of FDI, GR, RIR, TO, and TP that is stationary. According to Engle-
Granger residual based approach, the residuals from the regression of FDI on GR, RIR, 
TO, and TP were tested for stationarity using ADF test. Student-t ratio depends on the 
number of coefficients estimated and there are four coefficients to be estimated in this 
co-integration test. Therefore, we cannot use critical values from the standard DF/ADF 
tables where the number of coefficients estimated is assumed to be zero; instead we have 
to use critical values from the tables for positive number of estimated coefficients 
(Charemza & Deadman, 1997). Similarly, this co-integration test was repeated for 
specification 5.2 and specification 5.3.  
                                                 
30
 Max-eigenvalue test also produce similar results for specification 5.1 and 5.2. For specification 5.3, null 
hypothesis of at most 1 co-integration relationship (r ≤ 1) can be rejected, but very marginally (Max-
eigenvalue statistic is almost equal to 5% critical value). Therefore, Max-eigenvalue test result can be fairly 
approximated to indicate a 1 co-integration relationship for specification 5.3. 
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Table 5-4: Results of the Johansen co-integration test 
   
Null Hypothesis: hypothesised number of co-integrating equations 
None  At most 1 At most 2 
For specification 4.1: co-integrating 
equations among FDI, GR, RIR, TO, and 
TP 
Eigenvalue 
 
0.784983 0.604817 0.379852 
Trace test 
Trace Statistic 87.82164 44.78458 18.78919 
5% critical value 69.81889 47.85613 29.79707 
Max-eigenvalue test 
Max-Eigen statistic 43.03706 25.99539 13.37833 
5% critical value 33.87687 27.58434 21.13162 
For specification 4.2: co-integrating 
equations among FDIS, GRS, RIR, TO, 
and TP 
Eigenvalue 
 
0.720882 0.563293 0.428364 
Trace test 
Trace Statistic 77.05946 42.60417 20.23488 
5% critical value 69.81889 47.85613 29.79707 
Max-eigenvalue test 
Max-Eigen statistic 34.45529 22.36929 15.09984 
5% critical value 33.87687 27.58434 21.13162 
For specification 4.3: co-integrating 
equations among FDIM, GRM, RIR, TO, 
and TP  
Eigenvalue 
 0.723821 0.644272 0.243963 
Trace test 
Trace Statistic 73.65603 38.91494 11.00801 
5% critical value 69.81889 47.85613 29.79707 
Max-eigenvalue test 
Max-Eigen statistic 34.74109 27.90693 7.550969 
5% critical value 33.87687 27.58434 21.13162 
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Results of the ADF test are presented in Table 5-5. For specification with total FDI and 
Services FDI, reported test statistic is far below the lower bound of critical values, and 
therefore, the null hypothesis of no co-integration (or residuals are not I(0)) can be 
rejected. Therefore, results indicate that there is co-integration between these variables. 
For the specification with manufacturing FDI, although reported test statistic is much 
lower than the critical value taken from the standard DF/ADF tables (where number of 
coefficients estimated is assumed to be zero), the test statistic is slightly above the upper 
bound of critical values obtained from the tables for positive number of estimated 
coefficients. However, critical values can become excessively lower when the number of 
coefficients to be estimated increases. If the co-integration test is performed only for 
FDI, TO and TP (which were the most assuredly confirmed as I (1) variables), then the 
reported test statistic is below the lower bound of critical values, and therefore, the null 
hypothesis of no co-integration (or residuals are not I (0)) can be rejected. Since FDIM, 
TO and TP are integrated of order one, and other variables can be fairly approximated as 
integrated of order zero, if there is a co-integrating relationship among FDIM, TO and TP 
then this co-integrating relationship should persist when the other I (0) variables are 
included in the model (Charemza & Deadman, 1997). Therefore, specification 5.3 can 
also be considered to have a one co-integrating relationship.    
 
Table 5-5: Results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root in the residuals  
 
Reported 
test 
statistic 
5% critical 
value 
(standard 
DF/ADF 
tables) 
No of 
observa
tions 
(n) 
coefficient
s to be 
estimated 
(m) 
10% critical 
value  
5% critical 
value 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
For specification 5.1: 
regression of FDI on GR, RIR, 
TO, and TP 
-5.330** -2.983 33 4 -4.18 -4.12 -4.57 -4.50 
For specification 5.2: 
regression of FDIS on GRS, 
RIR, TO, and TP 
-4.770** -2.994 29 4 -4.18 -4.12 -4.57 -4.50 
For specification 5.3: 
regression of FDIM on GRM, 
RIR, TO, and TP  
-3.720 -2.994 29 4 -4.18 -4.12 -4.57 -4.50 
For specification 5.3: 
regression of FDIM on TO and 
TP  
-3.523* -2.994 29 2 -3.43 -3.37 -3.82 -3.73 
Note: Estimations are based on one lag 
** Significant at 5 percent  *   Significant at 10 percent   
 
   
As per the results of both Johansen co-integration test and Engle-Granger residual base 
approach, it can be concluded that there is one co-integrating long-run relationship in 
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each set of variables. Therefore, vector error correction models (VECMs) are used and 
the following specifications are formulated: 
∆FDIt = α0 + α1 ∆FDIt-1 + α2 ∆GRt-1 + α3 ∆RIRt-1  + α4 ∆TOt-1  + α5 ∆TPt-1  + α6 EC1t-1  + α7 Xt + ε1t                 (5.4)  
∆FDISt = θ0 + θ1 ∆FDISt-1 + θ1 ∆GRSt-1 + θ2 ∆RIRt-1 + θ3 ∆TOt-1 + θ4 ∆TPt-1 + θ5 EC3 t-1 + θ6 Xt + ε4t             (5.5) 
∆FDIMt = β0 + β1 ∆FDIM t-1 +β1 ∆GRM t-1 + β2 ∆ RIR t-1 + β3 ∆ TO t-1 + β4 ∆TP t-1 + β5 EC2 t-1 + β6 Xt + ε2t     (5.6) 
Where ∆ represents the first difference and ECM represents the error correction term 
associated with each error correction model, for example, EC1 is the lagged value of the 
residuals from the co-integrating regression of FDI on GR, RIR, TO, and TP. X is the 
conflict related variable which is either WAR, CONFLICT or NKILL.  
Political conflict variables (X) are considered as an exogenous variable and all other 
variables are considered as endogenous variables in vector error correction models. Since 
civil war in Sri Lanka has no direct economic root but mainly emerged as a result of 
ethnic differences, temporal variation in economic variables and FDI flows is unlikely to 
have a substantial effect on the political conflict variables, and therefore, justifies the 
consideration of political conflict variables as exogenously determined.  
5.4.2 Results and Discussions 
The results are summarized in Table 5-6
31
. Residuals were tested for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. Durbin-Watson d-statistic indicates that there is no serial correlation 
among residuals and Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistics indicate that there is no 
autocorrelation except in specification (6). White test results indicate that there is no 
heteroskedasticity among residuals.  
In all estimations except one, error correction term (EC) is negative and statically 
significant indicating the existence of a long run relationship between FDI and its 
determinants
32
. Negative and significant error correction term indicate VECM model is 
more appropriate over vector auto regression (VAR) model, therefore, strongly 
supporting the chosen model. 
                                                 
31
 Only the equation of interest, in which FDI is the dependent variable, is presented here and other 
simultaneous equations of the ECMs are not included here for brevity.     
32
 The coefficients associated with EC are less than -1 in five specifications, implying some short run over-
adjustment to deviations from long-run equilibrium. However they are not statistically different from -1.  
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Lagged FDI (∆FDIt-1) is statistically insignificant, indicating current FDI flows is not 
influenced by past FDI flows. Different from established consensus of the importance of 
market size to FDI inflows (Chakrabarti, 2001), GDP growth is found to have no effect 
on FDI inflows in Sri Lanka, either for aggregate FDI or for FDI in manufacturing and 
FDI in services. Real interest rate (RIR) has the expected sign of being negative and is 
statistically significant in most of the estimations. Trade openness (TO) is highly 
insignificant. Finally telephone density (TP) are positive as expected and significant in 
some estimations. Although coefficients of some of the explanatory variables are 
individually not significant, as suggested by a significant F statistics, explanatory 
variables are jointly significant.  
Now turning to the variables of interest, i.e. WAR, CONFLICT and NKILL, all three 
variables have the expected negative sign. The negative coefficient of WAR is 
statistically insignificant for total FDI and services FDI but is highly significant for 
manufacturing FDI, clearly demonstrating that WAR has a significant negative impact on 
FDI in manufacturing compared to services. The estimated coefficient of WAR in 
column 4 signifies that average value of FDI in manufacturing is US$ 92 million less 
during war than that in absence of war. Given the average FDI flows to manufacturing 
was only around US$ 59 million (Table 5-2), the magnitude of the estimated coefficient 
appears to be considerably large. In order to compare the effects of war on FDI in 
manufacturing and FDI in services, beta coefficients were estimated for the estimated 
coefficients of WAR
33
. Estimated beta coefficient of WAR for manufacturing FDI (-
0.65) is significantly higher than the estimated beta coefficient of WAR for services FDI 
(-0.25). This differential impact of WAR explains why the relationship between WAR 
and aggregate gross FDI flows is insignificant. WAR could instigate FDI, and the impact 
can be much larger for net FDI (increase in realised FDI) inflows than gross FDI inflows. 
This divestment phenomenon might have also caused the impact to be larger for net FDI 
inflows compared to that of gross FDI inflows.  
                                                 
33
 Beta coefficient of explanatory variable (WAR) is equal to the product of the estimated coefficient of the 
explanatory variable (WAR) and the ratio of the standard deviation of the explanatory variable (WAR) to 
the standard deviation of the dependent variables (FDIS and FDIM) 
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Table 5-6: Results of the time series estimations 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: ∆FDIt Total FDI Manufacturing FDI Services FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
WAR -29.738   -92.009***   -120.219   
 
(54.945)   (31.559)   (81.840)   
C1 
 
-89.899   -4.868   -136.258  
  
(78.949)   (48.551)   (125.106)  
C2 
 
-104.818   -86.733*   -226.753*  
  
(74.516)   (49.437)   (108.148)  
NKILL 
  
-22.653   -9.490   -50.240 
  
 (48.689)   (30.996)   63.479 
∆FDIt-1 0.445 0.087 0.428 0.096 -0.064 -0.441 -0.077 -0.222 0.284 
 
(0.292) (0.3007) (0.288) (0.322) (0.368) (0.306) (0.305) (0.303) (0.298) 
∆GRt-1 -3.467 9.158 0.234       
 
(11.129) (11.9502) (11.178)       
∆GRMt-1    -1.926 -1.215 1.926    
    (3.809) (4.541) (4.776)    
∆GRSt-1       0.944 10.961 -12.7185 
       (14.927) (15.792) (14.961) 
∆RIRt-1 -10.807** -10.685* -11.083** -1.729 -2.235 -6.291* -9.324 -8.569 -14.802* 
 
(4.888) (5.8442) (4.962) (2.558) (3.063) (3.263) (8.847) (9.519) (7.955) 
∆TOt-1 -1.486 1.437 -1.339 -3.693 -6.969* -1.382 9.387825 8.50582 6.372 
 
(5.585) (6.570) (5.560) (2.92) (3.941) (3.532) (8.236) (8.918) (7.408) 
∆TPt-1 19.766 44.763 20.481 22.219 11.280 -6.544 82.651** 110.107** 58.158 
 
(24.985) (32.223) (24.760) (16.177) (17.921) (18.297) (38.701) (47.289) (33.929) 
ECt-1   -1.204*** -0.627** -1.127*** -1.258*** -1.028** -0.274 -0.747** -0.478** -1.210*** 
 
(0.346) (0.281) (0.333) (0.412) (0.488) (0.245) (0.280) (0.220) (0.320) 
Constant 24.399 79.706 15.384 49.853* 48.784 15.436 60.186 130.920 8.452 
 
(46.921) (60.144) (40.263) (23.08) (35.472) (28.381) (65.974) (87.376) (54.471) 
R-squared 0.417 0.302 0.386 0.464 0.413 0.531 0.629 0.534 0.425 
F-statistic 2.354* 1.189 2.068* 4.593*** 2.581* 2.004 2.353* 1.585 3.075* 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.048 2.017 2.014 1.788 2.118 2.182 1.919 1.885 1.902 
Breusch-Godfrey LM  test (F-statistic)  0.105 0.027 0.029 0.026 0.93 2.49* 0.022 0.133 0.121 
White test (Chi-sq) 197.1 209.7 198.3 214.2 204.7 231.5 202.3 220.2 373.8 
151 
 
Coefficients of C1 are statistically insignificant for all three FDI variables but those of 
C2 are significant for manufacturing and services FDI in their respective regressions, 
indicating that FDI is more responsive to major wars than minor wars. Coefficient of 
NKILL is statistically insignificant for all FDI variables. R squared, adjusted R squared 
and F statistics are significantly low for the estimations that include C1 and C2 compared 
to estimations that include WAR. Most importantly, estimations with C1 and C2 have 
insignificant F-statistic indicating weak explanatory power associated with C1 and C2. 
Therefore, we can see that out of all civil war variables, WAR has a much higher 
explanatory power compared to CONFLICT (C1 and C2) and NKILL. These results 
indicate that FDI is largely dependent on whether or not there is a war and it is the major 
wars which have the most detrimental effects on FDI. This is plausible due to two 
reasons. First, presence of war carries a reputational damage which will scare off foreign 
investors. However, major wars can cause serious damage to MNCs in terms of physical 
and human assets. Second, due to relatively long term nature of FDI compared to other 
forms of financial flows, FDI flows may not be able to react to swift changes in conflict 
intensity.  Having observed this, it would be informative to compare the effect of 
presence/absence of conflict vs effect of conflict intensity on short term and long term 
financial flows, a potential project for future research. 
Until 1977‘s liberalization initiatives, FDI remained very low in Sri Lanka. As a result of 
trade and investment liberalization and introduction of export-oriented policies in late 
1970s, FDI started flowing to manufacturing and by 1983 more than 90% of FDI stocks 
were concentrated in manufacturing (Table 4-3). However, with the emergent of war in 
1983, the momentum of FDI inflows to manufacturing subsided, instead services FDI 
started to dominate FDI inflows. Currently FDI in services accounts for more than 70% 
of total FDI stocks while FDI in manufacturing has shrunk to less than 30% of total FDI 
stocks (Table 4-3). Consistent with this observation, time series econometric study 
showed that war has had a significant negative effect on manufacturing FDI while having 
a negative but insignificant effect on service FDI. So the important question is why 
service FDI is less sensitive to war than manufacturing FDI. 
Even though Sri Lanka has received a significant proportion of its FDI in services, they 
largely consist of domestic market-oriented FDI. Majority of services FDI has ended up 
in domestic service industries (Table 4-3). Inactivity of foreign firms in export-oriented 
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service industries is also evident from very low level of service exports (Figure 5-2). In 
contrast, FDI in manufacturing has taken place both in market-seeking and export-
oriented categories. Therefore, Sri Lanka‘s experience shows that FDI inflows to 
domestic market oriented service FDI is less sensitive to conflict than FDI inflows to 
manufacturing. 
A manufacturing MNC has couple of options available to serve a host country market, 
e.g. exporting, licensing and FDI, depending on the ownership, location and 
internalization advantages relevant to the specific context. Presence of conflicts can 
increase the risks to investments and undermine the host country location advantages, 
therefore, MNCs might opt out of FDI. Moreover, literature on choice of market entry 
mode suggests that under environmental uncertainty, manufacturing firms prefer lower 
control governance modes (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). MNCs may delay undertaking 
any FDI until the hostilities in the host country improve. In a similar vein, (Saggi, 1998) 
advocates that the firm's choice between exporting and FDI can be tilted towards the 
former in the face of uncertainty and theoretically proves that exporting is more favorable 
over FDI under demand uncertainty. Since serving the host market by exporting allows 
the operations to be located outside the host country, MNCs can minimize/avoid 
operational disruptions caused by conflict.  
In contrast, options for serving foreign markets are generally limited for service MNCs. 
Due to distinctive characteristics of services, the option of exporting may not be available 
for firms involved in majority of service categories and they need to be present in the 
host country in order to serve the host market (Dunning, 1989). It is well recognized in 
the literature that in order to establish physical facilities abroad, service firms are more 
likely to internalize via FDI compared to manufacturing counterparts (Czinkota et al., 
2010). Therefore, if a service firm wants to serve a conflict zone, FDI is likely to be the 
only available option, hence these MNCs are less responsive to the presence of war than 
manufacturing MNCs. 
In summary, it is likely that the amount of FDI that can take place in a conflict zone is 
dependent on how easily FDI can be substitutable by an alternative means. A host 
country associated with conflict is likely to lose market-seeking manufacturing FDI that 
are easily substitutable by imports. In contrast, since substitutability of service FDI by an 
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alternative form is very low compared to substitutability of manufacturing FDI by an 
alternative form, it is conceivable that market-seeking service FDI is less sensitive to 
conflict. 
The above discussion is also in line with casual observations of FDI flows and imports in 
tandem. We can distinguish two different trends in manufacturing and services (Figure 
5-1 and Figure 5-2). In manufacturing, while FDI stock has almost been stagnant, 
merchandise imports have grown impeccably, suggesting MNCs being more inclined to 
export to Sri Lanka than undertaking FDI. In contrast, service FDI has outperformed 
service imports both by volume and growth rates, indicating MNCs might find it difficult 
to substitute market oriented service FDI with service exports due to idiosyncratic 
characteristics of services as discussed before. 
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Figure 5-1: FDI, exports and imports in manufacturing 
 
 
Figure 5-2: FDI, exports and imports in services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
FDI stock in
manufacturing
Manufacturing imports
Manufacturing exports
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
FDI stock in services
Services imports
Services exports
155 
 
5.5. Panel Study Based on Annual Industry-wise Manufacturing FDI 
Inflows 
5.5.1 Methodology 
This econometric study employs a panel dataset based on annual industry-wise FDI 
inflows to Sri Lankan manufacturing industries during 1984-2012. The purpose of the 
study is to ascertain whether the effects of war differ between different industries. FDI 
into Sri Lanka is classified into 8 manufacturing industries (Table 5-7). Similar to above, 
the FDI figure considered is the net FDI. These FDI data were denominated in domestic 
currency and they were converted into US dollars using the end-of-year exchange rates 
published in the World Development Indicators. The control variables used are the same 
as those included in the time series study with one difference. Instead of the aggregate 
market growth variables used in the time series study, a sectoral growth rate (GRI) which 
is represented by growth of value added (in constant prices) in each manufacturing sector 
is included as a control variable. Description and sources of variables used in this 
econometric study is given in Table 5-8. Table 5-9 presents descriptive statistics. 
Table 5-7: Sector classification 
Sectors 
Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber & Plastics 
Fabricated Metal, Machinery & Transport Equipment 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
Other Manufactured Products 
Paper, Paper Prod. Printing & Publishing 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel & Leather Products 
Wood & Wood Products 
**It was noted that although this category is named as services, all non-manufacturing FDI is 
included in this category. 
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Table 5-8: Description of variables used in the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
FDI 
Increase in realised FDI in each sector Board of Investment of Sri Lanka 
GRI 
Growth of value added (in constant prices) in each 
manufacturing sector 
various issues of Central Bank annual reports 
WAR A binary variable representing whether an internal conflict 
was present in Sri Lanka. 0    No war 
1    War 
Compiled using various sources including central bank annual reports, and 
journals and newspapers including  Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & Kelegama, 
2001; Duma, 2007) 
CONFLICT A variable representing whether an internal conflict was 
present in Sri Lanka and the intensity of the conflict 
0    No war 
1    Minor: between 25 and 999 deaths  
2.   War: at least 1,000 deaths  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset  
NKILL 
Number of total confirmed fatalities (killed) in conflict 
related incidents (in thousands) 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
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Table 5-9: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the study 
  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI 232 7.357672 18.25509 -54.5 113.61 
GRI 232 8.41084 43.60677 -43.4 605.35 
WAR 232 0.724138 0.447914 0 1 
C1 232 .2413793 .428845 0 1 
C2 232 .5862069 .4935772 0 1 
NKILL 232 0.569586 0.492476 0 1.822 
RIR 232 4.383599 4.303911 -5.94387 12.74168 
TO 232 70.17285 9.577728 49.14915 88.63646 
∆.TO 232 -.3677198 4.897717 -14.21988 9.884984 
TP 232 5.350498 6.04527 .505254 17.15471 
∆.TP 232 .5690499 1.062335 -.2096634 4.134913 
Sector wise FDI      
FDI in Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber & Plastics  29 13.20759 22.32817 -17.41 64.96999 
FDI in Fabricated Metal, Machinery & Transport Equipment (F_METAL) 29 5.394483 16.52862 -28.08 53.29 
FDI in Food, Beverages & Tobacco (FOOD) 29 9.641724 16.91527 -14.51 61.52 
FDI in Non-Metallic Mineral Products (N_METALLIC) 29 4.291724 14.16421 -34.53 41.83 
FDI in Other Manufactured Products (OTHER) 29 5.687241 12.32226 -25.7 29.62 
FDI in Paper, Paper Prod. Printing & Publishing (PAPER) 29 1.301379 3.610168 -1.2 18.32 
FDI in Textiles, Wearing Apparel & Leather Products (TEXTILE) 29 16.79172 32.90665 -54.5 113.61 
FDI in Wood & Wood Products (WOOD) 29 2.545517 5.609616 -4.56 18.81 
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Prior to regression analysis, panel unit-root tests are conducted in order to identify the order of 
integration of each variable (Table 5-10). 
Table 5-10: Results of the unit-root tests  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Results of the unit root tests indicate that FDI, GROWTH and RIR are stationary but TO and TP 
are integrated of order one. Therefore, following model is formulated. 
 
 FDI = γ 0 + γ1 X + γ2 GRI + γ3 RIR + γ4 ∆TO + γ5 ∆TP + ε   (5.7) 
Where ∆ represents the first difference and X is civil war variable, which is either WAR, 
CONFLICT or NKILL.  
Estimations are carried out by Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), fixed effects (FE) and 
random effects (RE) estimation methods. In order to decide between Fixed and Random Effects 
models, Hausman test was performed and the test result favours random effects estimation; there 
was strong evidence to support the null hypothesis of industry-specific intercepts (Ui) not being 
correlated with the regressors. This is not surprising because except GRI and FDI, all other 
variables vary only over time and do not vary across industries. F-test for the joint significance 
of the industry specific effects (in Fixed Effects estimation) provided strong evidence for the 
presence of industry specific effects; the null hypothesis (that all ui are zero) of the F-test could 
be rejected. Moreover, Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects also 
 Test statistics (with one lag) 
 Levin-Lin-Chu 
unit-root test  
Im-Pesaran-Shin 
unit-root test 
Fisher-type unit-root test based on 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (P statistic) 
FDI -4.0197*** -5.1802*** 65.0668*** 
GROWTH -9.6312*** -9.6661*** 157.1453*** 
WAR -6.4911*** -1.9963** 24.2494* 
C1 -4.0401*** -4.0146*** 46.1330*** 
C2 -3.0310*** -3.4299*** 38.9854*** 
NKILL -3.6006 0.9825 6.3242 
RIR -1.9181** -4.6784*** 55.0343*** 
TO 1.4242 1.2274 5.5561 
∆.TO -7.0871*** -7.5600*** 102.8544*** 
TP 0.0654 2.1210 3.3802 
∆.TP -4.6965*** -4.0948*** 47.1649*** 
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supported random effects over simple OLS: the null hypothesis that there is no significance 
difference across units (no panel effect) could be strongly rejected. Therefore, compared to fixed 
effects model and Pooled Ordinary Least Squares regression, random effects model is more 
suitable to estimate these models.  
Residuals of all the estimations were tested for heteroskedasticity using Modified Wald test for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity. Results indicate heteroskedasticity. Since panels with long time 
series tend to have the problem of serial correlation, Wooldridge test for autocorrelation was 
used to test for serial correlation among residuals, but no serial correlation is detected in all 
specifications. Cross sectional dependence is finally tested using Pasaran‘s test of cross sectional 
independence and result indicates that there is no cross sectional correlation. Therefore, all 
specifications are estimated using RE with cluster robust standard errors. 
Table 5-11: Test results 
 
Potential endogeneity between industry-wise growth rates and industry-wise FDI is a major 
concern. Therefore, lagged growth rates are employed instead of contemporaneous growth rates. 
Moreover, generalised methods of moments (GMM) are also used in order to tackle the potential 
endogeneity. However, since GMM estimators can lack efficiency, RE estimations are reported 
alongside GMM estimators.  
 Spec. 5.7 with 
WAR 
Spec. 5.7 with C1 
and C2 
Spec. 5.7 with   
NKILL  
Hausman test for fixed Vs random effects  (chi2) 0.15 0.16 0.15 
F-test for the joint significance of industry specific effects  2.97*** 2.81*** 2.83*** 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity (chi2) 391.20*** 406.40*** 450.71*** 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation  1.158 0.400 0.580 
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence (chi2) (no cross 
sectional dependence) 
0.083 1.500 1.585 
160 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-12: Results of panel data estimations 
 
 
Dependent variable: FDI RE RE GMM RE RE GMM RE RE GMM 
WAR -9.995*** -9.979*** -10.030***       
 (2.506) (2.595) (2.505)       
C1    -5.135** -4.225* -4.331**    
    (2.212) (2.375) (1.865)    
C2    -6.473** -6.031** -6.027**    
    (2.889) (2.906) (2.409)    
NKILL       -4.748*** -5.071*** -4.963*** 
       (1.065) (1.088) (0.975) 
L.FDI   -0.034   -0.018   -0.014 
   (0.045)   (0.046)   (0.045) 
GRI -0.008  -0.008 -0.011*  -0.010* -0.010  -0.007 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) 
L.GRI  0.012*   0.008   0.011  
  (0.007)   (0.010)   (0.009)  
RIR -0.0567 -0.102 -0.0696 -0.119** -0.270** -0.248** -0.347** -0.571*** -0.545*** 
 (0.119) (0.180) (0.179) (0.061) (0.122) (0.110) (0.135) (0.186) (0.178) 
∆TO 0.203 0.186 0.189 0.213 0.178 0.181 0.368* 0.303 0.307 
 (0.194) (0.208) (0.190) (0.211) (0.214) (0.189) (0.207) (0.212) (0.193) 
∆TP 4.312** 4.281** 4.382** 4.108** 3.905** 3.943** 3.397* 3.049 3.087 
 (2.136) (2.149) (2.114) (1.970) (1.878) (1.835) (1.997) (1.961) (1.917) 
Constant 12.54*** 12.62*** 12.86*** 10.75*** 11.10*** 11.28*** 9.868*** 11.37*** 11.43*** 
 (2.601) (2.527) (2.475) (2.168) (2.178) (1.882) (1.761) (2.009) (1.905) 
N 232 224 216 232 224 216 232 224 216 
R-squared  0.107 0.105  0.066 0.066  0.068 0.072  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.5.2 Results of the baseline model 
Results of all the estimations are presented in Table 5-12. Coefficients of all civil war 
variables are negative as expected and statistically significant. These results indicate that 
war/conflict significantly impede FDI in manufacturing. As it was the case in time series 
study, WAR remains to have a higher explanatory power compared to CONFLICT (C1 
and C2) and NKILL. Coefficients of C2 are slightly higher than those of C1. These 
results reiterate that FDI is largely dependent on whether or not there is a war and it is the 
major wars which have the most detrimental effects on FDI. However, as before, R-
squired value is low for the estimations based on C1, C2 and NKILL, compared to R-
squired value of estimations based on WAR. Therefore, out of the conflict related 
variables, WAR has a much higher explanatory power compared to CONFLICT (C1 and 
C2) and NKILL.  
The coefficients of sectoral growth rate are negative but only significant (marginally) in 
some of the estimations. However, the estimated coefficient of lagged sectoral growth 
rate is positive. Coefficients of all other control variables have the expected sign. RIR 
and ∆TP are statistically significant in most of the estimations but ∆TO is insignificant in 
most of the specifications. In GMM estimations, coefficients of lagged FDI are negative 
and statistically insignificant in all estimations. In the presence of agglomeration 
benefits, FDI in current year is positively correlated with FDI in previous period (Busse 
& Hefeker, 2007). Therefore, results of these estimations may indicate an absence of 
agglomeration effect on FDI in the context of Sri Lanka, a result which is also found in 
time-series study above.  
5.5.3 Effect of Civil War on FDI by Industry  
In order to understand the effects of civil war on FDI by industry, I include dummy 
variables for industries
34
 and use pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and GMM. Given 
the strong explanatory power of WAR in previous estimations, results with the 
interaction terms of WAR and industry dummies are presented in Table 5-13. However, 
estimation results are qualitatively similar when CONFLICT (C1 and C2) and NKILL 
are used.    
                                                 
34
 ―Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber & Plastics‖ sector is used as the base group 
162 
 
 
Table 5-13: Results of panel data estimations with dummy variables for each industry 
Dependent variable: FDI POLS POLS GMM 
WAR -12.31*** -11.83*** -11.48*** 
 (0.813) (0.978) (0.798) 
WAR* F_METAL  5.063*** 4.562*** 4.316*** 
 (0.00870) (0.0117) (0.520) 
WAR * FOOD   -0.979*** -1.257*** -1.500** 
 (0.0208) (0.00115) (0.649) 
WAR * N_METALLIC   -3.529*** -4.346*** -5.393*** 
 (0.037) (0.0553) (0.901) 
WAR * OTHER   9.392*** 8.403*** 8.455*** 
 (0.176) (0.226) (0.708) 
WAR * PAPER   11.60*** 11.15*** 10.91*** 
 (0.013) (0.0200) (0.531) 
WAR * TEXTILE   -5.110*** -5.351*** -5.575*** 
 (0.083) (0.0724) (0.150) 
WAR * WOOD   2.229*** 1.766*** 0.291 
 (0.009) (0.0221) (0.861) 
L.FDI   -0.037 
   (0.043) 
GRI -0.011*  -0.009*** 
 (0.006)  (0.003) 
L.GROWTH  0.010  
  (0.008)  
RIR -0.057 -0.100 -0.089 
 (0.124) (0.187) (0.162) 
∆TO 0.204 0.187  
 (0.201) (0.216)  
∆TP 4.308* 4.279* 4.188** 
 (2.206) (2.220) (2.036) 
Constant 20.06*** 20.08*** 13.06*** 
 (0.871) (0.988) (2.586) 
F_METAL   -11.49*** -11.44***  
 (0.0137) (0.0187)  
FOOD   -2.865*** -2.821***  
 (0.0193) (0.00491)  
N_METALLIC   -6.321*** -6.29***  
 (0.00628) (0.0113)  
OTHER   -14.10*** -14.07***  
 (0.0156) (0.00318)  
PAPER   -20.34*** -20.27***  
 (0.0285) (0.0124)  
TEXTILE   7.345*** 7.411***  
 (0.0292) (0.00756)  
WOOD   -12.32*** -12.27***  
 (0.0172) (0.0175)  
N 232 224 216 
R-squared 0.203 0.202  
Wald chi2    18413.38*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                       Refer Table 5-9 for representations of sector specific dummy variables 
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Table 5-13 shows that the impact of WAR is significantly different for each 
manufacturing industry. Estimated marginal effects of WAR on FDI in each 
manufacturing industry (based on GMM) are presented in Table 5-14. Results indicate 
that WAR has impeded FDI in all industries, ranging as high as US$ 17 million in 
Textiles, Wearing apparel and Leather products to as low as US$ 570,000 in Paper, Paper 
Prod. Printing & Publishing, an industry that has not been able to attract much FDI in the 
past. Compared to total FDI stock at the end of year 2012, the magnitudes of these 
coefficients are considerably large. Therefore, the amount of FDI foregone due to civil 
war is very large for most of the manufacturing sectors. Another interesting casual 
observation is that industries with high export volumes seem to be those that also have 
high marginal effects of WAR on FDI. This propels a question, whether the impact of 
civil war on FDI also varies by market-orientation of MNCs. 
Table 5-14: Marginal effects of WAR on FDI in each manufacturing sector 
 
∂ FDI/ 
∂ WAR 
Realised FDI stock 
in US $ Mn as at 
end of year 2012 
Gross Export 
Earnings of BOI 
firms (US $ Mn) 
Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber & Plastics  -11.48 393.72 998.74 
Fabricated Metal, Machinery & Transport Equipment -7.164 159.10 161.63 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco -12.98 279.93 309.63 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products -16.873 126.47 175.27 
Other Manufactured Products -3.025 175.88 410.49 
Paper, Paper Prod. Printing & Publishing -0.57 37.77 52.50 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel & Leather Products -17.055 514.16 3377.76 
Wood & Wood Products -11.189 74.21 54.55 
Services (included for comparison purposes)  4730.08 370.40 
 
 
5.5.4 Effect of Civil War on FDI in Export-Oriented/Local-Market-Oriented 
Manufacturing Industries 
In order to understand the effect of war on export-oriented/local-market-oriented FDI, I 
include an interaction term between WAR and Export intensity of the industry 
(EX_INT). 
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  FDI = β0 + β1 WAR + β2 GROWTH + β3 EX_INT*WAR + β4 EX_INT + u1t (5.8) 
 
Export intensity is measured by the ratio of gross export earnings of BOI firms in year 
2011 to the total realized FDI in BOI firms in year 2011
35
. Following from the discussion 
in section 5.3, I expect the negative effect of WAR to be higher for the sectors associated 
with higher export intensity in FDI, therefore, a negative estimate for the interaction 
term.  
All else constant, marginal impact of WAR on FDI will be given by:  
      
 
  
Therefore, I expect a negative estimate for coefficient β3 if the negative effect of WAR is 
higher for the sectors associated with higher export intensity in FDI.  
Estimated results are reported in Table 5-15. Coefficients of WAR are negative and 
statistically significant, indicating the negative impact of WAR on FDI. Coefficients of 
EXP_INT are positive and statistically significant indicating the industries with higher 
export intensity are associated with higher FDI. The coefficients of the interaction term 
between EXP_INT and WAR are negative and highly significant in all three 
specifications, indicating that the negative impact of WAR increase with export 
intensiveness of the FDI in the sector, a result in line with theoretical expectation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 BOI firms also include non FDI projects but majority of BOI investments are foreign investments, and 
therefore, this ratio is used as an approximation for export intensity. 
∂ FDI 
= β1+ β3* EX_INT 
∂ WAR 
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Table 5-15: Results of the specification with interaction term between WAR and Export 
Intensity  
Estimation method RE RE GMM 
Dependent variable: FDI    
WAR -7.137** -7.286** -7.526*** 
 (2.967) (2.964) (2.681) 
WAR*EXP_INT -2.051** -1.930* -1.786** 
 (1.022) (1.034) (0.884) 
EXP_INT 5.258*** 5.259*** 9.211*** 
 (0.929) (0.928) (2.106) 
RIR -0.0567 -0.101 -0.0718 
 (0.120) (0.181) (0.178) 
D.TO 0.203 0.187 0.190 
 (0.195) (0.209) (0.189) 
D.TP 4.312** 4.280** 4.367** 
 (2.145) (2.158) (2.110) 
GROWTH -0.00877*  -0.00753 
 (0.00515)  (0.00469) 
L.GROWTH  0.0105  
  (0.00701)  
L.FDI   -0.0291 
   (0.0436) 
Constant 5.215 5.290 0 
 (3.452) (3.481) (0) 
Observations 232 224 216 
R-squared 0.1648 0.1632  
Wald chi2  642.96*** 4726.80*** 6.20e+10*** 
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
Civil war/conflict in a country is likely to discourage inflows of FDI. However, few 
studies explicitly investigate how civil war affects FDI (Czinkota et al., 2010). As 
highlighted in this paper, most of the existing studies that look at the impact of broad 
political instability variable which encapsulates civil war as one dimension show mixed 
findings. These studies contribute limited understanding of war-FDI relationship. Use of 
broad measures of political instability is unlikely to identify the true effect of war on 
FDI. This study attempts to address these limitations by investigating the effects of Sri 
Lanka‘s three decade of civil war, which has gone through considerable variation in 
conflict intensity, on FDI in Sri Lanka.   
Time series study clearly demonstrate that civil war has a significant negative impact on 
FDI in manufacturing sectors compared to FDI in services sectors. This differential 
impact explains why the relationship between civil war and gross FDI flows is 
insignificant. Civil war could also instigate foreign direct divestments, and therefore, the 
impact can be much larger for net FDI inflows than gross FDI inflows. 
The panel study based on annual industry-wise net FDI inflows to Sri Lanka reconfirms 
the strong negative relationship between civil war and FDI inflows to manufacturing 
sectors. Moreover, in contrast to time series study, all three war related variables were 
highly significant in the panel study. Superior performance of the panel study over the 
time series study is not surprising due to several reasons. FDI into different sectors could 
be affected to different degrees by political instability, but the aggregate FDI data does 
not capture these differences. Moreover, panel study accounts for sectoral differences 
which were mainly captured by sector level dummies and sectoral growth rates. 
Furthermore, superiority of panel study over time series study in terms of more degrees 
of freedom and more variability may have also helped the panel study to perform well 
than the time series study. Results of the panel study also points out that the magnitude of 
the negative impact of war varies by industry. Finally, panel study also provided strong 
evidence for a higher negative impact of WAR on FDI in export-intensive industries than 
in local-market-oriented industries.  
The above results highlight the importance of using disaggregated FDI data when 
investigating determinants of FDI. FDI data aggregated over sectors can suppress the 
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variation, and therefore, make it difficult to identify the precise relationship of 
explanatory variables to FDI flows. 
Findings of this study contribute to the literature on political instability and FDI by 
providing empirical evidence. These economic estimations are useful not only to assess 
the harmful effects of civil war on FDI, but also to assess the peace dividend, or the 
economic benefits (in terms of the increase in potential international investment) of 
avoiding or concluding conflict or at least achieving a reduction in political conflict. 
Moreover, this study also contributes to the literature on FDI in Sri Lanka and can also 
influence future policymaking with regard to handling conflicts and attracting FDI.     
Results of this study indicate that high real interest rate can affect FDI flows negatively, 
and trade openness and level of infrastructure (telephone density) can affect FDI flows 
positively. The relationship between market growth and FDI is a bit controversial; some 
of the negative coefficients are statistically significant. This could be due to several 
reasons. First, in Sri Lanka, services FDI are largely market-oriented while 
manufacturing FDI takes both market-seeking and export-oriented forms. Second, MNCs 
have a notorious reputation for having a larger import content in their inputs, and 
therefore, this fact is likely to affect the growth of value added negatively. Moreover, it is 
well documented that Sri Lanka‘s failure to develop backward linkages to foreign firms 
which could have also contributed to this negative relationship (Kelegama & Foley, 
1999). Furthermore, a significant proportion of manufacturing FDI has taken place in 
‗Textiles, Wearing Apparel & Leather Products‘ category, a sector which is reputed to 
have a very low value addition due to higher import content of the inputs to this sector 
and weak backward linkages in this sector (Kelegama & Foley, 1999).  Finally, due to Sri 
Lanka‘s smaller internal market, the significance of the GDP to FDI inflows cannot be 
strong as it is for countries with larger markets.   
Findings of this study extends IB theory by helping to answer an enquiry that remains 
largely unaddressed: ―what sort of investment is particularly sensitive to conflict?‖ 
(Driffield, Jones, & Crotty, 2013). In Sri Lanka, manufacturing FDI has taken place in 
export-oriented forms as well as market-oriented forms. In contrast, majority of services 
FDI is directed towards servicing the domestic market. Therefore, Sri Lanka‘s experience 
shows that war can have a much larger negative impact on manufacturing FDI over 
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market oriented services FDI. However, since services FDI in Sri Lanka has been 
primarily market-seeking, this study does not suggest that effect of war on non-market 
oriented services FDI is also low. In fact non market-seeking (vertical) service FDI is 
likely to be more sensitive to conflict even more than export-oriented manufacturing 
FDI. Due to simultaneity of production/delivery and consumption in services, potential 
damage of local disruptions to the global operations will be significantly higher for 
services than for manufacturing. For example, if manufacturing operation of a garment 
exporter in a conflict zone is disrupted, then the global operation will not come to 
standstill if the damaged product line is re-established in the same plant or somewhere 
else before stocks are exhausted. In contrast, if an offshore call centre operation is 
disrupted, then the entire operation will come to standstill instantaneously. Therefore, the 
potential damage of disruptions should be higher for non-market-seeking service FDI 
than for export-oriented manufacturing FDI. This might be the reason for Sri Lanka to 
perform very poorly in attracting export-oriented service FDI as well as generating very 
low volumes of service exports.  
Despite its merits, this study is not without limitations. One limitation of the time series 
study is the reliance on a limited number of observations. Number of observations were 
33 for the total FDI and 29 for the FDI in manufacturing and FDI in services. Given that 
there are five explanatory variables in the model and VECM model uses lag values of 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable to estimate the model, the degrees of 
freedom of the time series regressions is likely to be compromised, which could to some 
extent undermine the reliability and generalizability of the results. However, it should be 
noted that, although a larger sample size is desirable for good performance of a time 
series econometric model, in practical applications we seldom get longer time series, 
particularly when less frequent annual data is used. Given that the time series 
econometric model performed well (with reasonably high R-squared value and F 
statistics), results of the time series study can be fairly approximated to determine the 
effect of war on FDI. Another limitation of this study was the reliance on country 
specific explanatory variables in absence of an exhaustive set of sector specific 
explanatory variables. Except sector specific growth variable and industry dummies, all 
other explanatory variables were country specific.  An exhaustive set of sector specific 
explanatory variables could not be included because of the unavailability of sector 
specific information.   
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Chapter 6 : Determinants of FDI – A Country Level Study 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an empirical study conducted to examine the determinants of FDI.  
Study employs a panel study based on annual FDI inflows to a selected group of 
countries, one of which is Sri Lanka. The dataset spans 13 countries selected from South 
Asia, East Asia, and South East Asia and a period from 1995 to 2010. A special attention 
is given to detach relationships specific to Sri Lanka from the relationships general to rest 
of the countries.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 provide a theoretical discussion 
on the key FDI determinants explored in this study. Section 6.4 details the methodology 
and reports the results and section 6.5 provides a detailed analysis and discussion on the 
reported results. Finally, section 6.6 concludes the chapter by highlighting the 
conclusions and contribution of this study.     
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6.2 Human Capital and FDI 
Presence of a larger human capital base in the host country will increase the 
attractiveness of local investment climate through the direct effects of upgrading skill 
level of the workforce and the indirect effects of improved socio-political stability and 
health (Miyamoto, 2003). Furthermore, presence of infrastructure (physical capital) is 
also considered as a key determinant of FDI inflows. Effective use of physical capital 
largely depends on the quality of human capital since technical, professional, and 
administrative skills are needed for effective use of physical capital (Abbas, 2001). 
Success of offshore subsidiaries largely depends on how effectively the parent firms can 
transfer their ownership advantages to the subsidiaries. If local workers are educated, 
then local workforce can learn and adapt new technologies faster and easily, providing 
time and cost advantages to investing firms (Kinoshita & Campos, 2004). Moreover, a 
majority of present FDI takes place in capital-, knowledge- and skill-intensive industries. 
Therefore, the presence of high quality human capital is likely to be an important 
determinant in the modern FDI (Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youseff, 2001).  
Only few studies have given a considerable and systematic attention to empirically 
investigate the effect of host country human capital on incoming FDI (Kapstein, 2002) 
however, many studies have included proxies for human capital i.e. as an explanatory 
variable or as a control variable when the FDI is used as the dependent variable. 
Although the importance of human capital in attracting FDI is widely recognised in the 
literature, empirical evidence provided by these studies is inconclusive, particularly for 
developing countries. 
Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youseff (2001), using FDI flows to 36 developing countries in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America during 1980-94, investigated to what extent the level of 
human capital in host countries can affect FDI inflows to developing countries. They find 
that human capital is not only one of the most important determinants of FDI but also its 
importance is increasing over time. Nonnemberg and Mendonca (2004), investigating 
determinants of FDI into 38 developing countries, during 1975-2000, find that level of 
secondary schooling is positively related to FDI flows. Suliman & Mollick (2009), 
investigating determinants of FDI in 29 sub-Saharan countries during 1980-2003, find 
that adult literacy rate is a significant determinant of FDI flows to sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Yet, there are many studies that have found little or no effect of human capital on FDI 
flows. Root and Ahmed (1979), investigating the determinants of manufacturing FDI in 
58 developing countries, find that none of their proxies for human capital, i.e. literacy 
rate, primary and secondary school enrolment rate, and the availability of technical and 
professional workers represented by size of the middle class, are statistically significant 
determinants of inward FDI. Schneider and Frey (1985), using FDI flows to 54 
developing countries, finds that share of an age group with secondary education is not a 
significant determinant in the presence of other political and economic determinants in 
the model. Hanson (1996) shows that adult literacy rate was not a significant determinant 
of FDI for a sample of 105 developing countries. Kinoshita & Campos, (2004), 
investigating the determinants of FDI inflows to 25 transition countries in Central Europe 
and in the former Soviet Union, find that secondary education enrolment rate is not 
significant. Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002), using FDI stocks and FDI flows for a sample 
of 28 developing countries, find that average years of schooling is not significant for 
explaining both FDI stocks and flows in their multivariate regression analysis. In a study 
investigating determinants of the location of FDI in 29 Chinese regions, Cheng & Kwan 
(2000) find that none of their proxies for labour quality of the region, i.e. the percentages 
of the population whose education was at least primary school, junior high school, and 
senior high school, were significant determinants of FDI flows to Chinese regions. 
Interestingly, in a subsequent study conducted by Gao (2005), where bilateral FDI flows 
from 14 source countries to Chinese provinces are considered and bilateral specific 
effects are accounted for, proxies for labour quality of the region is positive and 
significant for most of their estimations. Jinyoung & Jungsoo (2012), investigating the 
relationship between FDI and foreign educated labour in an FDI host country, find that 
number of students in the host country who studied in an FDI source country has a 
significant positive effect on bilateral FDI flows, while the effect of secondary and 
tertiary school enrolment rates of the host country on FDI flows being insignificant.  
Various explanations have been proposed by Miyamoto (2003) for these mixed findings 
including different motives of FDI and the employment of different proxies for human 
capital in the previous empirical studies. However, there can be reasons that are country 
specific which can bias estimated slope coefficients of human capital. To this end it is 
important to identify outliers –if there are any- and then to investigate country specific 
issues that affect the relationship between human capital and FDI. 
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Sri Lanka is widely known for its high rating in human capital index in terms of literacy 
rate and schooling rates, however, Sri Lanka‘s performance in FDI inflows is far behind 
that of East Asian countries that have similar educational achievements. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be concluded that Sri Lanka‘s educational achievements have not been 
instrumental in attracting FDI just by comparing FDI and educational achievements 
without controlling for other FDI determinants. To this end, one of the main purposes of 
this study is to systematically investigate FDI performance against human capital and 
other FDI determinant, while giving special attention to detach FDI-human capital 
relationship that is specific to Sri Lanka from the relationship that is general to rest of the 
countries.  
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6.3 Stock Market Valuations and FDI inflows 
Arbitrage actions are generally associated with portfolio investments, however, both 
empirical and theoretical considerations suggest that FDI flows may reflect arbitrage 
activity by multinationals (Baker, Foley, & Wurgler, 2009). Extant literature recognises 
two types of misprice driven FDI: cheap financial capital hypothesis and cheap asset (fire 
sale) hypothesis. Under cheap financial capital hypothesis, it is assumed that FDI flows 
take place as a result of an opportunistic use of the relatively low-cost financial capital 
available to overvalued source-country firms. Under cheap asset hypothesis, it is 
assumed that FDI flows reflect undervalued host country assets (Baker, Foley, & 
Wurgler, 2009).  
Empirical evidence testing cheap financial capital hypothesis and cheap asset (fire sale) 
hypothesis in the context of FDI is scarce. Baker, Foley & Wurgler (2009), regressing 
FDI flows on source and host country stock market valuations for US based FDI data, 
found that FDI flows are strongly positively related to the average market price to book 
value ratio of publicly traded firms in the source country, supporting the cheap financial 
capital hypothesis. However, Baker, Foley & Wurgler (2009) have not found a 
relationship between FDI flows and the market-to-book ratios of host countries, disputing 
cheap asset hypothesis.  
However, it should be noted that this study used market price to book value ratio rather 
than market price to earnings ratio to proxy the host-country valuations. Since, 
investments are taken place considering their earning potential rather than their asset 
value, market price to earnings ratio is more appropriate than market price to book value 
ratio as a proxy for market valuations. Moreover, this study is based on US based FDI 
data, which can limit the generalisability of these findings to other countries, in 
particular, to developing countries.  
Countries that are riskier, financially underdeveloped, institutionally weak and less 
transparent are supposed to have larger ratio of FDI to FPI inflows relative to countries 
that are otherwise (Claessens, Klingebiel & Schmukler, 2001; Goldstein & Razin, 2006). 
Thus, MNCs might prefer to engage in FDI in developing countries. Therefore, they 
might have a higher tendency to arbitrage (or buy cheap assets) through FDI rather than 
portfolio investments. More importantly, underdeveloped stock markets are often 
174 
 
manipulated and inefficient compared to developed stock markets (Khwaja & Mian, 
2005). Due to these reasons, the degree of mispricing can be higher in developing 
country stock markets, and therefore, cheap asset hypothesis is likely to be more 
applicable to developing countries than developed countries. In some situations the stock 
markets could be pegged at artificial levels (as it is for currency pegs) by the host country 
governments with the use of its public funds and through manipulation of credit 
availability. Sri Lanka stock market experience provides a good example on how a stock 
market could be artificially pegged at a higher price level; during 2010 and 2011, in the 
midst of heavy foreign selling, the Sri Lankan government played a prominent role for 
sustaining high levels of prices (Daily Mirror, 2012). Therefore, an equally applicable 
situation in the context of developing countries is the opposite of cheap asset hypothesis, 
which is defined here as expensive asset hypothesis.  
Expensive asset hypothesis: It is assumed that when the stock market is at an artificially 
high valuation (artificially high price to earnings ratio), FDI flows are discouraged 
because host country assets are overpriced.     
6.3.1. Stock market valuations and FDI inflows: Sri Lanka’s experience 
After the end of three decades of civil conflict in 2009, CSE went through a tremendous 
but rather a magical growth. All share price index of Sri Lanka‘s Stock Exchange 
recorded an inconceivable growth of 125.7% in year 2009 and 96% in year 2010. Sri 
Lanka‘s Stock Exchange was the second best performing stock exchange in the world in 
the year 2009 (Colombo Stock Exchange, 2009; Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2010). As a 
result of this magical growth, price to earnings ratio (PER) increased considerably after 
the end of civil conflict; market PER went up from 5.4 (at the end of 2008) to 25.2 (at the 
end of 2010). This growth of over 200% in the share price index and almost fivefold 
increase in the market PER during 2009 and 2010 was fuelled by local buying interests 
created mainly through credit support and from institutional buying from government 
through its various funds. The government played a prominent role for sustaining high 
levels of prices amidst heavy foreign selling. Therefore, the situation of Sri Lanka‘s stock 
market in this period can be considered as a kind of pegged market, and therefore, one 
could argue the share prices were artificially maintained at an upper level. 
 
175 
 
Table 6-1: Net foreign inflows to the stock exchange, FDI inflows and stock market 
valuations 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
FDI Inflow (US$ millions) 172 197 229 233 272 480 603 752 404 478 956 
Net foreign inflow to the 
stock market (US$ millions) 
-11 25 2 11 61 52 102 128 -7 -233 -172 
No of IPOs - 5 4 2 3 2 0 2 3 8 22 
Contracted FDI projects 149 177 216 228 167 217 298 238 182 262 164 
Market price to earnings 
ratio 
7.5 12.1 11.1 10.8 12.1 14.0 11.6 5.4 16.6 25.2 15.8 
Source: compiled using various issues of CSE annual reports, various issues of Central Bank annual 
reports and UNCTAD, 2012 
Figure 6-1: Net foreign inflows to the stock exchange, FDI inflows and stock market 
valuations 
 
 
Source: various issues of CSE annual reports, various issues of Central Bank annual reports and 
UNCTAD, 2012 
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Even though CSE recorded a sharp growth after the war, CSE has consecutively 
recorded net foreign outflows since the end of civil war, possibly due to the higher price 
levels in the stock market (Table 6-1 and Figure 6-1). CSE experienced net foreign 
outflows of Rs.789 million, Rs. 26.3 billion, and Rs.19 billion in 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
respectively, adding to a total net outflow of over Rs. 46 billion for the three years 
(Central Bank Annual Report 2010). Also, even though FDI flows into Sri Lanka 
increased considerably during the last decade, rather paradoxically, while the stock 
market was going through a spectacular growth, FDI flows were unusually low in 
2009 and 2010 despite the absence of war. A possible explanation for these strange 
observations in net foreign inflows (portfolio and FDI) is that the foreign investors could 
be reluctant to invest and/or could be selling their stocks because the stocks are 
overpriced. 
High PER could discourage potential foreign acquisitions because they have to pay high 
prices if they acquire companies through the stock market. It is also possible that the PER 
in the stock market to be used as a proxy for privately negotiated deals, and therefore, 
higher PER can have a wider effect on foreign acquisitions. Higher PER can also make 
investors of local businesses who wants to sell their assets or raise capital to prefer initial 
public offerings (IPOs) through stock market over finding foreign investors. This will 
increase the opportunity cost of selling to foreign investors through a privately negotiated 
deal. This preference for IPOs over foreign investors can be observed by comparing FDI 
inflows, IPOs and contracted projects (Table 6-1).  
To summarise, even though FDI flows into Sri Lanka increased considerably during the 
last decade, rather paradoxically, despite the absence of war, FDI flows were unusually 
low in 2009 and 2010 when the stock market was going through a dramatic growth. This 
recent performance in stock market and FDI provide an opportunity to test cheap asset 
hypothesis (and expensive asset hypothesis). Also, due to various reasons mentioned 
previously, cheap asset hypothesis (and expensive asset hypothesis) should be more 
applicable for a country that has less developed stock market, and therefore, should be 
more applicable to Sri Lanka.  
Therefore, in light of these considerations, I hypothesise that cheap asset hypothesis (and 
expensive asset hypothesis) is valid in the context of less developed stock markets, and 
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therefore, in the context of Sri Lank. Put it differently, it is hypothesised that price levels 
in the stock market are inversely related to FDI inflows in the context of countries with 
underdeveloped stock markets, and therefore, in the context of Sri Lanka. 
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6.4 Methodology and Results  
This econometric study employs a panel study based on annual FDI inflows to a selected 
group of countries during the period from 1996 to 2011. This time frame was selected 
because data for some of the selected variables, for e.g. political instability, regulatory 
quality, corruption, price earnings ratio, were not available prior to 1996.  
The sample of countries comes from Asia. The sample comprises of 14 countries selected 
from South Asia, East Asia, and South East Asia (Table 6-2). Such a selection would 
enable Sri Lanka to be compared with its regional counterparts; Sri Lanka has to compete 
with both South Asian and Asian countries in order to attract FDI. Countries from these 
regions are selected based on data availability. Taking the sample from Asia would allow 
Sri Lanka and its neighbouring countries to be included in the analysis. Expanding the 
sample of countries by extending the region beyond Asia would inevitably bring in 
countries with very different FDI dynamics (relative to Sri Lanka), which could 
complicate the analysis and undermine the focus of the study. Also, inclusion of FDI 
success stories such as China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Vietnam in the group will 
enable Sri Lanka to be compared with benchmark FDI destinations.  
Table 6-2: Selected countries for the cross country study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable in the estimations is the FDI inflows to the selected countries. 
Human capital in the host country is measured by gross secondary school enrolment rate. 
Market price to earnings ratio is used to measure stock market valuations.  
Guided by previous literature on determinants of FDI flows, following control variables 
are also included; market demand of the host country (Schneider & Frey, 1985; 
Billington, 1999; Suliman & Mollick, 2009; Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef, 1999), 
South Asia (5) East Asia (4) South East Asia (5) 
Sri Lanka China Malaysia 
India Hong Kong Thailand 
Pakistan Republic of  Korea  (South Korea) Vietnam 
Bangladesh Mongolia Philippines 
Nepal  Indonesia 
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trade openness (Suliman, 2009; Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef, 2001; Asiedu, 2002), 
level of infrastructure (Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Asiedu, 2002; Suliman & Mollick, 
2009), political stability (Root & Ahmed, 1979; Schneider & Frey, 1985; Suliman & 
Mollick, 2009) corruption (Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Zhou, 2007; Wei, 2000), regulatory 
quality (Daude & Stein, 2007), exchange rate (Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, & LahrÈche-
Révil, 2001; Blonigen, 1997; Froot & Stein, 1991) and the degree of stock market 
development (Adam  and Tweneboah 2009; Henry, 2000). 
Real GDP growth rate is used to control for market demand of the host country and trade 
intensity, measured by total trade to GDP ratio, is used to control for trade openness. 
Level of infrastructure in the host country is proxied by telephone density measured by 
telephone lines per 100 people. Political stability, corruption, and regulatory quality are 
represented by the relevant indicators in worldwide governance indicators published by 
World Bank. Exchange rate is represented by real exchange rate defined as the nominal 
exchange rate (direct quote against US$
36
) times foreign (US) to domestic price ratio. 
Degree of stock market development is measured by the market capitalization of listed 
companies as a percentage of GDP. Inclusion of these variables also provides an 
opportunity to assess the effect of these variables on FDI inflows in the context of these 
selected countries. The variable measurement and sources of data are presented in Table 
6-3. 
Prior to deciding on the regression model and estimating the models, Fisher-type unit-
root test (based on Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests) was conducted in order to identify the 
order of integration of each variable (Table 6-4).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Domestic currency units per US$ 
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Table 6-3: Description of variables used in the panel study 
Variable Description Broad measure  Source 
FDI FDI Inflows FDI inflows  World Development Indicators 
GGDP Real GDP growth rate Market demand  World Development Indicators 
TO 
Trade openness represented by 
trade intensity (X+M/GDP) 
Trade openness  World Development Indicators 
POLI 
Political stability variable 
published by Worldwide 
Governance Indicators  
Political Stability  
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators of World Bank 
CORR 
Corruption variable published by 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators of  
Institutional 
environment  
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators of World Bank 
REGQ 
Regulatory quality variable 
published by Worldwide 
Governance Indicators  
Institutional 
environment  
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators of World Bank 
EXR 
Real Exchange rate (direct quote 
against US$) 
Exchange rate  
World Development  
Indicators 
PER Market Price to Earnings Ratio  
Stock Market 
valuations  
World Federation  of Exchanges 
and respective stock market 
annual reports 
MCAP 
Market capitalization of listed 
companies (% of GDP) 
Degree of stock 
market 
development  
World Development  
Indicators 
EDS 
Secondary School enrolment (% 
gross) 
Human Capital  World Development Indicators 
TEL 
Telephone density measured by 
telephone lines per 100 people 
Infrastructure World Development Indicators 
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Table 6-4: Results of the Fisher-type unit-root tests  
 Test statistic based on Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests (with 
2 lags) 
 Level First Difference 
FDI 13.4566 55.1966*** 
GGDP 56.1429***  
TO 17.7625 78.3726*** 
POLISTAB 43.0938*  
REGQUALITY 57.3887***  
CORRUPTION 35.7390 74.3576*** 
EDS 143.8697***  
MC_INS  46.3458***    
TEL 21.6361 30.5862 
TELE (with one lag) 27.9407 49.1323** 
PER 38.2004***  
EXR 122.8069***  
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Results of the unit root tests indicate variables FDI, TO, CORRUPTION and TEL are 
integrated of order one, i.e. I(1) and rest of the variables are integrated of order zero, i.e. 
I(0). However, stationarity of the first difference of variable TEL was not assuredly 
confirmed, and therefore, this variable is not included in the baseline specification. Since 
some of the variables are integrated of order one, statistically it would be more 
appropriate to test these variables in their first difference form than in their levels. This is 
because direct application of ordinary least squares regression to non-stationary data 
produces regressions that are misspecified or spurious in nature (Engle & Granger, 
1987). An alternative approach to using first difference in a regression model is using 
Error Correction Model (ECM) and this model can be used to capture both short term 
and long term effects of explanatory variables. In order to use ECM these variables 
should have a co-integrating relationship. Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test, which is 
based on Engle and Granger two step residual based test, was used to test for co-
integration among these variables. Out of the seven statistics reported in Pedroni co-
integration test, most of the statistics indicate that there is no co-integration among 
variables (Table 6-5). In this case, where nonstationary variables are integrated of the 
same order but the residual sequence is nonstationary, it is recommended that regression 
equation be estimated with the first differences of such variables (Walter, 1948). 
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Therefore, first difference model (including I(1) variables in their first difference form) is 
chosen as the basis of the estimations.  
Table 6-5: Results of Pedroni co-integration test  
 
Statistic Prob. 
Weighted 
Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic 1.525572 0.0636 -2.06753 0.9807 
Panel rho-Statistic 2.965767 0.9985 3.374529 0.9996 
Panel PP-Statistic -6.29265 0 -1.61437 0.0532 
Panel ADF-Statistic 4.983414 1 1.346334 0.9109 
Group rho-Statistic 4.688367 1   
Group PP-Statistic -5.60583 0   
Group ADF-Statistic 1.989419 0.9767   
Null Hypothesis: No co-integration 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC 
 
A major concern in designing the econometric model is the possibility of existence of 
explanatory variable that might be correlated with FDI flows as well as other explanatory 
variables and the potential endogeneity between FDI flows and explanatory variables. 
Existing literature has emphasised the potential endogeneity between FDI and economic 
growth rate (Wang, Wei, & Liu, 2010). Therefore, lagged growth rate is included in the 
model instead of contemporaneous growth rate. For potential foreign investors, economic 
growth rate of the previous period can act as an indicator variable of the presence 
economic growth. Another major issue is the potential endogeneity between market price 
to earnings ratio (PER) and FDI inflows. PER is the reported figure at the end of each 
year. Therefore, both current PER (price level at the end of the current year) and lagged 
PER (price level at the beginning of the current year) have equal potential for 
representing current price levels. Therefore, lagged PER is included in the model instead 
of contemporaneous PER in order to mitigate the reverse causality of FDI on PER. 
Inclusion of MCAP (Market capitalization of listed companies as a percentage of GDP) 
as a measure of stock market development can also pose complications. First, MCAP can 
be correlated with PER. Since market capitalization is equal to the share price times the 
number of shares outstanding, increase in PER can make market capitalization increases 
and vice versa. Therefore, for stock markets that goes through considerable fluctuations 
in PER compared to the changes in shares outstanding and changes in GDP, as it is the 
case in less developed stock markets, PER can be highly correlated with  Market 
capitalization ratio. Proving this fact, correlation coefficient between PER and MCAP for 
Sri Lanka, is 0.88 for the observed time period. Furthermore, MCAP can be endogenous 
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with FDI as well as economic growth rate. In order to address these concerns, the 
following instrumental variable is used to represent the level of stock market 
development. 
  MC_INS   =   ( L2.MCAP + L3.MCAP + L4.MCAP ) / 3  
  Where Li is the i
th
 lag of the variable 
All the endogeneity concerns are mitigated by not including both current measures as 
well as lagged measures of MCAP. In order to MC_INS to be a good instrumental 
variable, first, MC_INS should be highly correlated with MCAP and, second, MC_INS 
should be exogenous from FDI, GDP and PER. MC_INS is highly correlated with 
MCAP with a correlation coefficient of 0.92. By construct, MC_INS is exogenous from 
FDI, GDP and PER; because both current measures and lagged measures of MCAP are 
not used to construct MC_INS. Supporting this further, the correlation coefficient 
between PER and MC_INS for Sri Lanka, is 0.22 which is far lower than the correlation 
coefficient between PER and MCAP for Sri Lanka, which is 0.88. 
Considering the results of unit root tests and above concerns, following two baseline 
specifications are formulated. 
∆FDI = α0 + α 1 EDS + α2 Ds*EDS + α3 GGDP + α4 ∆TO + α5 POLI + α6 MC_INS + + α6 EXR + ε1         
(6.1) 
∆FDI = β0 + β1 PER + β2 Ds*PER + β3 GGDP + β4 ∆TO + β6 POLI + β7 MC_INS + β8 EXR + ε2            
(6.2) 
Ds-Dummy variable for Sri Lanka 
 
Estimated results of specification 6.1 are reported in Table 6-6. Variables FDI, TO, 
TELE, and CORR were plugged into the specifications in their first differences since 
they were not stationary. First the specification was estimated without the variable TELE 
since the stationarity of ∆TELE was not assuredly confirmed. Institutional factors are 
interconnected and dependent on each other, and therefore, weaknesses in one 
institutional factor can lead into deterioration in other institutional variables: for example, 
economic, political and social structures that are poorly differentiated and lack 
independency can facilitate and propagate corruption. Confirming this, the correlation 
coefficients among institutional variables were very high, particularly between variables 
REGQUALITY and CORRUPTION, for which correlation coefficient was 0.932. 
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Therefore, to avoid multicollinearity, each institutional variable was included in separate 
estimations. Finally, in order to account for any effects of Asian financial crisis and 
Global financial crisis, specification was re-estimated using two dummy variables, AFC 
and GFC. AFC is a binary variable which is unity for year 1997 and 1998 and GFC is a 
binary variable which is unity for year 2007 and 2008. 
Table 6-6: Estimated results of specification 6.1 
Dependent variable: ∆FDI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EDS 498.4*** 526.3*** 483.9*** 546.2*** 462.3*** 
 (81.00) (83.04) (63.41) (95.03) (89.33) 
Ds*EDS -685.9*** -721.7*** -482.6*** -595.5*** -698.5*** 
 (67.35) (71.92) (54.36) (59.94) (74.71) 
L.GGDP -64.29 -64.01 -110.6 -160.0 -108.0 
 (115.8) (125.0) (88.50) (117.8) (137.6) 
D.TO 286.3*** 303.7*** 290.0*** 316.2*** 308.0*** 
 (21.89) (27.13) (17.52) (26.69) (30.76) 
POLI 3,214*** 3,766***   4,040*** 
 (837.3) (880.5)   (879.0) 
MC_INS 82.10*** 80.73*** 75.41*** 72.51*** 84.35*** 
 (12.15) (11.72) (9.348) (11.71) (12.58) 
EXR 30.95 59.78* 47.00 50.92* 46.41 
 (29.00) (34.78) (31.86) (26.19) (38.89) 
D.TEL  -47.66 43.17 -83.41 -72.67 
  (181.0) (164.1) (206.6) (192.8) 
REGQ   8,223***   
   (1,144)   
D.CORR    -3,139  
    (2,795)  
AFC     -1,957 
     (1,696) 
GFC     2,082 
     (1,705) 
Constant -20,270*** -20,985*** -15,519*** -25,914*** -17,477*** 
 (3,960) (3,970) (3,160) (4,618) (4,305) 
      
Observations 169 164 164 156 164 
R-squared 0.422 0.427 0.430 0.428 0.428 
Wald chi2 10990.58**
* 
8476.03*** 316702.23*
** 
28501.60*** 1.23e+06*** 
Number of countries 14 13 13 13 13 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Vietnam could not be included in the estimations with TEL (columns 2-5) due to missing values in TEL. 
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Specifications 6.1 was initially estimated using fixed effects estimation (employing 
country fixed effects). According to the test results, residuals of the estimations displayed 
heteroskedasticity in all the specifications. Wooldridge test for autocorrelation was used 
to test for serial correlation among residuals in the estimations, and the test results 
indicate that there is serial correlation among residuals in all specifications. In the 
presence of autocorrelation, although OLS estimates are unbiased and consistent, they 
are inefficient and standard errors tend to be underestimated/overestimated. Presence of 
missing data in some panels did not allow testing for cross sectional dependence for the 
whole sample. Therefore, cross sectional dependence were tested for a smaller sample 
(11 countries) where complete data were available, and the test indicated presence of 
cross sectional correlation. Therefore, specifications were estimated using fixed effects 
estimation with heteroskedastic, cross sectional dependent and panel-specific AR1 
autocorrelation error structure
37
.  
In all specifications, human capital (EDS) have the expected positive sign and significant 
at a one per cent significance level. Coefficient of the interaction term between Sri Lanka 
dummy and human capital variable (Ds*EDS), which corresponds to the additional effect 
of human capital for Sri Lanka, is negative and significant at a one per cent significance 
level. Its absolute value is numerically larger than the coefficient of EDS.  Coefficient of 
human capital for Sri Lanka is given by the sum of coefficients of EDS and Ds*EDS, 
which add up to a negative value in all specifications. Therefore, the coefficient of 
human capital for Sri Lanka is negative in all specifications. This supports the point of 
view that although Sri Lanka scores well in human capital measurements, Sri Lanka has 
not been able to capitalise on these high scores to attract FDI. 
With respect to control variables, most of the results are consistent with expectations, 
except GDP growth rate. Trade openness (TO), the level of development of stock market 
(MC_INS), political stability (POLI) and regulatory quality (REGQ) have the expected 
positive sign and significant in all specifications. Coefficient estimate of exchange rate is 
positive and significant in some of the estimations. This positive coefficient indicates that 
depreciation of exchange rate is associated with higher FDI flows, which is consistent 
with the mainstream of the extant literature. GDP growth rate (GGDP) has a negative 
                                                 
37
 Estimations were carried out based on xtpcse estimator. xtpcse calculates panel-corrected standard error 
(PCSE) estimates for panel data models. 
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sign but insignificant in all specifications. Level of infrastructure (TELE) is highly 
insignificant.  Contrary to initial expectations, estimated coefficient of control for 
corruption (CORR) is negative but insignificant. Finally, coefficient of AFC variable 
representing Asian financial crisis is negative and coefficient of GFC variable 
representing global financial crisis is positive; however, neither of them is significant.  
Estimated results of specification 6.2 are reported in Table 6-7. Out of the total 14 
countries, information on stock market PER was available only for 9 countries
38
. 
Therefore, sample coverage was reduced to 9 countries for this estimation. Similar to 
previous estimations, the residuals of the estimations displayed heteroskedasticity, 
presence of serial correlation and cross sectional dependence. Therefore, specifications 
were estimated using fixed effects estimation with heteroskedastic, cross sectional 
dependent and panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation error structure.  
Coefficient of stock market price level (L.PER) has a negative sign and is highly 
insignificant. This result does not support the cheap asset hypothesis where price level 
and FDI is expected to have a negative relationship. This result is in line with previous 
empirical findings of Baker, Foley & Wurgler (2009), where they find similar evidence 
that conflict with cheap asset hypothesis. However, coefficient of the interaction term 
between Sri Lanka dummy and stock market price levels (Ds*L.PER), which 
corresponds to the additional effect of stock market price levels for Sri Lanka, is 
negative, numerically very large and significant. Coefficient of PER for Sri Lanka 
corresponds to the sum of coefficients of L.PER and Ds*L.PER, which add up to a large 
negative value in all specifications. Therefore, as it was hypothesised, stock market price 
level and FDI has a significant negative relationship in the context of Sri Lanka. 
Coefficient estimates of control variables have the same sign compared with previous 
estimates; however, significance levels are somewhat lower compared to previous 
estimates. This may be due to the smaller sample size. 
 
 
                                                 
38
 Information on stock market PER was available for Sri Lanka, India, China, Honk Kong, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and Philippines. 
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Table 6-7: Estimated results of specification 6.2 
Dependent variable: ∆FDI (1) (2) (3) 
L.PER -4.205 -9.890 -3.304 
 (46.48) (47.83) (44.77) 
Ds*L.PER -792.2** -861.7*** -849.4*** 
 (374.1) (316.4) (308.1) 
EDS 448.8 470.8** 429.8* 
 (274.7) (231.5) (239.2) 
L.GGDP -82.29 -35.37 -47.02 
 (320.4) (317.4) (273.3) 
D.TO 349.4*** 354.9*** 361.4*** 
 (82.08) (82.31) (79.15) 
POLI 2,471 2,605* 3,513** 
 (1,727) (1,504) (1,709) 
MC_INS 55.48 55.96 62.56 
 (41.41) (40.61) (38.71) 
EXR 39.96 43.69 35.26 
 (50.01) (43.59) (45.35) 
D.TEL  270.8 266.2 
  (590.9) (680.2) 
AFC   -3,760* 
   (2,093) 
GFC   1,372 
   (3,704) 
Constant -16,480 -18,351 -15,728 
 (23,916) (20,397) (20,570) 
    
Observations 110 110 110 
R-squared 0.472 0.472 0.471 
Wald chi2 52.02*** 55.23*** 63.71*** 
Number of countries 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As it was emphasised earlier, due to the distinctive characteristics of underdeveloped 
stock markets, the degree of mispricing can be higher in underdeveloped stock markets 
and therefore, cheap asset hypothesis (and expensive asset hypothesis) is likely to be 
more applicable in countries with underdeveloped stock markets. As per the above 
results, this hypothesis is supported in the context of Sri Lanka, which has one of the 
lowest market capitalisations in this sample of countries. In order to extend this analysis, 
nine countries in the sample were divided into two groups, based on the average market 
capitalisation ratio for last 10 years (Table 6-8).  
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Table 6-8: Degree of development of stock markets in selected countries 
Country Average market 
capitalization (% 
of GDP) for last 10 
years (m) 
Standard Deviation of 
market capitalization 
(% of GDP) for last 
10 years (β) 
β /m Dummy variable (LD) for 
less developed stock 
market 
China 72.2   23.35173 32.4 0 
Hong Kong 465.8 104.5 22.4 0 
India 71.9 21.6 30.0 0 
Indonesia 37.3 14.2 38.0 1 
Korea 87.4 24.1 27.6 0 
Malaysia 127.7 35.4 27.7 0 
Philippines 57.5 22.8 39.7 1 
Sri Lanka 25.7 13.3 51.8 1 
Thailand 63.7 22.7 35.6 1 
 
Out of the 9 countries, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand have the lowest 
market capitalisation (as a % of GDP). These four countries also have the highest 
fluctuation in the market capitalisation, as suggested by β/m ratio (Table 6-8 Column 4). 
Therefore, out of the 9 countries, these countries appear to have the least developed stock 
markets, and therefore, they were assigned a dummy variable (LD) and the following 
specification was estimated. 
∆FDI = β0 + β1 PER + β2 LD*PER + β3 GGDP + β4 ∆TO + β6 POLI + β7 MC_INS + β8 EXR + ε2    (6.3) 
 
Estimated results of specification 6.3 are reported in Table 6-9. Coefficient of stock 
market price level (L.PER) has a positive sign but insignificant. In line with previous 
empirical findings of Baker, Foley & Wurgler (2009), this result does not support the 
cheap asset hypothesis where price level and FDI is expected to have a negative 
relationship. However, coefficient of the interaction term between less developed stock 
market dummy and stock market price levels (LD*L.PER), which corresponds to the 
additional effect of stock market price levels for countries with less developed stock 
markets, is negative, numerically very large and highly significant. Coefficient of L.PER 
for these countries corresponds to the sum of coefficients of L.PER and LD*L.PER, 
which add up to a large negative value in all specifications. Therefore, as it was 
hypothesised, results indicate that stock market price level and FDI has a significant 
negative relationship in the context of countries with less developed stock markets. 
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Table 6-9: Estimated results of specification 6.3 
Dependent variable: ∆FDI (1) (2) (3) 
L.PER 9.512 6.444 13.31 
 (46.13) (47.09) (43.46) 
LD*L.PER -440.7*** -457.1*** -467.6*** 
 (115.1) (114.9) (127.6) 
EDS 385.7* 391.3** 358.8* 
 (225.0) (186.8) (194.4) 
L.GGDP -71.24 -50.41 -69.71 
 (303.3) (297.0) (250.4) 
D.TO 367.5*** 370.5*** 376.7*** 
 (83.32) (84.22) (82.17) 
POLI 1,620 1,569 2,315* 
 (1,180) (1,038) (1,288) 
MC_INS 55.98 56.53 63.20* 
 (40.45) (40.10) (38.22) 
EXR 13.73 14.13 7.279 
 (37.29) (31.39) (34.98) 
D.TEL  167.5 176.1 
  (607.2) (700.6) 
AFC   -3,759* 
   (1,926) 
GFC   1,371 
   (3,723) 
Constant -12,757 -13,338 -11,378 
 (20,420) (17,315) (17,558) 
    
Observations 110 110 110 
R-squared 0.472 0.472 0.471 
Wald chi2 51.61*** 54.62*** 60.94*** 
Number of country 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.5 Analysis and Discussion of Results 
6.5.1 Human capital as a determinant of FDI 
It was revealed that human capital has a significant positive relationship with FDI 
inflows to the selected Asian countries. However, this was not the case for Sri Lanka; the 
relationship between human capital and FDI flows was significantly negative for Sri 
Lanka. Does this mean increase in human capital has negatively affected FDI flows to Sri 
Lanka? This is unlikely to be the case. We have to interpret the result cautiously, without 
establishing a naive causality of human capital affecting FDI negatively. 
The negative relationship between human capital and FDI inflows in Sri Lanka may not 
be surprising due to few reasons. First, Sri Lanka‘s human capital indicators are more 
than exceptional, particularly for a developing country with less achievement in other 
facets. Since these other facets such as level of development, infrastructure, and income 
levels also affect FDI inflows, performance of FDI does not commensurate with the level 
of human capital. Therefore, further improvements in human capital cannot positively 
affect FDI inflows due to constraints in these other facets. Moreover, since Sri Lanka‘s 
secondary education enrolment rate was already very high in 1995, which is the starting 
period for this regression study, further increase in human capital after 1995 may be 
contributing diminishing marginal effects.      
Even though we cannot conclude any causality of human capital negatively affecting FDI 
in Sri Lanka, we can clearly understand that Sri Lanka has not been able to capitalise on 
its impressive human capital indicators to attract FDI, formally from the results of the 
panel study, and casually from comparing Sri Lanka‘s performances in FDI and Human 
Capital indicators. Therefore, the important question is why Sri Lanka has not been able 
to capitalise on its impressive human capital indicators to attract FDI. 
Quality of education and FDI inflows 
If the quality of education differs between two countries, then there literacy rates and 
particularly the secondary/primary school enrolment ratios are difficult to be compared; 
A country with a less attractive literacy rates and schooling rates might have a more 
effective education system than a country that has a better profile in terms of literacy 
rates and secondary/primary school enrolment ratios, and therefore, the former might be 
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able to offer a better package of skills to foreign investors than the latter. This aspect is 
neglected in previous research studies, and therefore, may have also been a reason for 
some studies to produce weak relationships between Human capital and FDI inflows.  
Even though Sri Lanka has a high rating in human capital index in terms of literacy rate 
and schooling rates (UNDP Sri Lanka, 1998; UNDP Sri Lanka, 2012; Duma, 2007; The 
World Bank, 2011), it might be the case that Sri Lanka has concentrated only on the 
quantity while neglecting the aspect of quality in education. It is noteworthy that Sri 
Lanka, being classified as a middle-level income group country, spends only a 3% of its 
national income on education, while average spending on education by countries in the 
low and lower-middle income groups are around 3.2% and 4.1% respectively 
(Ganegodage & Rambaldi, 2011). Education expenditure as a share of national income 
and as a share of government expenditure in Sri Lanka and selected other countries are 
given in Table 6-10. It can be clearly seen that Sri Lanka‘s spending on education does 
not commensurate with its achievement in education. Also, Sri Lanka‘s education system 
is highly criticised for being inefficient, and for having a low level of interaction between 
academic world and industry, which have resulted in high level of graduate 
unemployment (Aturupane, 2009; Country Summary of Higher Education, 2007; 
Ganegodage & Rambaldi, 2011). 
Table 6-10: Education expenditure as a share of national income and government 
expenditures for Sri Lanka and selected other countries. 
 
Source: (Aturupane, 2009) 
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Countries where education system is dominated by the public sector are well known for 
their associated inefficiencies that bring about negative impact on the quality of 
education (Bukowska & Siwińska-Gorzelak, 2011). Wößmann (2007) finds that student 
performance is better in countries with large share of privately managed schools. In Sri 
Lanka, private sector is largely excluded from the provision of education (Aturupane, 
2009, Ganegoda & Rambaldi, 2011). Several efforts in the past to establish private 
universities in Sri Lanka were also blocked, mainly due to pressures of students, political 
parties, and various interest groups. Higher education is mainly catered through the 17 
public universities, which are sufficient to cater to only 3% of student enrolment rate 
(Country Summary of Higher Education, 2007). Nevertheless, universities, other public 
institutions and unregulated private institutions, collectively, cater for about 18% of 
student enrolments (Country Summary of Higher Education, 2007). It is believed that a 
significant proportion of students go abroad for higher education but the exact statistics 
are not available (Silva, 2012). Limiting the private sector in participating in the 
provision of education has several negative consequences. It puts an extra burden on the 
government because the cost of providing education is largely borne by the government. 
This also reduces the resources available for the education sector, and undermines the 
efficiency of government education system due to lack of competition from private 
players (Aturupane, 2009). Furthermore, Sri Lanka has restrictions on FDI in education 
sector (UNCTAD, 2004). Such restrictions would further obstruct the flow of latest skills 
and knowledge to the country‘s education sector.  
In his study examining the effects of educational performance on the economic growth of 
Sri Lanka and Pakistan during the period 1970–1994, Abbas (2001) has found that 
education at the primary level has a negative relationship, secondary level has a 
significant positive relationship and higher education has a positive but insignificant 
relationship to the economic growth of Sri Lanka. This raises questions on the efficacy of 
Sri Lanka‘s tertiary education investment because Sri Lanka spends more on tertiary 
education at the expense of primary and secondary schooling (Ganegodage & Rambaldi, 
2011). Several studies have exposed the lower quality of education in primary schools 
and a mismatch between the skills and the needs of the job market and the education 
provided by secondary school system and the public universities (Aturupane, 2009; 
Country Summary of Higher Education, 2007; Ganegodage & Rambaldi, 2011).  
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Another interesting aspect that has not been taken account of in the previous research 
studies on FDI and human capital is the differences in compositions of the output of 
tertiary education systems in different countries. For example, some countries produce 
more scientists and engineers than other countries. These different compositions of the 
output of tertiary education system might have major implications on the level of FDI 
inflows as well as the type of FDI inflows that a country pursues. This neglected issue 
may have been a reason for some studies to produce weak relationships between Human 
capital and FDI inflows. 
Interestingly, output composition of the Sri Lankan tertiary education system looks 
extraneous. The percentage of students studying subjects such as Engineering, 
Information and communication technologies, Medicine and Dental are very low while a 
large percentage of students are studying Arts and Law subjects (Figure 6-2). This might 
have major implications on the level of FDI inflows as well as the type of FDI inflows 
that Sri Lanka can pursue. Although, Sri Lanka is highly praised for its educational 
achievements, majority of FDI inflows to Sri Lanka has taken place in standard labour-
intensive manufacturing sectors, out of which majority has concentrated in the garment 
industry (Athukorala, 2006). It might be the case that Sri Lanka does not have the 
required level of technical graduates to attract higher value added FDI. It would be 
intriguing to look at the output composition of tertiary education systems of other 
countries, especially of the countries that have been successful in attracting higher 
volumes of FDI and higher value added FDI. Although the contribution of higher 
technical education on FDI is not investigated, there exist studies where contribution of 
higher technical education on productivity growth is empirically investigated. In the 
McMahon (1984)‘s study attempting to assess the effects of education on productivity 
growth, when their measure of schooling is augmented with higher science and technical 
education
39
, then the higher science and technical education variable had a significant 
positive effect on labour productivity growth. 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Higher science and technical education is measured as the number of newly trained physical scientists, 
social scientists, engineers, management personnel and agricultural specialists as a percentage of the labour 
force. 
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Figure 6-2: Undergraduate admissions by Broad fields 
 
Source: University Grant Commission Sri Lanka, 2010 
 
It appears that Sri Lanka‘s quality of education is not as good as its quantitative 
achievements in education. Therefore, in terms of quality of education, Sri Lanka may be 
far behind the countries which are successful in attracting FDI inflows. Therefore, these 
qualitative weaknesses in education are likely to have made Sri Lanka‘s high human 
capital indicators infertile in attracting foreign investors.  
Linguistic capabilities/limitations of human capital and FDI inflows 
 
Liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1960) and the associated administrative and transaction 
costs that MNCs must overcome when undertaking FDI in a host country can be better 
overcome if the home and host country share common language. On the empirical side, 
one observation in the FDI literature is the country-bias effects, i.e. FDI source countries 
tend to invest more in host countries that use the same language. For example, much of 
Chinese FDI inflows originate from East Asian countries with similar ethnic 
backgrounds and countries which have large Chinese Diaspora (Wei & Wang, 2009); 
Indian FDI inflows mainly come from English speaking countries (Aggarwal, 2008); and 
some of the major recipients of Turkish FDI are newly independent Turkish speaking 
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Central Asian Republics (Demirbag, McGuinness, & Altay, 2010). Lundan & Jones 
(2001) suggest that the widespread use of the English language, along with other 
similarities within the Commonwealth, have lowered the cost of foreignness, and 
thereby, increase the bilateral trade and investment among the Commonwealth members. 
Adding to these, there is a tendency for MNCs to confine their early expansion to regions 
within their language groups (Welch, Welch, & Marschan-Piekkari, 2001). In many 
MNCs, staff in different countries are often required to operate in a common corporate 
language (Harzing, Köster, & Magner, 2011; Selmier Ii & Oh, 2012; Welch & Welch, 
2008), and therefore, language skills are an important consideration of MNC strategy. 
Moreover, several empirical studies have shown that language distance between host and 
home countries plays a major role in determining bilateral FDI flows (Konara & Wei, 
2013b; Goldberg, Heinkel, & Levi, 2005; Hejazi & Ma, 2011; Oh, Travis Selmier, & 
Lien, 2011).  
Previous studies that have explored the relationship between human capital and FDI 
inflows have not considered the importance of language. Most of these studies rely on 
education enrolment rates and literacy rates. If language is important in determining FDI 
inflows, then overlooking linguistic capabilities of human capital i.e. not considering the 
language element of education enrolment rates and literacy rates may have been a reason 
for these studies to produce weak relationships between Human capital and FDI inflows. 
Providing support to this hypothesis, Konara & Wei (2013a) have shown that linguistic 
capabilities of human capital are important in determining bilateral FDI flows. 
Considering the relationships between language, human capital and FDI in a single 
framework, they show that human capital is a positive determinant of FDI flows. 
However, this positive effect of human capital diminishes when the host country 
becomes linguistically distant from the home country. Sri Lanka‘s high human capital 
indicators are largely based on vernacular languages, and therefore, Sri Lanka is likely to 
be at a disadvantage when attracting FDI.  
Under the British colonial rule, Sri Lanka had two types of schools for aged from 5 to 18: 
higher status schools (fee levying) where the teaching was done in English medium and 
lower status primary schools (free education) where teaching was done in local languages 
(Punchi, 2001). Those who received education in vernacular languages were 
marginalised as they were not proficient in English, and most government employment 
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opportunities and opportunities for higher education were open only to the students from 
the fee-levying schools (Ranasingha 1999 in Punchi, 2001). This created hatred against 
the English language among the masses. Sri Lankan politicians, capitalising on this 
hatred to gain political advantage, made Sinhala language the only official language 
through the Sinhala only bill in 1956, and also made local languages (Sinhala and Tamil) 
as languages of instruction in education in all primary schools in 1945, in secondary 
schools in 1953 and in universities in 1960. These language policies laid the foundation 
for the ethnic division that later on led to a civil conflict and adversely affected the 
economic competitiveness of the country by reducing fluency in English, the lingua 
franca of the international business (Aturupane, 2009; Utne and Garbo, 2009; DeVotta, 
2010; DeVotta, 2000). This exclusion of English from the primary and secondary 
education system still remains (Table 6-11); less than 1% of total students were studying 
in English in any grade in Sri Lanka in 2006 (Ministry of Education Sri Lanka, 2006).  
Table 6-11: language of instruction and medium of study in primary and secondary 
education in Sri Lanka 
Schools by language of instruction Students by medium of study 
 No of schools  No of students % 
Sinhala only 6500 Sinhala  2,902,157 73.6 
Tamil only  2825 Tamil 1,006,460 25.5 
Sinhala and Tamil 40 English 33,795 0.9 
Sinhala and English 249    
Tamil and English 86    
Sinhala, Tamil, and English 27    
Source: Ministry of Education Sri Lanka, 2006 
If linguistic homogeneity is important in attracting foreign investors, Sri Lanka might not 
be able to capitalise on its high literacy rate as its literacy rate is largely based on 
‗Sinhala‘ language, a language that is understandable only by Sri Lankans. Similarly, Sri 
Lanka‘s high primary/secondary/tertiary enrolments rates would be, to some extent, 
impotent for attracting FDI because the languages of instruction in primary schools, 
secondary schools and universities are mainly vernacular languages.  
Evolution of language of instruction in the education system in Sri Lanka can be 
contrasted with that of India. Similar to Sri Lanka, English was established as the 
medium of instruction and administration in India during British occupation and was 
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replaced by Hindi after the independence due to nationalist movement that wanted an 
indigenous Indian language to be adopted as the official language. Imposition of Hindi, 
which is not evenly distributed throughout India, as the official language led to ethnic 
conflicts as it was the case with Sri Lanka. However, in direct contrast to Sri Lanka, 
central government of India made Hindi and English joint official languages in 1967 
(Hohenthal, 2003). This change significantly increased English literacy in India, 
particularly among speakers of languages linguistically distant to Hindi (Shastry, 2012).  
Therefore, India‘s English literacy rate is far superior to that of Sri Lanka‘s. For this 
reason, even though India‘s literacy rate and school enrolment rates are considerably low 
compared to Sri Lanka, India‘s effective literacy rate and effective school enrolment rates 
(effective in the sense applicable to international business) might be higher than that of 
Sri Lanka‘s. Therefore, Sri Lanka‘s low level of English proficiency is likely to be a 
major barrier for attracting FDI inflows. 
Widespread education/literacy (lower GINI coefficient of education) and FDI 
inflows 
 
Sri Lanka enjoys a widespread literacy rate and its population enjoys relatively long 
years of education.  Literacy rates are evenly spread as it is depicted by a low GINI 
coefficient (Figure 6-3). As a result of the deficiencies in the education system identified 
previously, Sri Lanka might not possess a considerable proportion of highly skilled 
labour or a rich endowment of human capital. Is it likely that such a high literacy rate and 
a low GINI on education, though most admirable from a social and politico economic 
point of view, might not be attractive to MNCs, especially those who seek high skilled 
labour. Instead of widespread literacy, they may seek an oasis of highly educated skilled 
labour as Sri Lanka is a largely service based economy. Contrastingly, India has a very 
low level of average years of education and a very high GINI coefficient. Therefore, 
while bulk of their population being illiterate, India might possess a small proportion of 
highly skilled labour or a rich endowment of human capital. This might explain why 
India, relative to Sri Lanka, has been successful in attracting large volumes of FDI in the 
recent past, particularly in the services sector.  
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Figure 6-3: Education Gini Coefficient for selected countries, 1990 
    
Source: Thomas et al., 2000 
Also, low GINI on education in Sri Lanka might have implications for the impact of FDI.  
It could be possible that whilst FDI may promote growth it may not promote 
development in the sense that a low GINI on education would not necessarily assist in 
promoting technology and know-how and activities associated with high technology. 
Therefore it will be informative to understand how this evenly distributed literacy rate 
affects both the attractiveness of the country to MNCs and the impact of FDI, a potential 
topic for future research. 
6.5.2. Stock market valuations as a determinant of FDI     
In line with the findings of Baker, Foley & Wurgler (2009), when all countries are 
considered together, this study did not reveal any relationship between host country 
stock market valuations and FDI inflows. However, as it was hypothesised, host 
country stock market valuations and FDI inflows has a significant negative 
relationship in the context of Sri Lanka. Moreover, the relationship between host 
country stock market valuations and FDI inflows was negative and significant for the 
countries with less developed stock markets. Therefore, these results indicate that cheap 
assets hypothesis (and expensive assets hypothesis) is likely to be applicable in the Sri 
Lanka‘s context and in the context of countries with less developed stock markets. 
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Sri Lanka‘s recent performance in stock market and FDI provide evidence for cheap 
assets hypothesis (and expensive assets hypothesis) in the context of FDI. This finding is 
not only important to Sri Lanka, but also to other countries with underdeveloped stock 
markets. As it was emphasised earlier, due to the distinctive characteristics of 
underdeveloped stock markets, the degree of mispricing can be higher in developing 
country stock markets and therefore, cheap asset hypothesis (and expensive asset 
hypothesis) is likely to be more applicable to developing countries than developed 
countries. 
However, this finding is only based on a sample of nine countries, and therefore, it would 
shed more light if we can use data on several countries with less developed stock 
markets. However, this is practically difficult because of the difficulty of finding past 
stock market valuation data on underdeveloped stock markets. 
The above observations bring attention to another interesting question. Have these high 
price levels in the stock market resulted in any foreign divestments, particularly through 
the stock market? This should be the case because, during 2009-2011, CSE has 
experience a net foreign outflow of US$ 412, a figure larger than 10% of total foreign 
holdings of the CSE as at the end the end of year 2011. The magnitude of this figure 
suggests that foreign stakes of some of the companies should have been considerably 
decreased. However, a detail study on the extent of fall in foreign stake is not possible 
due to data limitations. 
6.5.3. Other FDI determinants 
This study also provided a platform to verify other conventional FDI determinants as 
they were used as control variables. Results of this study indicated that trade openness is 
a significant positive determinant of FDI flows to selected countries.  
This study provided evidence for positive association of good institutional factors and 
FDI. Coefficients of both regulatory quality and political stability had the expected 
positive sign and were significant. However, contrary to our expectations, control for 
corruption had a negative coefficient but insignificant. Therefore, in line with some of 
the previous empirical studies (Walsh & Yu, 2010), effect of corruption on FDI remained 
largely inconclusive in our study. Countries in Asia and countries in South Asia in 
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particular perform poorly in terms of institutional factors. As it was presented earlier, and 
summarised in Table 6-12, East Asian average is negative for Control for corruption and 
Regulatory quality and slightly positive for Rule of law; and South Asian average is 
negative for all three institutional factors. Even though Sri Lanka‘s institutional 
environment is weak, this fact will not be that frustrating in terms of attracting FDI 
because Sri Lanka‘s institutional environment is at least not worse than its counterparts 
in the South Asian region. Sri Lanka could also benefit from the improvements in 
political stability due to the end of civil war. However, Sri Lanka will have to improve its 
institutional environment in order to standout in the region or at least to stay par with 
other regional counterparts since most of the countries in the region are pursuing 
institutional reforms.    
Table 6-12: Institutional factors for South Asia, East Asia and OECD 
 Control for corruption Rule of law Regulatory quality 
 
Percentile 
Rank 
Governance 
Score 
Percentile 
Rank 
Governance 
Score 
Percentile 
Rank 
Governance 
Score 
South Asia 30.2 -0.64 35 -0.6 26.9 -0.74 
East Asia 45.8 -0.18 50.8 0.02 41.1 -0.29 
OECD 89.8 1.61 90.4 1.5 90.4 1.44 
Source: World Wide Governance Indicators 2010b 
Exchange rate was found to be positively associated with FDI flows to the selected 
countries. This indicates that depreciation of exchange rate is associated with higher FDI 
flows. This finding has a major implication for Sri Lanka. Due to overvalued exchange 
rate, Sri Lanka‘s competitiveness in attracting FDI is likely to be largely compromised. 
Past empirical evidence provide evidence for a larger effect of exchange rate on export 
oriented FDI. Therefore, Sri Lanka‘s export competitiveness, and therefore, capacity to 
attract export oriented FDI is also likely to be compromised. 
This study failed to support a positive association between improvements in 
infrastructure and FDI inflows. However, there were couple of issues regarding the 
variable used to represent the level of infrastructure: Telephone connections per 100 
people (TEL). First, the variable ―TEL‖ represents only a one aspect of infrastructure and 
therefore fails to act as a composite measure of level of infrastructure in a country. 
Second, it was not possible to incorporate the variable ―TEL‖ as a regressor in its level 
form due to its non-stationarity and hence ∆TEL was used instead. But the stationarity of 
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∆TEL was not assuredly confirmed. Although this study is constrained from the above 
mentioned limitations, results of this study combined with findings from previous 
research studies point out that infrastructure is an important determinant of FDI. 
Therefore, Sri Lanka‘s infrastructure deficits are likely to stifle FDI. As it was presented 
earlier, Sri Lanka has severe infrastructure deficits in internal transport (road and 
railroad) and power categories. These categories are likely to be more crucial for 
manufacturing industries than services industries. Therefore, deficiencies in these 
categories is likely to be a major reason for Sri Lanka to perform poorly in FDI in 
manufacturing sectors compared to FDI in services. However, Sri Lanka‘s infrastructure 
standards in telecommunication are irreprehensible. Infrastructure in telecommunication 
is crucial for services, and this fact might have facilitated Sri Lanka‘s better performance 
in FDI in services compared to FDI in manufacturing.  
GDP growth rate was found to be insignificant as a determinant of FDI in the selected 
countries in Asia. This might have been due to the larger proportion of vertical FDI in 
FDI flows to the selected countries.  
Although there are theoretical arguments favouring both complementary and substituting 
relationships between local stock market development and FDI, arguments favouring a 
complementary effect of stock market development on FDI inflows are much stronger. 
Supporting this, results of this study indicate that the stock market development is 
positively related to FDI inflows, and therefore, results of this study suggest that 
complementary effect between stock market development and FDI inflows is 
predominant over their substitute effect.   
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6.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examined the determinants of FDI by conducting a panel study based on 
annual FDI inflows to a selected group of countries in Asia. It was evident that the 
relationship between human capital and FDI flows was significantly negative for Sri 
Lanka while, in general, human capital has been a positive determinant of FDI flows to 
rest of the countries. Several reasons for this deviation were identified and examined in 
this chapter. Therefore, it can be concluded that Sri Lanka‘s so called impressive human 
capital indicators have not been able to augment FDI inflows possibly due to linguistic 
limitations of the human capital and qualitative weaknesses in the education system. 
Study also revealed a significant negative relationship between host country stock 
market valuations and FDI inflows in the context of Sri Lanka, while not revealing 
any relationship between host country stock market valuations and FDI inflows for rest 
of the countries taken as a whole. When the sample is divided into two groups based 
on the level of development on their stock markets, the effect of host country stock 
market valuations on FDI inflows was negative for the countries with less developed 
stock markets and was positive but insignificant for the other countries. Therefore, 
these results indicate that cheap assets hypothesis and expensive assets hypothesis are 
likely to be applicable in the Sri Lanka‘s context and in the context of countries with less 
developed stock markets. 
Finally, this study also confirmed the importance of trade openness, political stability, 
regulatory quality and exchange rate for attracting FDI flows in the context of these 
Asian countries. 
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Chapter 7 : FDI Spillover Effects: Evidence from Sri Lanka 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents an empirical study conducted to examine the impact of FDI on firm 
level productivity in the context of Sri Lanka. Using Sri Lanka 2011 Enterprise Survey 
Data Set published by World Bank, this study examines the direct effects (own firm 
effects of foreign owned firms) and spillover effects (effects of foreign owned firms on 
other firms) of FDI on firm level labour productivity. This chapter is organised as 
follows. Sections 7.2 provide a theoretical discussion on FDI and firm level productivity. 
Section 7.3 provides a preliminary investigation of own firm effects of foreign firms. 
Section 7.4 includes an empirical study focuses on estimating direct effects and spillover 
effects of FDI on firm level labour productivity. Finally, section 7.5 concludes the 
chapter by highlighting the conclusions and contribution of this study.   
7.2. FDI and Firm Productivity 
Theories of FDI demonstrate that foreign firms possess significant ownership advantages 
over domestic firms, without which they would not be able to engage in FDI (United 
Nations, 1992). This supposition leads to the inference that foreign firms are productive 
than domestic firms. To put it differently, foreign firms that are not productive than 
domestic firms cannot enter the host country due to entry costs (Moller, Markusen, & 
Schjerning, 2007). Much of the foreign firms‘ higher productivity stems from their 
advanced technological knowledge, improved marketing and management skills, 
international contacts, and reputation (United Nations, 1992; Aitken & Harrison, 1999). 
If foreign ownership leads to subsequent increase in productivity in the firm (own firm 
effects), then such an increase is beneficial to the host country. However, foreign firms‘ 
superior productivity can also stem from the sample selection bias: It is believed that 
MNCs tend to acquire or join up with local firms with higher than average productivity 
(Vahter, 2004; Vahter & Masso, 2006).  
Although most of the literature points to a positive own firm productivity effects, there 
are few instances in the literature indicating the possibility of foreign firms to have lower 
productivity than domestic firms (Vahter, 2004). Foreign owned firms may not be as 
productive as domestic firms, particularly in the short run, due to liability of foreignness 
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and initial difficulties in assimilating the new venture into the MNC‘s network (Harris & 
Robinson, 2003). Use of lower skilled workers and older technology due to MNCs 
tendency to retain most of their higher value adding operations at home and locate lower 
value-adding operations in the host country can also bring down foreign owned firms 
productivity (Domes & Jensen, 1998).  
Presence of foreign firms can also affect performance of domestic firms. Foreign firms‘ 
superior productivity can spillover to domestic firms, often in the form of technology 
transfer (Hanousek, Kočenda, & Maurel, 2011). Such spillovers occur when MNC‘s 
cannot completely internalise their ownership advantages due to public good 
characteristics of firm specific assets (Vahter & Masso, 2006; Vahter, 2004). Literature 
recognizes three main channels of productivity spillovers; demonstration effects, worker 
turnover and competition effects (Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Havranek & Irsova, 2012; 
Bwalya, 2006; Hanousek, Kočenda, & Maurel, 2011; Kugler, 2006). Under 
demonstration effects, local firms can improve their productivity by observing and 
adopting/imitating advance technologies, and managerial and organisational skills that 
foreign firms possess. Through observing foreign firms, local firms can not only detect 
existence of new/advance products and processes but also understand the benefits and 
risks of adopting them; this will increase the chances of adopting/imitating these 
technologies by local firms (Blomström & Kokko, 1998). 
Local firms will also be exposed to foreign firms‘ expertise when local firms engage in 
arm‘s length relationships with foreign firms, particularly in the form of upstream and 
downstream relationships (Görg & Strobl, 2001). Additionally, foreign firms may provide 
training and support, particularly in the form of technical assistance, to their suppliers 
and customers, and this could benefit local firms in upstream and downstream sectors.  
Foreign owned firms hire local employees and these employees will be exposed to 
foreign firms‘ superior technologies.  Moreover, foreign firms have a reputation for 
training their staff (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Blomström & Kokko, 1998). Spillovers 
through worker turnover occur when these workers are subsequently hired by local firms 
or when these employees start their own firms.  
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The competition effect can have both positive effects and negative effects on local firms. 
Local firms may be forced to improve their efficiencies in order to compete with foreign 
owned firms. The competition may also encourage local firms to innovate and find more 
efficient technologies. Average productivity of local firms can also increase due to the 
selection effect under which only the fittest firms will survive the foreign competition 
(Kugler, 2006). Some industries are associated with high initial capital requirements, 
advanced technology, and intensive advertising. Local firms may not have the necessary 
capacity to enter/compete in such industries, particularly in less developed and/or small 
countries, and this can lead to high concentration in such industries. Not only foreign 
firms are likely to enter just those industries but they are also capable of 
entering/competing in such industries due to their scale, resource and technological 
superiorities. Therefore, foreign firms‘ entry into such monopolistic industries is likely to 
increase the level of competition within such industries, and compel existing firms to 
become more efficient (Blomström & Kokko, 1998). However, due to weaknesses of 
local competition, MNCs could attain a higher degree of market dominance, which could 
lead to higher concentration (Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Lall, 1978). Higher 
competition can also adversely affect local firms‘ productivities. Increase competition 
from foreign firms may compel local firms to operate in less-efficient scales of 
production; when local firms lose market share amid competition by foreign firms, local 
firms can experience lower productivities because their fixed costs are being spread over 
a smaller output (Lipsey, 2004; Javorcik, 2004; Aitken & Harrison, 1999). This could 
also hurt the technology progress of local firms because larger and profitable firms are in 
a better position to undertake R&D and also to enjoy economies of scale in R&D 
(Blomström & Kokko, 1998). 
Spillovers of FDI are typically categorised into two types: horizontal and vertical 
spillovers. Externalities of a foreign firm on the domestic firms in its own industry are 
categorized as horizontal spillovers and externalities of a foreign firm on the firms in 
upstream industries (backward spillovers) and downstream industries (forward 
spillovers) are categorized as vertical spillovers (Hanousek, Kočenda, & Maurel, 2011; 
Havranek & Irsova, 2012). There is a wide held expectation for vertical spillovers, 
particularly backward spillovers, to be significant than horizontal spillovers (Kugler, 
2006; Javorcik, 2004). The competition effects discussed above primarily take place 
within industries rather than between industries (Kugler, 2006), and therefore they are 
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commonly associated with horizontal spillovers rather than vertical spillovers. Unlike 
demonstration and worker turnover effects that are presumably positive, competition can 
have both positive and negative externalities (Vahter, 2004). Moreover, MNCs may lose 
competitiveness when their firm specific advantages are leaked to competitors, but 
MNCs can benefit by transferring their knowledge to their suppliers. Therefore, MNCs 
are encouraged to prevent spillovers to local firms in their own industry while 
encouraged to facilitate spillovers to their local suppliers (Javorcik, 2004). Therefore, 
vertical spillovers are more likely to be positive than horizontal spillovers. Forward 
spillovers are also likely to exist because of MNCs‘ provision of product/service inputs 
that are technologically more advanced, are less costly or previously did not exist 
(Javorcik, 2004). 
Empirical evidence, except handful of exceptions, provide strong evidence for positive 
own firm effects of foreign ownership (Vahter, 2004; Lipsey, 2004; Chang, Chung, & 
Moon, 2013). In most of the exceptions, some of which are included below, higher 
productivity of foreign firms can be attributed to their larger size or higher capital 
intensity (Lipsey, 2004). Controlling for differences in capital intensity, labor quality, 
scale, and concentration, Blomström (1988), finds that foreign affiliates in Mexican 
manufacturing industries are significantly more productive than local Mexican firms. 
Looking at firms in manufacturing sectors in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Taiwan, Ramstetter (1999) finds that, except Malaysia, foreign firms in all 
other countries have higher productivities than local firms. Using panel data on 
Venezuelan plants between 1976 and 1989, Aitken & Harrison (1999) find that foreign 
owned plants are more productive than domestic plants. However, this productive 
advantage of foreign firms was robust only for smaller plants that employ less than 50 
employees. Globerman, Ries, & Vertinsky (1994), comparing economic performance of 
foreign-owned firm and local firms in Canada, found that although foreign owned firms 
were relatively more productive in terms of value added per worker, this superior 
productivity disappear when size and capital intensity are controlled for. Based on panel 
data from Estonia for the period 1995–2002, Vahter & Masso (2006) shows that foreign 
owned firms in Estonia have higher TFP than domestic firms. Recently, based on 
Chinese firm level data, Chang, Chung, & Moon (2013) find superior performance 
associated with foreign acquired local firms compared to comparable local firms, 
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particularly when foreign firms acquire local firms with higher absorptive capacity or 
modernised ownership structure. 
Although relatively few studies have looked at own firm effects of FDI, possibly because 
authors have generally taken foreign owned firms‘ productivity superiority for granted, 
plethora of studies have examined the productivity spillover of FDI on domestic firms, 
and these studies have produced mixed results (Lipsey, 2004).  
Blomström & Persson (1983) analysed spillovers of foreign firms on Mexican 
manufacturing industries in 1970.  Controlling for capital intensity, labour quality and 
scale of production, they found that labour productivity in domestic owned plants are 
positively associated with the extent of foreign owned plants in the industry. Kokko 
(1994), analysing spillovers of foreign firms on domestic manufacturing industries in the 
same country, found that, generally, presence of foreign firms increase labour 
productivity of domestic firms. However, extent of spillovers differed across industries 
and spillovers were less likely in industries where large technology gaps and high foreign 
market shares coincide, which authors designated as industries with ―enclave‖ 
characteristics.  
Using panel data on Venezuelan plants between 1976 and 1989, Aitken & Harrison 
(1999) exposed that foreign owned plants has negatively affected the productivity of 
domestic plants in Venezuela. However, own firm positive effects were slightly higher 
than negative spillover effects of FDI, and therefore, the overall effect of FDI on 
productivity in Venezuelan plants were marginally positive. Thereafter, trying to 
replicate Aitken & Harrison (1999)‘s results for other countries, several studies found 
insignificant or negative spillovers for Czech Republic, India, Lithuania, China, and 
Mexico (Herzer, 2012, page 397).  
Using Taiwanese firm-level data, Chuang & Lin (1999) found that FDI have positive 
spillover effect on productivity of domestic firms. In contrast, they found weak evidence 
for spillover effects on productivity of other foreign owned firms. Conducting a meta-
analysis of 32 empirical studies on technology spillovers from FDI in developing 
countries, Wooster & Diebel (2010) shows that past empirical evidence, collectively, 
provide weak support for the presence of horizontal spillovers in developing countries. 
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As is expected from theoretical considerations, between horizontal and vertical 
spillovers, empirical findings favours for the existence of vertical spillovers, particularly 
supporting vertical spillovers taking place through backward linkages. Using firm level 
data from Lithuania for the period 1996-2000, Smarzynska (2002) provide evidence of 
positive spillovers taking place through backward linkages but they do not find evidence 
of horizontal spillovers. Havranek & Irsova (2012) conducted a meta-analysis of the 
literature on horizontal and vertical spillovers40.  The average spillover estimates of their 
sample were insignificant for horizontal spillovers, negligible for forward spillovers and 
significant for backward spillovers. Based on firm-level data from Lithuania, Javorcik 
(2004) finds evidence for presence of productivity spillovers taking place through 
backward linkages while finding no evidence for the presence of horizontal spillovers or 
spillovers taking place through forward linkages. Moreover, their results indicate that 
spillovers are associated with partially owned foreign investments but not with fully 
owned foreign investments.  
A recent econometric study conducted by Jeon, Park, & Ghauri (2013) using Chinese 
firm-level panel dataset provides some interesting findings. They investigate the extent of 
horizontal and vertical spillover effects of foreign firms in different industries. With 
respect to horizontal spillovers, they find mixed results (positive and negative spillovers) 
associated with high and medium technology industries. However, they find consistent 
negative spillovers associated with most of the low technology intensive industries. With 
respect to vertical spillovers, they find positive spillovers associated with most of the 
industries.  
In sum, extant literature and empirical studies provides a strong support for the own firm 
effects of foreign firms. Evidence on spillover effects of foreign firms on local firms is 
mixed, particularly for horizontal spillovers. Moreover, past empirical evidence, 
collectively, provide weak support for the presence of horizontal spillovers in developing 
countries. 
  
                                                 
40
 However, their sample included studies that focus on vertical spillovers, and therefore their sample is not 
fully representative of studies on horizontal spillovers. 
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7.3. Data, Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Investigation at Own 
Firm Effects of Foreign Firms  
Data used in this empirical study come from the Sri Lanka 2011 Enterprise Surveys Data 
Set published by World Bank. This data set contains firm level data on 610 firms in both 
manufacturing and services sectors
41
. World Bank Enterprise Survey uses a uniform 
sampling methodology and a common questionnaire for the participating countries. In the 
Enterprise Survey, firms are randomly selected from the universe of registered 
businesses
42
 based on a stratified random sampling with three levels of stratification: 
industry, establishment size, and region. Thereafter, enumerators personally visit the 
sampled firms and collect a range of quantitative and qualitative information through the 
survey questionnaire.   
Table 7-1 presents the breakdown of local and foreign firms in each sector and their share 
of sales and workers in each sector. It can be seen that penetration of foreign investment 
is low in most of the sectors. One salient limitation of this sample is that only a few 
foreign firms are included in some sectors, particularly in Textile, Wearing Apparel and 
Leather Products category. Available evidence shows that although the number of 
foreign firms is low in this sector, they account for a larger share of output (Kelegama & 
Foley, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 Universe of this study is the non-agricultural economy, comprising all manufacturing sectors (group D), 
construction sector (group F), services sector (groups G and H), and transport, storage, and 
communications sector (group I) and IT (sub-sector 72 of group K). Group classification is based on ISIC 
Revision 3.1.  
42
 Sample frame used for this survey is the database of firms obtained from the Department of Census and 
Statistics of Sri Lanka. 
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Table 7-1: Local and foreign firms‘ share of activity in each sector  
 
No of Firms Sales (%) Employment (%) 
Sector 
Total 
firms 
Local 
firms 
Foreign 
affiliates  
Local 
firms 
Foreign 
affiliates 
Local 
firms 
Foreign 
affiliates 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco Products 130 124 6 82.1 17.9 85.8 14.2 
Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Products 130 129 1 99.9 0.1 99 1 
Wood and Wood Products 34 34 0 100 0 100 0 
Paper Products, Publishing and Printing 6 5 1 9.5 90.5 41.4 58.6 
Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products 20 17 3 69.3 30.7 94.4 5.6 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 30 28 2 94.2 5.8 80.1 19.9 
Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Transport 
Equipment 
4 4 0 100 0 100 0 
Manufactured Products (n.e.s) 2 2 0 100 0 100 0 
Services 246 229 17 75.4 23.8 83.2 15.7 
 
602 572 30 
    
Source: Sri Lanka 2011 Enterprise Survey Data 
Table 7-2 reports the descriptive statistics differentiated by foreign and domestic 
ownership. Foreign firms are considerably larger than domestic firms in terms of both 
sales and employment and enjoy a substantially higher productivity and profitability 
relative to domestic firms. Foreign firms pay a higher nominal wage rate and employ a 
higher percentage of educated employees compared to local firms. However, the 
effective wage rate measured by skill adjusted wage rate is lower for foreign firms. 
Therefore, even though foreign firms pay a higher wage rate, it is because they hire 
higher proportion of skilled workforce. Put it differently, foreign firms does not pay a 
higher wage rate for a given level of human capital. Capital intensity, measured as energy 
consumption per employee
43
, is considerably higher in foreign firms compared to local 
firms. 
 
                                                 
43
 Ideally, net assets per worker, which is the popular choice for representing capital intensity in previous 
studies, would be a better proxy for capital intensity of a firm. Since majority of firms have not reported 
their net assets value, energy consumption per worker is chosen to proxy the capital intensity. There is a 
large literature indicating that capital and energy are complementary inputs in manufacturing (see 
Globerman, Ries, & Vertinsky, 1994). This approach is used in several studies (for example, Lipsey & 
Sjöholm, 2004a; Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004b; Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004c; Globerman, Ries, & Vertinsky, 
1994). Energy consumption is taken as the total cost of fuel and electricity for the manufacturing sector and 
cost of electricity for the services sector.  
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Table 7-2: Descriptive statistics by foreign and domestic ownership 
 
Domestic Foreign 
sales (Rs Mn) 199.2 1006.1 
employment 88 240 
Labour productivity (Rs Mn per worker) 2.34 7.03 
Profit (Rs Mn) 62.68 313.66 
Wage rate (Rs ,000) 197.2 692.8 
Percentage of full-time permanent workers who completed secondary school  52.3 67.3 
Skills adjusted wage rate (wage rate/secondary education level) 14.5 9.6 
Exporting firms (%) 7.9 30 
Percentage of sales exports from total sales (%) 4.8 16.7 
Importing firms (%) 10.2 26.7 
Inputs of foreign origin (%) 10.2 35.6 
Directly or indirectly exporting firms (%) 16.6 46.7 
% of firms which have introduced new products or services during past 3 years 29.4 63.3 
% of firms which have introduced new or significantly improved methods during past 3 years 42.2 69 
% of firms which have introduced new or significantly improved logistic or business support processes past 3 years 37.7 65.5 
% of firms which have introduced new or significantly improved organizational structures or management practices during  past 3 years 34.4 70 
% of firms which have introduced new or significantly improved marketing methods during  past 3 years 38.7 75.9 
% of firms which have incurred R&D expenditure during  past 3 years 11.2 41.4 
% of firms which have had formal training programs 25.4 83.3 
Average staff turnover 22.3 14.4 
Capital intensity (energy consumption per employee) 106.99 188.02 
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Out of total foreign firms, 30% are engaged in exporting while only 7.9% of local firms 
are engaged in exporting. On average, foreign firms‘ export intensity, measured as the 
percentage of exports from total sales, is considerably higher than that of local firms. 
Therefore, it seems foreign firms are more export oriented than local firms. Out of total 
foreign firms, 26.7% are engaged in importing while only 10.2% of local firms are 
engaged in importing. Foreign firms, on average, imports 35.6% of its inputs, while 
domestic firms using only 10.2% of inputs of foreign origin. Therefore, it seems that 
foreign firms are much more import oriented. Even when both direct and indirect 
exporting are considered, foreign firms significantly outperform local firm; 47% of 
foreign firms engaged in either exporting or indirectly exporting while only 16.6% of 
local firms are engaged in either exporting or indirect exporting. Since foreign firms are 
very active in both exporting and indirect exporting, it may be the case that foreign firm 
are exporting via other foreign firms. This speculation coupled with higher import 
propensity of foreign firms may suggest that foreign firms source larger proportion of 
their inputs either from abroad or from foreign firms established in the host country. 
However, this speculation cannot be confidently ascertained without observing the 
dyadic sourcing relationships between sourcing and supplying firms.  
Foreign firms tend to engage in research and development activities much more than 
local counterparts; 41.4% of foreign firms have incurred research and development 
expenditure during past three years compared to 11.2% of local firms. While only a 
quarter of local firms have undertaken formal training programmes, more than 83% of 
foreign firms have undertaken training programmes. Foreign firms experience much 
lower staff turnover compared to domestic firms. Moreover, compared to domestic firms, 
foreign firms display much higher propensity in introducing new products/services, new 
or significantly improved methods, new or significantly improved logistic or business 
support processes, new or significantly improved organisational structures or 
management practices, and new or significantly improved marketing methods. 
Table 7-2 shows that foreign firms are distinctive from domestic firms in each reported 
characteristic. However, simple comparison of average of each characteristic for foreign 
firms and domestic firms is not adequate. In order to check whether these differences are 
significant Two-sample t test was employed and the results are reported in column one of 
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Table 7-3.  Also, in order to account for sector specific differences, following model was 
estimated for each characteristic:  
 Yi = β0 + β FDIi + Uj+ εi   
Where Y is the each characteristic observed in Table 7-2 and FDI is a dummy variable 
identifying whether or not a firm has FDI which adopts the value of 1 if the firm‘s 
foreign ownership is more than 10% and zero otherwise. Uj is a vector of sector specific 
dummies. Estimated regression coefficients of FDI (β) are reported in column two of 
Table 7-3
44
.  
Results presented in Table 7-3 show that compared to domestic firms, foreign firms are 
larger, more productive and more profitable. They also tend to hire high proportion of 
skilled workers and pay higher wages than their domestic counterparts. Furthermore, 
foreign firms are more export oriented and rely more on inputs of foreign origin than 
local firms. Foreign firms tend to be more active in R&D and undertake more in-house 
training programmes than domestic counterparts. Foreign firms are much more 
innovative than domestic firms; foreign firms display much higher propensity in 
introducing new/improved products, services, methods, processes, management practice 
and marketing methods. These results are largely consistent with empirical studies 
conducted on other countries (Yasar & Paul, 2007; Chudnovsky, López, & Rossi, 2008; 
Doms & Jensen, 1998) which have found similar superior characteristics associated with 
foreign firms. Even though initial crude comparisons show that foreign firms have lower 
skill adjusted wage rate, lower staff turnover and higher capital intensity, subsequent 
analysis show that these differences are not statistically different from zero. Most 
importantly, observed differences between foreign firms and local firms mostly persisted 
when controlled for sector specific effects. However, it is important to highlight one 
limitation of this methodology. Except for sector specific effects, I do not separately 
account for other factors that might be relevant to explaining each type of characteristic 
observed. For example, differences in labour productivity may be due to other factors 
that can affect labour productivity such as capital intensity and skill intensity of the 
workforce.   
 
                                                 
44
 When the dependent variable is a binary variable, probit estimation was used instead of OLS.  
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Table 7-3: Differences between foreign owned firms and domestic firms   
Dependent variable 
Two-sample t test 
difference = 
mean(Foreign) - 
mean(Domestic)45 
Estimated coefficient 
of  FDI (β) with sector 
specific dummies as 
control variables) 
Sales (Rs Mn) 
806.9*** 762.5*** 
(213.8) (217.1) 
Employment  
152.1** 144.9** 
(60.10) (60.79) 
Labour productivity (Rs Mn per worker) 
4.696*** 4.345*** 
(1.340) (1.361) 
Profit (Rs Mn) 
251.0** 187.8* 
(98.67) (101.8) 
Wage rate (Rs ,000 per worker) 
495.6*** 471.8*** 
(77.71) (77.79) 
Secondary education level : Percentage of full-time permanent 
workers who completed secondary school 
15.06** 12.56* 
(6.582) (6.432) 
Skills adjusted wage rate (wage rate/secondary education level) 
-4,884 -799.4 
(15,373) (11,964) 
Exporting firm ( = 1 if the firm exports and 0 otherwise) 
0.22*** .86*** 
(0.05) (.25) 
Export intensity: Percentage of sales exports from total sales (%) 
11.90*** 11.67*** 
(3.882) (3.894) 
Importing firm ( = 1 if the firm imports and 0 otherwise) 
0.16*** 1.23*** 
(0.05) (.38) 
Import intensity: Inputs of foreign origin (%) 
25.40*** 24.21*** 
(7.526) (7.364) 
Directly or indirectly exporting firm ( = 1 if the firm exports directly 
or indirectly and 0 otherwise) 
0.3*** .996*** 
(0. 07) (.249) 
New Product (=1 if the firm introduced new products or services 
during past 3 years and 0 otherwise) 
0.339*** .831*** 
(0.085) (.244) 
New Process (=1 if the firm introduced new or significantly improved 
methods during past 3 years and 0 otherwise) 
0.266*** .59** 
(0.093) (.25) 
New Process2 (=1 if the firm introduced new or significantly 
improved logistic or business support processes past 3 years and 0 
otherwise) 
0.277*** .58** 
(.092) (.25) 
New Management (=1 if the firm introduced new or significantly 
improved organizational structures or management practices during  
past 3 years and 0 otherwise) 
0.356*** .79*** 
(0.088) (.25) 
New Marketing (=1 if the firm introduced new or significantly 
improved marketing methods during  past 3 years and 0 otherwise) 
0 .371*** .93*** 
(0.092) (.26) 
R&D firm (=1 if the firm incurred R&D expenditure during  past 3 
years and 0 otherwise) 
0.301*** .909*** 
(0.062) (.249) 
Training firm (=1 if the firm had formal training programs for its 
permanent, full-time employees  and during the year and 0 otherwise) 
0.579*** 1.63*** 
(0.081) (.29) 
Staff turnover (staff turnover/ 
-7.873 -4.976 
(6.464) (6.410) 
Capital intensity (Energy consumption per employee) 
81.04 87.79 
(165.1) (168.2) 
                                                 
45
 Two-sample t test difference = mean (Foreign) – mean (Domestic). Standard errors of the differences in 
means are reported in parenthesis. The significance level is based on the p value of the null hypothesis that 
difference between foreign firms and domestic firms are zero. 
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7.4. Direct and Indirect Effects of FDI on Firm Level Productivity: a 
Cross Sectional Econometric Study  
Direct and indirect effects of FDI on firm level productivity are usually estimated based 
on the production function using econometric analysis regressing firm productivity, 
either labour productivity or total factor productivity, on factors that can affect 
productivity (Vahter, 2004; Hanousek, Kočenda, & Maurel, 2011). Among the 
explanatory variables, a measure of foreign presence in the firm is included to assess the 
direct effects and a measure of foreign presence in the sector in which the firm operates 
is included to assess the indirect effects (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Vahter, 2004). Along 
these lines, this empirical study focuses on estimating direct effects of FDI on labour 
productivity in foreign affiliates and spillover effects of FDI on labour productivity in 
other firms
46
.  
This study investigates the spillover effects of foreign firms on other firms in the same 
sector. The effect of foreign firms on downstream and upstream sectors could not be 
investigated due to unavailability of recent input output table for Sri Lanka. However, 
since this study uses a broad sectoral classification, i.e. a classification that is largely 
based on two digit sectoral classification, some vertical relationships between 3-digit 
level sectors or between more detailed level sectors will be included within each of the 
two digit level sector (Vahter & Masso, 2006). Moreover, in the classification used in 
this study, some of the two digit sectors are grouped into broader categories, and 
therefore, even relationships between 2-digit level sectors are included within each 
category. For example two digit sectors 17 to 19, i.e. Textiles (17), Garments (18) and 
Leather (19) are considered as a one category, and therefore, vertical relationships among 
these three categories are included within the considered category. Therefore, although 
the measured spillover effects largely represent horizontal effects, they may capture a 
considerable amount of the vertical effects within the categories considered in this study.  
In line with previous literature on FDI spillovers, the following initial representation is 
formulated: 
                                                 
46
 Due to data limitations on input costs and capital employed, total factor productivity cannot be 
accurately measured, and therefore, labour productivity was chosen as the measure of productivity for this 
study. 
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LPi = β0 + β FDIi + βspillover FPj + βx Xi+ εi      (7-1) 
 
where LP is a measure of firm‘s labour productivity, FDI is a measure of foreign 
presence at the firm level, FP is a measure of foreign presence in sectoral level and Xi is 
a vector of control variables that explain labour productivity. 
Non-random selection of FDI recipients is a major concern in estimating equation 7.1 
(Vahter, 2004). It is commonly highlighted in the literature that foreign investors tend to 
acquire stakes in domestic firms that have better performance or/and better 
assets/capabilities (Smarzynska, 2002). Assuming foreign investor‘s entry decision is 
dependent on certain characteristics of the firm, foreign investor‘s entry decision can be 
represented by the following dichotomous choice model. 
FDIi = 1 if FDI*i > 0 
FDIi = 0 otherwise 
  Where        FDI*i = α0 + α Wi + ei          (7.2) 
FDI*i is a latent variable measuring foreign investors‘ underline propensity to invest in 
the firm which depends on firm characteristics and industry conditions that form the 
vector Wi. FDIi is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the firm received FDI or 
not, taking the value of one if the latent variable FDI*i is positive and taking the value of 
zero otherwise. While the latent variable FDI*i is not directly measurable, the indicator 
variable FDIi can be directly measured by observing whether the firm receives FDI or 
not. 
Disregarding the selection equation (equation 7.2) when the outcome equation (equation 
7.1) is estimated can lead to bias estimates for direct effects (β) and spillover effects 
(βspillover) due to following reasons. First, the relationship between FDI and firm 
productivity can run in both ways; FDI may lead to higher labour productivity and firms 
with higher labour productivity can attract FDI (Vahter, 2004). Many studies have 
indicated the existence of this self selection bias (Vahter & Masso, 2006). If foreign 
investors prefer domestic firms with higher labour productivity or be drawn towards 
more productive industries, then firms with higher labour productivity or firms in high 
productive sectors can be associated with higher foreign presence. Therefore, both β and 
βspillover will be overestimated if multinationals are inclined to choose firms or industries 
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associated with higher labour productivity and this selection is not properly treated in the 
estimation. Second, there can be unobserved factors that can affect labour productivity 
that are not included in the vector Xi and unobservable factors that can affect foreign 
investors preference to invest in a firm that are not included in the vector Wi. These 
unobservable effects are captured in εi and ei, respectively. If εi and ei include same 
unobservable effects, then εi and ei will be correlated (Shaver, 1998). For example, firm 
specific intangible assets that are difficult to be measured can affect attractiveness of a 
firm to foreign investors and can also contribute to higher labour productivity. Unless 
such factors are measured and included in the vector Xi, εi and ei will be positively 
correlated
47
. It is reasonable to assume that unobservable factors that positively affect 
labour productivity will improve the attractiveness of a firm to foreign investors. 
Therefore, the two-stage Heckman selection model is used to account for this selection 
issue. This treatment procedure involves two steps. First, the selection model (equation 
7.2) is estimated using a probit estimation to obtain estimate of α and then inverse mills 
ratio is computed for each observation. Thereafter, this ratio is included as an additional 
regreessor in the outcome equation (equation 7.1) to control for possible selection bias 
and obtain estimate for β and βspillover
48
.  
Guided by previous literature, outcome equation and selection equation is expanded by 
including suitable explanatory variables in vector X and vector W, and the following 
final representations are formulated: 
Outcome equation: 
LP = β0 + β1FDI + β2FDI*FP + β3DOM*FP + β4SIZE + β5SIZE2 + β6WAGE + β7TRADE + β5STATUS + 
β6EC + β7RD + ε          (7.1)   
Selection equation: 
FDIi = 1 if FDI*i > 0 
FDIi = 1 otherwise 
 Where        FDI*i = α0 + α1 L3.LP + α2 L3.SIZE + α3 EXP_FIRM + α4 SKILL + ei  (7.2) 
 
where LP is the firm‘s labour productivity. In this study, labour productivity is measured 
as output per employee, which is the most common approach of measuring labour 
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 Therefore, both β and βspillover will be overestimated 
48
 This procedure is referred as the Heckman selection model. See Heckman (1979) and Smarzynska 
(2002) for further explanation on this procedure. 
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productivity. Alternatively, some studies use value added instead of output in calculating 
labour productivity (Doms & Jensen, 1998). However, this measure cannot be used in 
this study due to data limitations on input costs.  
FDI is a dummy variable identifying whether or not a firm has FDI which adopts the 
value of 1 if the firm‘s foreign ownership is more than 10% and zero otherwise. DOM is 
the opposite of FDI, and takes the value of zero if the firm‘s foreign ownership is more 
than 10% and one otherwise. Most common approach of measuring foreign presence in 
the sector is to use the foreign firms‘ share of output in the sector, while some studies 
have used foreign firms‘ share of employment and equity in the sector (Havranek & 
Irsova, 2012; Yasar & Paul, 2007). Most cross sectional studies on productivity 
spillovers use the same dataset to calculate the foreign firms‘ share of output in a sector49 
and use this as a proxy for the degree of foreign presence in a sector (Havranek & Irsova, 
2012). However, I couldn‘t rely on 2011 Enterprise Surveys Data Set to calculate foreign 
presence variable (FP) because only few foreign firms are included in some sectors, 
particularly in Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Products category, which is an 
important sector for Sri Lanka (Table 7-1). As per this dataset, foreign share in this 
category in terms of sales and employment is about 0.1% and 1%, respectively. 
However, available evidence suggests that although large proportion of factories in the 
Garment sector is owned by locals, foreign firms, which are considerably larger than 
local firms, account for almost half of all garment export earnings (Kelegama & Foley, 
1999). In order to rely on a foreign presence measure calculated based on sample data, it 
is crucial for the sample to be representative in terms of MNC subsidiaries (Marin & 
Bell, 2006). Also, since Sri Lanka is a small country, inclusion or exclusion of a one big 
foreign firm can considerably change the average characteristics of firms and sectors 
(Vahter, 2004). Due to these reasons, foreign penetration levels calculated based on this 
data set is likely to be misleading. Therefore, in this study, degree of foreign presence 
(FP) is represented by the cumulative realised FDI stock in each sector as at the end of 
2010. Degree of foreign presence (FP) is interacted with both FDI and DOM dummies in 
order to differentiate the spillover effects of foreign firms on domestic firms and on other 
foreign firms. This approach is used in several previous studies: see for example, 
(Smarzynska, 2002; Chudnovsky, López, & Rossi, 2008).  
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 Some studies use the employment or equity share instead of sales share 
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Rest of the variables are control variables. Variable SIZE captures how large the firm is, 
which categorises firm size into four levels, i.e. micro, small, medium and large, based 
on the number of employees
50
. SIZE2 is the square of SIZE. Economies of scale can 
affect a firm‘s productivity positively, and therefore, size of a firm can have a positive 
effect on productivity. However, relationship between size and productivity can be non-
linear; the effect of firm size on productivity can become negative above some optimum 
size due to diseconomies of scale. Therefore, similar to previous studies (Ganotakis & 
Love, 2012), both SIZE and SIZE2 is included as control variables.  
WAGE is a proxy for the skill intensity of the firm‘s workforce and is represented by the 
average wage rate per employee. Average wage rate is commonly used as a measure of 
labour quality in productivity studies (Blomström, 1988). TRADE is a binary variable 
representing whether the firm engages in international trade; TRADE adopts the value of 
1 if the firm either export or import and zero otherwise. Firm‘s engagement in 
international trade can have implications on its productivity. Technology transfer can 
take place not only through FDI spillovers but also through spillovers from international 
trade linkages (Smarzynska, 2002). These technology spillovers take place when firms 
that export and import come into contact with new technologies via their imports and 
import/export contacts. Firms that export will have to compete with world class practices 
and therefore need to be more efficient. Firms that export may have a better opportunity 
to achieve economies of scale and to better utilize internal capacity, which could lead to 
increase in factor productivity (Makki & Somwaru, 2004). On the other hand, firms that 
solely depend on domestic market may not be able to achieve optimum productive 
efficiency because of the small market size of Sri Lanka.  
STATUS is a binary variable that adopts the value of 1 if the firm is a shareholding 
company and zero if the firm is a sole proprietorship or a partnership. Ownership 
structure can have implications on firm productivity (Hill & Snell, 1989; Barth, 
Gulbrandsen, & Schønea, 2005) and need to be controlled for. EC is a proxy for capital 
intensity of a firm which is represented by the energy consumption per worker. As 
capital available for each unit of labour (capital intensity) increases, labour productivity 
increases (Hill & Snell, 1989), and therefore, it is a common practice in studies 
                                                 
50
 A firm is a micro-firm if it has less than five employees, small if it employs between 5 and 19 workers, 
medium if it has between 20 and 99 employees, and large firms if it employs more than 99 employees. 
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investigating labour productivity to control for capital intensity. RD is a binary variable 
that identifies whether a firm is R&D active or not; RD adopts the value of one if the 
firm has spent on formal research and development activities during the last three years 
and zero otherwise. R&D activities contribute to the firm‘s existing stock of accumulated 
knowledge and thus contribute to improvements in product/service quality and reduction 
in production/operation cost of the firm, and thereby, improving the productivity of firms 
(Wieser, 2005; Hill & Snell, 1989).  
In line with previous studies (Vahter, 2004), four explanatory variables are included in 
the selection equation: L3LP, L3SIZE, SKILL, and EXP_FIRM. Foreign firms are 
inclined to invest in domestic firms that are more productive ex ante, which is commonly 
referred in the literature as the cherry-picking phenomenon (Hanousek, Kočenda, & 
Maurel, 2011). However, some previous studies tend to use the same variable that was 
used as the dependent variable in the outcome equation as an explanatory variable in the 
selection equation. For example, Vahter (2004), studying the effects of FDI on labour 
productivity, uses the same labour productivity measure in both selection equation and 
the outcome equation. This can create an endogeneity issue. Fortunately, ES 
questionnaire includes two questions where respondent firms are asked for the amount of 
sales generated and the number of workers employed in 2007/2008 (three fiscal years 
before). Using these information, the variable L3LP, i.e. three year lagged labour 
productivity, is constructed, and this measure is used in the selection equation, instead of 
contemporaneous labour productivity. This approach can help to mitigate the above 
mentioned endogeneity problem. Along similar considerations, instead of including the 
variable SIZE in the selection equation, L3SIZE is included. L3SIZE is a categorical 
variable constructed similar to SIZE variable, but based on the number of workers 
employed in 2007/2008. SKILL is a variable capturing the percentage of full-time 
permanent workers who completed secondary school, is used as a proxy for the skill 
intensity of the firm‘s workforce. Many studies have shown that foreign firms can self-
select into firms with higher skill intensity (Doms & Jensen, 1998). EXP_FIRM is a 
binary variable that identifies whether a firm exports or not and adopts the value of one if 
the firm exports. Some studies point out that foreign firms can self-select into more 
capital intensive firms or industries (For example, Doms & Jensen, 1998). Therefore, 
energy consumption per worker (EC) was initially used in the selection equation. Since 
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coefficient of EC was insignificant and was not statistically different from zero, it was 
dropped from the selection equation.  
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Table 7-4: Description of variables used in the study 
 
 
Variable Description and measurement Source 
LP labour productivity represented by output per employee  measured in rupees millions per worker 
Sri Lanka 2011 
Enterprise Surveys 
Data Set published by 
World Bank 
FDI A binary variable representing whether or not a firm has FDI: adopts the value of 1 if the firm‘s foreign ownership is 
more than 10% 
DOM A binary variable representing whether or not a firm has FDI: adopts the value of zero if the firm‘s foreign 
ownership is more than 10% 
SIZE Categorical variable representing how large the firm is: A firm is a micro-firm if it has less than five employees, 
small if it employs between 5 and 19 workers, medium if it has between 20 and 99 employees, and large firms if it 
employs more than 99 employees 
WAGE Labour quality of the firm‘s workforce represented by the average wage rate of the firm measured in rupees thousand 
per worker 
SKILL skill intensity of the firm‘s workforce represented by the percentage of full-time permanent workers who completed 
secondary school 
TRADE Binary variable representing whether the firm engage in international trade; adopts the value of 1 if the firm either 
export or import and zero otherwise. 
STATUS Binary variable representing firm‘s status: 
0    firm is a sole proprietorship or a partnership 
1    firm is a shareholding company 
 
EC Proxy for capital intensity of a firm represented by the energy consumption per worker measured in rupees millions 
per worker 
EXP_FIRM Binary variable that identifies whether a firm exports or not: 
 adopts the value of one if the firm exports 
RD A binary variable that adopts the value of one if the firm has spent on formal research and development activities 
during the last three years and zero otherwise. 
FP cumulative realised FDI stock in each sector as at the end of 2010 measured in US$ million Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka, 2010 
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Table 7-5: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Descriptive statistics Correlation Matrix 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 LP 2.58 6.98 0.025 80   
         2 FDI 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.15   
        3 FP 1494.97 1443.11 35 3221.9 0.08 0.06   
       4 SIZE 1.67 0.77 1 3 0.06 0.23 -0.02   
      5 SKILL 53.08 34.09 0 100 0.08 0.07 0.24 0.08   
     6 WAGE 220.72 407.60 5.455 5333.3 0.22 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.04   
    7 TRADE 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.11 0.20 -0.22 0.40 0.05 0.11   
   8 EXP_FIRM 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.06 0.18 -0.09 0.36 0.08 0.12 0.72   
  9 STATUS 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.20 0.22 0.03 0.39 0.08 0.18 0.25 0.20   
 10 EC 110.92 836.14 0 18157.8 0.25 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.01   
11 RD 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.15 0.22 0.02 0.36 0.05 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.14 
 
Selection model (equation 7.2) is estimated using a probit estimation and the outcome 
model (equation 7.1) is estimated using OLS estimation. Residuals of the estimations of 
the outcome model were tested for heteroskedasticity using Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity. Since test results indicated heteroskedasticity, 
specification 7.1 was re-estimated with cluster (industry specific) robust standard errors.  
Table 7-6: results of the probit estimation of the selection model  
Dependent variable: FDI  
L3.LP 0.00542 
 (0.00485) 
L3.SIZE 0.291** 
 (0.133) 
EXP_FIRM 0.552* 
 (0.289) 
SKILL 0.00717** 
 (0.00339) 
Constant -2.736*** 
 (0.342) 
Prob > chi2 0.0003 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1177 
Observations 476 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7-7 presents the results of OLS estimation of the outcome model and presents four 
sets of regression results. Since unobserved industry specific effects can affect firm 
productivity, industry fixed effects are included in estimations reported in column two, 
three and four. Industry fixed effects is defined at a narrower categorisation
51
 than the 
one used for measuring FDI spillover (industry-level foreign presence) variable. Column 
one and two present results estimated without accounting for the self-selection issue. 
Results reported in column four are estimated by including region specific dummies in 
addition to including sector specific dummies and accounting for self-selection. Some 
studies suggest that spillovers of foreign firms mainly accrue to the local firms located 
close to the foreign firms. Therefore, some of the empirical studies investigating 
productivity effects of FDI account for regional specific effects (Blomström & Kokko, 
2003b) or regional specific spillover effects (Konings, 2000).  
Coefficient of FDI, which represent direct effects of FDI, is positive and significant in all 
specifications, and therefore, provide strong indication of positive own firm effects of 
FDI. 
Coefficient of ―FDI*FP‖, which represent the effect of the degree of foreign presence in 
the sector on the productivity of foreign firms in the same sector, is negative and 
significant in all specifications indicating negative spillovers of foreign firms on other 
foreign firms in the same sector. This result is to some extent consistent with the findings 
of past empirical studies. Chudnovsky, López, & Rossi (2008), based on firm level data 
on Argentina, found that foreign firms have negetive spillovers (but only marginally 
significant) on other foreign firms. Chuang & Lin (1999) found weak spillovers on other 
foreign owned firms for Taiwanese firm-level data. Smarzynska (2002) did not find 
evidence of FDI spillovers on other foreign firms through the horizontal channel for firm 
level data from Lithuania. Contrastingly, based on panel data from Estonia, Vahter & 
Masso (2006) observed positive spillovers on other foreign firms. 
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 Industry fixed effects are included for the following 21 sectors:  Food (15), Tobacco (16), Textiles (17), 
Garments (18), Leather (19), Wood (20), Paper (21), Recorded media (22), Chemicals (24), Plastics & 
rubber (25), Non-metallic mineral products (26), Medical and optical precision instruments (33), Transport 
machines (34), Furniture (36), Recycling (37), Construction Section F (45), Sales, repairs, and service of 
motor vehicles (50), Wholesale (51), Retail (52), Hotel and restaurants section H (55), Transport  Section I: 
(60), IT (72) 
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Table 7-7: Results of OLS estimations of the outcome model 
Dependent variable: LP (1) 
OLS estimation  
(2) 
OLS estimation  
(3) 
OLS estimation 
with Heckman 
treatment 
(4) 
OLS estimation 
with Heckman 
treatment 
FDI 7.407** 7.950** 8.537* 8.709* 
 (3.336) (3.399) (4.449) (4.306) 
FDI*FP -0.00219* -0.00386*** -0.00420*** -0.00425** 
 (0.00113) (0.00104) (0.00135) (0.00173) 
DOM*FP 0.000503* -0.00105*** -0.00140*** -0.00134** 
 (0.000248) (0.000116) (0.000212) (0.000523) 
SIZE 3.507 3.236 4.117 3.975 
 (3.270) (3.816) (3.833) (3.884) 
SIZE2 -1.096 -1.035 -1.598 -1.513 
 (0.942) (1.108) (1.112) (1.088) 
WAGE 0.00259** 0.00274** 0.00309 0.00263 
 (0.000953) (0.00111) (0.00182) (0.00190) 
TRADE 1.141 1.284 0.406 0.218 
 (0.894) (1.086) (1.141) (1.204) 
STATUS 2.480** 2.431** 2.991** 2.423* 
 (0.888) (0.974) (1.168) (1.253) 
EC 0.00170*** 0.00168*** 0.00188*** 0.00188*** 
 (0.000187) (0.000189) (0.000138) (0.000135) 
RD 1.402 1.517 1.691** 1.536* 
 (0.991) (0.932) (0.803) (0.749) 
INVMILLS   -3.990*** -3.795** 
   (1.379) (1.521) 
Constant -2.020 -0.361 9.522* 11.21** 
 (1.926) (2.646) (4.649) (4.895) 
Industry fixed effects NO YES YES YES 
Regional effects NO NO NO YES 
Observations 525 525 454 454 
R-squared 0.165 0.192 0.216 0.235 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Coefficient of DOM*FP, which represent the effect of the degree of foreign presence in 
the sector on the productivity of domestic firms in the same sector, is positive and 
significant for the specifications that do not control for self-selection and industry fixed 
effects (column 1). In contrast, when industry fixed effects are included, this coefficient 
turned negative and highly significant. Magnitude of this negative coefficient increases 
slightly
52
 when both industry fixed effects and Heckman selection model are used. Also, 
the estimate of the coefficient of inverse mills ratio is negative and significant. This 
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 As per the estimated results of the selection model (Table 7-6), labour productivity is not the main 
driving factor in the self-selection; instead skill intensity, firm size and export orientedness are more 
important in self-selecting to a foreign owned firm. In line with this observation, magnitude of this 
negative coefficient increases only slightly when self-selection issue is controlled for. 
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implies that self-selection is prevalent and highlights the importance of correcting for the 
selection bias. Previous studies, for example, (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Marin & Bell, 
2006) have warned that when FDI takes place in highly productive sectors, there can be a 
positive association between the degree of foreign presence in the sector and the 
productivity of domestic firms in the same sector. In line with these studies, results of 
this study reiterate the importance of controlling for industry specific effects and 
addressing the self-selection issue. In sum, results of the estimations indicate foreign 
firms have a negative spillover effect on domestic firms‘ productivity.  
As expected, coefficient of SIZE is positive and the coefficient of SIZE2 is negative in 
all specifications, however they are not significant at a 10% significance level. This 
provides some evidence for the non-linear relationship between firm size and 
productivity. Coefficient estimate of WAGE is positive and significant in some 
specifications. This indicates the importance of firm level labour quality on firm level 
labour productivity. As expected, coefficient estimate of TRADE is positive in all 
specifications but not significant at a 10% significance level. The coefficient of EC, 
which represents the effect of capital intensity of the firm on firm productivity, is 
positive as expected and is highly significant in all specifications. In all specifications, 
coefficient estimate of STATUS is positive as expected and significant. This indicates 
that shareholding companies are more productive than sole proprietorships or 
partnerships. Coefficient of RD is positive and significant in some specifications, 
indicating the importance of R&D investment for higher labour productivity. 
Results remain qualitatively similar when regional dummies are introduced. Most of the 
coefficient estimates do not change in term of magnitude and significance. This is not 
surprising because Sri Lanka is a relatively small country
53
. Therefore, it would be 
acceptable to ignore regional spillovers and consider entire Sri Lanka as one market for 
this study. 
Some of the recent studies on productivity spillovers have emphasised the importance of 
accounting for the non-normal distribution of the labour productivity of the firms in the 
sample (Dimelis & Louri, 2002; Girma & Görg, 2007). If the labour productivity of the 
firms in the sample is not normally distribute, which is usually the case because there is 
                                                 
53
 Konings (2000) found insignificant regional spillovers for Bulgaria, which is a small open economy. 
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large and persistent heterogeneity in labour productivity across firms even within 
narrowly defines sectors (Girma & Görg, 2007), then OLS estimations of the coefficients 
might not be representative of the entire firm distribution. Formal testing for normality 
using Shapiro-Wilk normality test and Shapiro-Francia normality test leads to a rejection 
of the null hypothesis of normality of the labour productivity distribution. Since OLS 
regressions estimate the means of labour productivity conditional on the covariates for 
the whole sample, quantile regression technique was employed in order to examine 
whether there are any notable differences in labour productivity dynamics in different 
quantiles of the distribution.  
Table 7-8 reports the regression estimates for five different quantiles of the labour 
productivity distribution. Results largely remain intact except for few minor differences 
in some quantiles. Coefficient of FDI, which represent direct effects of FDI, remains 
positive for all quantiles except for the 10
th
 quantile where the coefficient estimate is 
negative but insignificant. This is not surprising because foreign firms might not have a 
superior advantage in productivity in sectors associated with very low productivity. Also, 
foreign firms‘ participation is likely to be lower in sectors associated with lower 
productivity and this could make the coefficient estimate inefficient due to smaller 
number of foreign firms in the sector. Compared to other quantiles, coefficient estimate 
of FDI for the 90
th
 quantile is very large and highly significant. This shows that foreign 
firms enjoy a very high labour productivity relative to domestic firms in the upper end of 
the labour productivity distribution.  
Coefficient of ―FDI*FP‖, which represent the effect of the degree of foreign presence in 
the sector on the productivity of foreign firms in the same sector, remains negative for all 
quantiles except for the 75
th
 quantile where the coefficient estimate is positive but 
insignificant. 
In line with OLS estimations, coefficient of DOM*FP, which represent the Spillover 
effect of foreign firms on the domestic firms in the same sector, is negative in all quantile 
estimations. However, interestingly, this negative coefficient estimate is significant in 
median and higher quantiles but insignificant in lower quantiles. This clearly indicate 
that negative spillovers are stronger in higher productivity quantiles.  
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With respect to control variables, all results remain intact with previous OLS estimates. 
Inverse mills ratio is negative in all quantiles, but only significant in the 90
th
 quantile. 
This implies that self-selection is more prevalent in the upper end of the labour 
productivity distribution.    
 Table 7-8: Results of the quantile regressions 
Dependent variable: 
LP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
10
th
 quantile 25
th
 quantile Median 75
th
 quantile 90
th
 quantile 
FDI -0.0330 0.0228 1.844** 0.626 71.50*** 
 (0.144) (0.450) (0.871) (1.523) (2.515) 
FDI*FP -0.00003 -0.000129 -0.00105*** 0.000323 -0.0239*** 
 0.00006 (0.000144) (0.000338) (0.000627) (0.000843) 
DOM*FP -0.00002 -0.00004 -0.000353*** -0.000437*** -0.00152*** 
 0.00003 0.00004 (0.000136) (5.58e-05) (0.000534) 
SIZE 0.0656 0.102 0.0599 0.832 6.209 
 (0.0681) (0.178) (0.331) (0.808) (4.018) 
SIZE2 -0.0277 -0.0573 -0.0789 -0.334 -2.016* 
 (0.0202) (0.0602) (0.0715) (0.227) (1.082) 
WAGE 0.00103*** 0.00166*** 0.00260*** 0.00391** 0.0101 
 (0.000394) (0.000307) (0.000582) (0.00160) (0.0106) 
TRADE 0.0111 -0.0211 0.161 0.325 -0.273 
 (0.0345) (0.0718) (0.200) (0.430) (1.337) 
STATUS 0.0487 0.125 0.681* 1.367 4.080** 
 (0.0526) (0.103) (0.357) (1.288) (2.047) 
EC 0.00184*** 0.00196*** 0.00189*** 0.00177*** 0.00136** 
 (0.000318) 0.00002 0.00002 (0.000115) (0.000543) 
RD 0.0207 0.00859 0.188 0.795 1.176 
 (0.0518) (0.0898) (0.283) (0.872) (1.202) 
INVMILLS -0.0387 -0.185 -0.388 -0.781 -3.827** 
 (0.0588) (0.120) (0.334) (0.518) (1.799) 
Constant 0.159 0.569* 1.327 2.700* 9.421* 
 (0.181) (0.304) (1.137) (1.408) (4.838) 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Heckman treatment YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 454 454 454 454 454 
R-squared 0.084 0.098 0.140 0.159 0.119 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7.5. Concluding Remarks 
FDI is considered as a major channel in facilitating international transfers of resources, 
technology, management know-how, products and services from a home country to a 
host country (Bang Nam & Se Young, 2004). It is expected that presence of foreign firms 
in host economies to generate positive impact on the efficiency of investment within the 
host country through own firm effects and spillover effects of foreign firms. However, 
there are growing concerns of possible negative effects of FDI on the host country (Bang 
Nam & Se Young, 2004). Aggravating these doubts, empirical studies examining 
productivity spillovers of foreign firms have produced mix results, sometimes results 
varying according to the sample (country) and methodology. This study examines the 
direct effects and indirect effects of foreign firms on firm level labour productivity. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical study that attempt to shed some light 
on the impact of FDI on firm level labour productivity, in the context of Sri Lanka. 
In line with previous empirical studies conducted on other countries (Yasar & Paul, 
2007; Chudnovsky, López, & Rossi, 2008; Doms & Jensen, 1998), comparison of 
foreign and local firms in Sri Lanka revealed that foreign firms are quite distinctive from 
local firms. Compared to domestic firms, foreign firms are larger, more productive and 
more profitable. Foreign firms also tend to hire high proportion of skilled workers, pay 
higher wages and undertake more in-house training programmes. They are more active in 
R&D and more innovative.  They are more export oriented but rely more on inputs of 
foreign origin. 
Results of the econometric study provided a strong indication of positive own firm 
effects of FDI. This is in line with the majority of previous empirical evidence (Yasar & 
Paul, 2007; Chudnovsky, López, & Rossi, 2008; Doms & Jensen, 1998; Lipsey, 2004).  
As per the results of the econometric study, foreign firms have a negative Spillover effect 
on local firms‘ productivity. Given the Sri Lankan context, this might not be surprising 
due to several reasons. First, literature on productivity spillovers recognise that the extent 
of spillovers will depend on the degree to which foreign affiliates are technologically 
active in the host country (Marin & Bell, 2006; Deborah, 2013). Analysis of chapter four 
demonstrates that FDI in Sri Lanka has primarily taken place in sectors with low 
technical intensity. Therefore, potential for technology spillovers will be very limited.  
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Second, the extent of spillovers will also depend on the degree to which foreign affiliates 
expose their technologies (technology leakage) to local firms (Marin & Bell, 2006). 
Available evidence shows that backward linkages to foreign firms are weak in ‗Textiles, 
Wearing Apparel & Leather Products‘ category, a sector which has attracted the largest 
proportion of foreign investments (Kelegama & Foley, 1999). Moreover, higher import 
propensity of foreign firms (from the results of section 7.3) and higher import content of 
the inputs to ‗Textiles, Wearing Apparel & Leather Products‘ category (Kelegama & 
Foley, 1999), would limit the opportunities for domestic firms to develop. Also, as per 
the descriptive statistics reported in Table 7-2 foreign firms experience much lower staff 
turnover compared to domestic firms (However, two-sample t test showed that this 
difference is not statistically different from zero). All these indicate that the extent to 
which foreign affiliates expose their technologies is low, which could limit the extent of 
positive spillovers.  
Third, literature on productivity spillovers also recognise that the extent of spillovers will 
depend on the level of absorptive capacity of the domestic firms (Marin & Bell, 2006). 
Industrial structure in Sri Lanka is narrowly concentrated in a few sectors with little 
participation in technical intensive sectors, which indicate that overall technical 
knowledge of the firms are low. As per the descriptive statistics reported in Table 7-2 and 
the results of econometric study reported in Table 7-7, foreign firms‘ average labour 
productivity is significantly higher than local firms‘ labour productivity. This indicate the 
technology gap between the local firm and foreign firm is quite large. Many studies have 
shown that when the technological gap between foreign firms and local firms are 
relatively large, then local firms are not technically proficient to absorb spillovers. Also, 
section 6.5.1 demonstrates that, although Sri Lanka has very good human capital 
indicators (secondary education levels and literacy), Sri Lanka produces only few 
technical graduates. Several studies have exposed that there is a mismatch between the 
skills and the needs of the job market and the education provided by secondary school 
system and the public universities (Aturupane, 2009; Country Summary of Higher 
Education, 2007; Ganegodage & Rambaldi, 2011). Descriptive statistics reported in 
section 7.3 revealed that compared to foreign firms, only a smaller percentage of local 
firms are undertaking R&D or in-house training programmes. All these factors indicate a 
low absorptive capacity of local firms. Given this context, it appears that out of the three 
potential spillover channels of demonstration effects, worker turnover and competition 
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effects; competition effects might be dominating over other two. Unlike demonstration 
and worker turnover effects that are presumably positive, competition can have both 
positive and negative externalities (Vahter, 2004). Increase competition from foreign 
firms may compel local firms to operate in less-efficient scales of production; when local 
firms lose market share amid competition by foreign firms, local firms can experience 
lower productivities because their fixed costs are being spread over a smaller output 
(Lipsey, 2004; Javorcik, 2004; Aitken & Harrison, 1999). This could also hurt the 
technology progress of local firms because larger and profitable firms are in a better 
position to undertake R&D and to enjoy economies of scale in R&D (Blomström & 
Kokko, 1998). Therefore, it seems that negative competition effects are predominant over 
other positive Spillover effects.   
Sri Lanka‘s industry structure is concentrated in low technology intensive industries, 
while FDI has also taken place in low technology intensive industries. It appears that this 
absence of participation in medium and higher technical intensive sectors have largely 
facilitated the negative spillovers. This argument is supported by a recent econometric 
study conducted by Jeon, Park, & Ghauri (2013) based on Chinese firm-level data. 
Estimating the extent of horizontal and vertical spillover effects for different industries, 
they find consistent negative spillovers associated with most of the low technology 
intensive industries while finding mix results (positive and negative spillovers) 
associated with high and medium technology industries.     
Results indicate that higher foreign presence in a sector has a negative Spillover effect on 
other foreign firms in the same sector. This is likely to occur due to competition effects. 
Higher foreign presence in a sector is likely to intensify the competition and compel the 
foreign firms to operate in less efficient scales of production. In contrast, lower foreign 
presence can allow few firms to enjoy monopolistic powers and economies of scale.  
Findings of this study has important implications on the development of local firms. As 
per the IDP theory, inward FDI plays a major role in upgrading local firms‘ 
competencies, which will enable the indigenous firms to later on undertake outward FDI 
(Dunning, 1981; United Nations, 2006; Dunning, Kim, & Lin, 2001; Dunning, 2003). 
Also, according to this theory, the development of a country is closely linked to its local 
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firms‘ capacity to build up/upgrade firm specific advantages. Therefore, presence of 
negative spillovers could further retard the progress of Sri Lanka.  
Results of this study are robust. First, the econometric model accounts for the non-
random selection of FDI recipients. Moreover, measures were taken to minimise the 
endogeneity between dependent variable and explanatory variables.  These results are 
also robust to the inclusion of sectoral fixed effects and regional fixed effect. Finally, 
results remains largely intact when quantile regression technique was used in order to 
account for the non-normal distribution of the labour productivity of the firms in the 
sample.  
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Chapter 8 : Conclusion 
Sri Lanka has performed poorly in terms of attracting FDI. The country has resource and 
location advantages and impressive human capital indicators but had suffered from 
nearly three-decades of civil war, which ended in 2009. Systematic research on the 
determinants of FDI and FDI productivity spillovers in the context of Sri Lanka is almost 
non-existence. Only a handful of studies (Wijeweera & Mounter, 2008; Athukorala & 
Jayasuriya, 2004; Athukorala, 2003; Athukorala, 1995) have looked at FDI in the context 
of Sri Lanka. Motivated by this background, this thesis aims to conduct an in-depth 
research on FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. 
This thesis consists an initial literature review covering theories in FDI, determinants of 
FDI and impact of FDI (Chapter 2), a context analysis of FDI in Sri Lanka (Chapters 3 
and 4), and three empirical chapters (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). Chapter five investigates the 
effect of war on FDI, giving particular attention to the differential impact of war on FDI 
in different sectors, by employing time series econometrics (vector error correction 
model) and panel data econometrics. Chapter six explores the determinants of FDI for a 
sample of countries in Asia by employing panel data econometrics, giving special 
attention to detach relationships specific to Sri Lanka from the relationships general to 
rest of the countries. Chapter seven investigates the impact of FDI in the context of Sri 
Lanka with the use of firm level data by estimating the impact of foreign firms on labour 
productivity of both foreign and local firms.  
This concluding chapter summarise the key empirical findings of this thesis and then 
highlight the key contributions of this research study. Thereafter, it emphasises policy 
implications of the research findings and finally discusses the limitations of this study 
and suggests potential research topics that could extend this study further. 
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8.1. Research Findings 
Key findings of this thesis can be summarised as follows. Results of the econometric 
analysis in chapter five indicate that war has had been a major impediment in attracting 
FDI into the manufacturing sectors in Sri Lanka. Although, war also had a negative 
association with FDI into services, this was not statistically significant and the magnitude 
of the effect was also smaller than that for manufacturing FDI. Results also points out 
that war has a significant negative impact across almost all manufacturing industries, 
while the magnitude of this negative impact varying over industries. Also, the effect of 
war was greater in export intensive sectors compared to sectors that are host market 
oriented. 
Panel study based on FDI into selected countries in Asia indicates that countries that 
have better human capital indicators attract more FDI; however, this was not the case 
with Sri Lanka. It was evident that the relationship between human capital and FDI flows 
was significantly negative for Sri Lanka, while, in general, human capital is a positive 
determinant of FDI flows to rest of the countries in the sample of countries. Two main 
reasons for this discrepancy were identified. First reason is the linguistic limitations of 
Sri Lanka‘s so called impressive human capital indicators. Sri Lanka‘s ability to 
capitalise on its high human capital indicators to attract FDI is largely limited because Sri 
Lanka‘s literacy rates and school enrolment rates are based on ‗Sinhala‘ language, a 
language that is understandable only by Sri Lankans. Second reason is that although Sri 
Lanka‘s human capital indicators are quantitatively outstanding, there are widespread 
concerns on the quality of education system in Sri Lanka. Government expenditure on 
education is very low and Sri Lanka‘s education system is highly criticised for being 
inefficient, and for having a low level of interaction between academic world and 
industry. Moreover, limited access to tertiary education system and extraneous output 
composition of the tertiary education system is likely to waste the harvest of the 
secondary education system. 
Another new finding of this thesis is the reported evidence supporting cheap asset 
hypothesis (and expensive asset hypothesis) in the context of FDI. This study revealed a 
significant negative relationship between host country stock market valuations and 
FDI inflows in the context of Sri Lanka, while this relationship was not evident for 
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rest of the countries taken as a whole.  Moreover, the effect of host country stock 
market valuations on FDI inflows was negative for the countries with less developed 
stock markets while there was no such relationship for the other countries. Therefore, 
these results indicate that cheap asset hypothesis (and expensive asset hypothesis) is 
likely to be applicable in the Sri Lanka‘s context and in the context of countries with less 
developed stock markets. 
In addition to war, human capital and price levels, this thesis also provided support for 
several FDI determinants. Findings of this thesis confirmed the importance of trade 
openness, political stability, regulatory quality and exchange rate for attracting FDI flows 
in the context of Asian region.  
Empirical study based on firm level data in chapter seven also produced several 
important findings. A preliminary investigation on the nature of foreign invested firms 
relative to domestic firms revealed that foreign firms are quite distinctive from local 
firms. Compared to domestic firms, foreign firms are larger, more productive and more 
profitable. Foreign firms also tend to hire high proportion of skilled workers, pay higher 
wages and undertake more in-house training programmes. They are more active in R&D 
and more innovative.  They are more export oriented but rely more on inputs of foreign 
origin. Finally, the cross sectional econometric study estimated the direct and indirect 
effects of FDI on firm level labour productivity. Results indicated a positive own firm 
effects of FDI and negative spillover effects of foreign firms on local firms and on other 
foreign firms in the same sector.  
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8.2. Key Contribution  
This thesis comprises a detailed and systematic investigation of determinants, impact and 
policy issues relating to FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. Only a handful of studies 
(Wijeweera & Mounter, 2008; Athukorala & Jayasuriya, 2004; Athukorala, 2003; 
Athukorala, 1995) have looked at FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. The need for this 
thesis is largely justified by this dearth in research studies on FDI in Sri Lanka.  
Chapters three and four provide a detailed overview of FDI in Sri Lanka while also 
providing a general discussion on the related geographical, political, social and economic 
background of Sri Lanka. Out of the existing studies on FDI in Sri Lanka, chapters three 
and four provide not only the most extensive overview but also the most recent one. 
To the best of my knowledge, Wijeweera & Mounter (2008) is the only study that has 
examined the determinants of FDI in the context of Sri Lanka. However, their study is a 
short econometric study that uses vector autoregressive model (VAR) to regress FDI 
against GDP, total trade, wage rate, exchange rate, and interest rate. Therefore, this thesis 
is the first study that has undertaken a detailed and systematic investigation of 
determinants of FDI while covering an exhaustive set of FDI determinants. Moreover, 
this is the first study that estimates the impact of the civil war on FDI in Sri Lanka.  In 
addition to these, this thesis has identified various factors that can influence FDI inflows 
at the country level and at the sector level in the context of Sri Lanka.   
This research study is the first to compare and contrast foreign owned firms and local 
firms in the context of Sri Lanka and also the first to assess the direct and indirect effects 
of FDI on firm level productivity in the context of Sri Lanka. Therefore, this thesis 
contributes immensely to the FDI literature in the context of Sri Lanka. 
This thesis not only contributes to the FDI literature in the context of Sri Lanka, but also 
makes several contributions to the general literature on FDI. Previous studies have major 
limitations in explaining the effect of war on FDI. These limitations were highlighted in 
chapter 5 in detail. Sri Lanka as a case study provided a unique opportunity to address 
these limitations due to the presence of a nearly three decade long civil war, which has 
gone through considerable variation in conflict intensity. Moreover, this is the first study 
that investigates the impact of war, or of any dimension of political instability, on FDI in 
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different sectors; previous studies investigating the effects of political instability on FDI 
flows have relied on country level FDI flows. Results of this study indicate that the effect 
of war on FDI inflows can be different for different sectors, and highlights the 
importance of using sectoraly disaggregated FDI data when determinants of FDI are 
investigated.  
This thesis also contributes to the literature on human capital and FDI. Although the 
importance of human capital in attracting FDI is widely recognised in the literature, 
existing empirical evidence is inconclusive, particularly for developing countries. It was 
evident that the relationship between human capital and FDI flows was significantly 
negative for Sri Lanka while, in general, human capital has been a positive determinant 
of FDI flows to rest of the countries. Two main reasons for this discrepancy were 
identified: linguistic limitations and qualitative limitations of human capital in Sri Lanka. 
This finding highlights the importance of recognizing country specific limitations in 
human capital in understanding the relationship between human capital and FDI.  
This study also contributes to the literature on the relationship between asset prices and 
FDI. Although theoretical considerations suspect lower asset prices in the host country to 
augment FDI (cheap asset hypothesis), this supposition is not supported by previous 
empirical studies. Extending the theoretical considerations further, it was comprehended 
that degree of mispricing is high in less developed markets due to market inefficiency 
and manipulation, and therefore, misprice driven FDI is a possibility in less developed 
markets. Empirical analysis strongly supported this supposition. This is a new finding 
that is in contrast with the extant empirical evidence. Therefore, this empirical finding 
and the associated theoretical justification makes an important contribution to revive a 
hypothesis that is disputed mainly because the hypothesis has been tested in the wrong 
context. 
Extant literature on FDI spillovers remains inconclusive and it is widely believed that 
different methodologies and different country contexts contribute to these inconsistencies 
in empirical findings. This fact justifies the need for further studies on FDI spillovers in 
different country contexts. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the FDI spillover 
literature by providing evidence from a country that has never been empirically 
investigated in previous spillover literature. Also, as it is discussed in section 7.5, it 
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appears that existence of negative spillovers is closely related to the lower technology 
intensity in the industrial structure and FDI. This context provides an opportunity to 
understand conditions under which spillovers are (not) likely to materialise - a research 
gap that is identified in the literature (Deborah, 2013).  
This study also makes methodological contribution by employing more recent data and 
applying statistically robust empirical methodologies in new applications. Except in the 
study investigating impact of FDI on labour productivity, all other studies use the most 
appropriate methodologies in both time series and panel data econometrics. For the study 
investigating impact of FDI on labour productivity, cross sectional econometrics were 
used due to unavailability of panel data. However, using responses received from 
respondents about past data, several tactical measures were taken to minimise the 
endogeneity and self selection bias, and thereby, largely minimising the well-known 
limitations of using cross sectional econometrics. Varity of estimation techniques were 
used in this thesis, for example, Ordinary Least Squares, Generalised Least Squares, 
fixed/random effects models, vector error correction model, GMM, Heckman selection 
model, and quantile regression technique, and most of these estimation techniques were 
applied in unique settings. 
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8.3. Policy Implications 
Research findings of this study have important policy implications for scholars, 
practitioners and policymakers. First, research findings of this study have important 
policy implications for the Sri Lankan government and various institutions governing 
FDI and related areas. This study uses Sri Lanka as a case study but the policy 
implications can be generalised to other host countries that share similar characteristics 
with Sri Lanka. To this end, policy implications of this study can be particularly relevant 
to other countries with small, open and peripheral economies. However, Sri Lanka‘s 
unique features, such as having impressive development indicators while having weak 
growth indicators, could to a certain extent, limit the generalisability of the policy 
implications of this study to other host countries. Findings of this study also provide 
important insights to investing countries and multinational firms.   
Results of this study show that the effect of war on FDI flows can be different for 
different sectors. It was observed that war has had a greater impact on FDI in 
manufacturing than FDI in services. Also its effect was greater in export intensive sectors 
compared to sectors that are host market oriented. Therefore, it is necessary to design 
sector specific FDI policies in order to revamp FDI in these affected industries. A 
possible strategy could be to provide carefully designed incentives to foreign investors in 
order to lure them into these affected industries. Service sector has attracted the majority 
of the FDI flows, and FDI flows to manufacturing sectors is concentrated in few sectors, 
mainly in industries that are associated with low technical intensity. Furthermore, 
analysis in chapter three and four shows that, not only FDI, but also exports and the 
overall economy are narrowly concentrated with little participation in technical intensive 
sectors. Therefore, one of the main agendas of the government should be to formulate 
appropriate strategic policies to diversify FDI flows, particularly to industries with high 
technical intensity.  Given Sri Lanka‘s low technical maturity, diversifying FDI flows 
could be the best method to achieve economic and export diversifications.  Findings of 
this study would also inform foreign investors, particularly assisting decision making of 
potential foreign investors who are considering investing in Sri Lanka or in a conflict 
zone.  
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This study strongly emphasize that different factors have different levels of effect on FDI 
inflows to different sectors. This has important implications for designing FDI policy 
framework in order to achieve the desired sectoral distribution of FDI in a host country.  
Although Sri Lanka is touted as a country with impressive human capital indicators, it 
was revealed that Sri Lanka has not been able to capitalise on its quantitative 
achievements in human capital to attract FDI. Two main limitations that undermine Sri 
Lanka‘s human capital base were identified: linguistic limitations of its human capital 
and issues with quality of education. Countries such as Sri Lanka that rely primarily on 
vernacular languages might not be able to capitalise on their human capital to attract FDI 
unless they improve the linguistic capabilities of their human capital. In other words, 
having an educated workforce is necessary but not a sufficient condition to attract FDI; 
they should also give due attention to improve the linguistic capabilities of their human 
capital. One possible solution to mitigate this issue could be to train their workforce in a 
most widely spoken lingua franca in international business. For example, for a country 
like Sri Lanka, acquisition of English language proficiency can improve prospects of 
attracting FDI from English speaking countries. Therefore, it is important to draft 
suitable policies to improve linguistic capabilities of human capital. Improving the 
literacy in English, which is the lingua franca in international business, should be a high 
priority if the government intend to engage in international business. To this end, 
government should reintroduce English as a medium of instruction in schools and 
strengthen the English teaching infrastructure in schools. Also, following countries such 
as India and Singapore, Sri Lanka should seriously consider re-introducing English as an 
official language. These changes could not only help in attracting more FDI to the 
country but also increase its integration with global markets.  Equipping Sri Lanka‘s 
large human capital base with linguistic capabilities in a lingua franca will improve the 
competitiveness of Sri Lanka in the international terrain and enable Sri Lanka to achieve 
its true potential. However, present nationalistic sentiments and policies that promote 
linguistic nationalism are likely to further deteriorate the ability of its human capital to 
engage in international business.  
Sri Lanka‘s experience demonstrates the importance of the language competency of 
human capital for attracting FDI inflows. This can also have many implications for other 
host countries, investing countries and multinationals. Policy implications of this study 
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are equally valid for other countries that largely use their own vernacular languages. 
Countries in which only vernacular languages are spoken or countries that are 
linguistically distant from major FDI source countries are likely to be at a disadvantage 
in attracting FDI. Also, such countries may not be able to capitalise on their human 
capital to attract FDI unless they improve the linguistic capabilities of their human 
capital. Findings of this study would also inform MNEs and investing countries about the 
importance of language for undertaking FDI in a host country. MNEs could benefit by 
improving their own language skills within the firms; MNEs with wider linguistic 
capabilities can afford to be more flexible when their locational choices are made.  
Sri Lankan policymakers should also concentrate on overhauling the current education 
system in order to improve the quality of education.  Since Sri Lanka‘s education system 
is state managed, Sri Lanka needs to increase its government expenditure at least to a 
level in par with countries that have the same level of development. Alternatively, more 
private participation in the education system could be encouraged.  Efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public education system should be improved giving particular 
attention to linking the education system to academic world and industry requirements. 
Finally, the tertiary education system should be revamped by increasing the output of 
technical graduates rather than producing excessive number of unemployable graduates 
that have studied arts and law. 
Empirical results of chapter six suggest that, in the context of Asia, exchange rate 
depreciation in the host country positively affect FDI inflows. This finding has a major 
implication for Sri Lanka. It‘s quite extraordinary that being a developing country, Sri 
Lanka‘s real exchange rate has appreciated relative to most of the countries in Asia, even 
against the developed countries in Asia. Sri Lanka‘s central bank‘s interventions to 
maintain a fixed peg arrangement with the US$ and large foreign borrowing may have 
largely caused this overvaluation. Such an overvalued exchange rate is likely to have 
devastating impact on FDI and also on exports and thereby on export oriented FDI. 
Therefore, overvalued exchange rate largely compromise Sri Lanka‘s competitiveness in 
attracting FDI. However, in February 2012, central bank of Sri Lanka has limited its 
intervention and allowed some flexibility in the determination of exchange rate, and as a 
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result, exchange rate depreciated significantly after that
54
. It is important for Sri Lanka to 
maintain a reasonably competitive exchange rate in order to promote exports and attract 
more FDI into the country.   
Research findings of chapter seven indicate that foreign firms have superior 
characteristics that can benefit Sri Lanka. Econometric analysis also provided a strong 
indication of positive own firm effects of FDI. However, results of the econometric 
analysis indicate that foreign firms can have a negative spillover effect on productivity of 
local firms in the same sector. These findings have several implications. First, since 
foreign firms have superior characteristics that can benefit Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka should 
be gravely concerned on the poor penetration of foreign firms in most of the sectors. Sri 
Lanka should revisit its policies and encourage more FDI into the country, particularly 
into the sectors that are associated with high technology intensities. Although, this study 
shows that FDI could contribute positive own firm effects and negative spillover effects, 
it cannot provide assured judgement on the net effect of FDI. Although this initiative 
provides a much needed first step in this direction, due to limitations in the data used in 
this study, it would be important to validate and extend these findings by employing 
better data. However, limitation on data availability makes this difficult, at least for now, 
but improving data availability in future, possibly by carrying out more comprehensive 
surveys that collect firm level time series data could benefit immensely to ascertain firm 
level benefits of FDI. 
Sri Lanka‘s low national savings rate has led to a negative savings investment gap. In the 
past, this gap has been largely funded through foreign borrowing, which has led to a 
deteriorating external debt situation. Compared to foreign borrowing, FDI is a far better 
alternative for funding Sri Lanka‘s inherent savings investments gap. FDI can contribute 
to the host country capital formation directly and could also have an indirect crowding in 
effect on domestic capital formation (Agosin & Mayer, 2000; Bosworth, Collins, & 
Reinhart, 1999; Konings, 2000; Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998). Moreover, 
reliance on excessive borrowing can increase external vulnerability, particularly if it is 
financed by short term instruments such as bond investments. Therefore, Sri Lankan 
government should be less reliant on external borrowings by focusing its attention on 
attracting FDI.    
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Lack of comprehensive data on FDI projects and scarcity of research studies on FDI in 
Sri Lanka makes proper policy making difficult. Developed countries and even some 
developing countries have organisations that collect and disseminate FDI related data and 
these organisations play an active role in carrying out research on FDI. Board of 
investment in Sri Lanka is the only organisation associated with FDI and it makes a very 
limited contribution to these activities. Therefore, it is recommended that Sri Lanka 
should either create suitable organisations or strengthen BOI to carry out these tasks. 
Analysis of chapter three and four demonstrates that Sri Lanka has done a poor job in 
terms of progressing along the investment development path. It can be comprehended 
that Sri Lanka is still in stage one of the investment development path (IDP) with little 
participation in technology intensive sectors. As per the IDP theory, inward FDI plays a 
major role in upgrading local firms‘ competencies, which will enable the indigenous 
firms to later on undertake outward FDI (Dunning, 1981; United Nations, 2006; 
Dunning, Kim, & Lin, 2001; Dunning, 2003). Domestic firms build and upgrade their 
firm specific advantages mainly through the spillovers arising from foreign firms and 
competing with foreign firms. Sri Lanka‘s mediocre performance in attracting FDI, poor 
performance in attracting FDI into technology intensive sectors, and absence of positive 
spillovers from foreign firms to local firms may all have resulted in poor performance of 
local firms in terms of upgrading their firm specific capabilities. The goal of the national 
FDI policies are twofold. First a country should attract the right type of FDI. Second, the 
country should devise appropriate policies to extract benefits from it. It appears that Sri 
Lanka has performed poorly in both of these aspects, and this has in turn, deprived the 
country the much needed skills and technologies, and decelerated the development of the 
country.       
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8.4. Research Limitations and Future Research 
Although this study extends the literature on FDI in Sri Lanka and also the literature on 
FDI in general, there are a few limitations largely arising due to limited resources that 
were available for this study, particularly because of poor data availability. One limitation 
of the empirical study on the effect of war on FDI was the reliance on country specific 
explanatory variables in absence of an exhaustive set of sector specific explanatory 
variables. Except sector specific growth variable and industry dummies, all other 
explanatory variables were country specific. An exhaustive set of sector specific 
explanatory variables could not be included because of the unavailability of sector 
specific information. Another limitation associated with the time series study is the 
reliance on a limited number of observations. Number of observations were 33 for the 
total FDI and 29 for the FDI in manufacturing and FDI in services. This could to some 
extent undermine the reliability and generalizability of the results of the time series 
study.   
Panel data econometrics is usually considered superior to cross sectional econometrics. 
However, unavailability of panel data constrained me to use cross sectional data for 
assessing impact of FDI on firm level labour productivity. Although several tactical 
measures were taken to minimise the well-known limitations of using cross sectional 
econometrics, availability of panel data in future could help us to improve our 
understanding on this subject in the context of Sri Lanka. Also, recent studies on 
productivity spillovers use input-output tables to estimate vertical spillovers arising from 
forward and backward linkages. In future, if input-output tables are made available for 
Sri Lanka, then this could potentially be useful in estimating vertical spillovers of FDI in 
the context of Sri Lanka. 
Sri Lanka‘s unique features, such as having impressive development indicators while 
having weak growth indicators, were helpful to extend the literature on FDI by providing 
unique perspectives. However, these unique features could also limit the generalisability 
of the findings to other host countries. Therefore, it is important to test the findings of 
this thesis in other country settings, and if possible, to explore the propositions put 
forwarded in this study in the context of larger set of countries with the use of large 
cross-country datasets.   
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It is also important to analyse the post war FDI performance to understand how investors 
react after the end of a long period of conflict. It would also be interesting to assess the 
Phoenix effect, in which war devastated countries are expected to bounce back to high 
levels of growth and development rapidly. At the time of writing this thesis, only three 
years of post war data was available, and therefore, it is too early to explore any post war 
effects. Another related extension of this research could be to understand different home 
country experiences during war and post war periods. Some home countries, particularly 
countries associated with conflict, may be more comfortable investing in conflict zones 
than others. Therefore it would be interesting to analyze the effect of war on bilateral FDI 
flows to understand different home country experiences during war and post war periods. 
Another interesting potential future research theme is to analyze the effect of war on 
foreign direct divestments. As it was noted earlier, extent of foreign direct divestment 
that has occurred during the period of war is alarming. Moreover, our empirical analysis 
indicated that the effect of war on net FDI flows is much larger than its effect on gross 
FDI flows, probably indicating that war has resulted in divestments. Have these 
divestment lowered the social rate of return to investment much more than the 
elimination of the private rates of return to the firms that have divested? Future research 
could attempt to answer these questions.  
Contrast to previous findings, research findings of this thesis show that lower asset prices 
in the host country can augment FDI and vice versa in the context of less developed stock 
markets in which the degree of mispricing is high due to market inefficiency and higher 
degree of manipulation. However, this finding is based on data for handful of countries. 
This study could be extended to include large set of countries. However, this extension 
would require time series P/E ratios for large number of less developed markets, which is 
currently difficult to find because of lack of data for less developed markets. Future 
studies could attempt to construct a different proxy for market price levels for 
underdeveloped markets probably by using index movements or aggregating firm level 
valuations. 
This study carried out a preliminary investigation on how the regional context in which 
Sri Lanka operates can affect FDI inflows. It appears that regional integration within the 
South Asian region has yet failed to generate any tangible benefits to Sri Lanka, in 
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general, and in terms of boosting FDI flows. Given its geographical proximity to India - 
Sri Lanka lies 31 kilometers (19 miles) south east of India - that has emerged as a leading 
economy with growth rates of around 8% per annum; it is interesting to find out whether 
Sri Lanka can benefit from closer ties with India? Can FDI from India forge these ties 
given that the two countries share many attributes? Sri Lanka could largely benefit from 
its proximity to India, just as Hong Kong profits from being a trade hub to China. It 
would be important to find out whether Sri Lanka can benefit, particularly in terms of 
attracting FDI, through high degree of regional integration. 
Finally, this thesis relies completely on secondary data. There are couple of advantages 
of using secondary data. Secondary data usually comes from reliable sources, and data 
collection is often guided by experts, and therefore, such data is more reliable. Use of 
secondary data is often more economical and less time consuming compared to using 
primary data. However, secondary data is collected for a different purpose and therefore 
may not contain all required information to answer all desired research questions. These 
data limitations were highlighted in previous chapters and in this concluding chapter. 
Future researchers can address these limitations by designing and collecting their own 
data. Also, future research could also employ more qualitative research methodologies to 
validate the findings of this study. For example, it would be informative to know how the 
end of war has affected the mind set of foreign investors.  
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